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ABSTRACT

This dissertation seeks to provide an empirical evaluation of whether
scholars are justified in calling for the end of the transition paradigm, the

dominant model of democratization study among Comparative

My

thesis argues that the

among

predominant emphasis on elections and

transition theorists

transitions in the

Politics scholars.

is

institutions

largely ineffective in understanding democratic

former Soviet Union. To

test

my

thesis,

I

conduct qualitative

case studies of Ukraine and Russia that focus on the role of elections and

institutions in the transition process.

Under

the transitions model, one

would reasonably expect

the transition

process

in

each country to be relatively similar, given the similar timing and

manner

in

which elections and

institutions

were implemented, coupled w ith

strong geographic, cultural, and historic commonalities. Instead, both cases have

experienced highly divergent paths of development

v

w ith

varied levels of success.

This comprehensive study sheds serious doubt on the ability of the transitions

model

to accurately

comprehend

the

dynamics of democratic development

in

the

former Soviet Union. Though many scholars have criticized certain assumptions
or

components of the

transitions model,

few

if

any, have constructed a

comprehensive, empirical analysis of the transitions model on

vi

its

own

terms.
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CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION
Though America has long sought

to protect

democracy and encourage

its

spread,

have never been higher. With the end of the Cold War, America

the stakes in this pursuit

ascended as a unipolar world power

lh

in

contrast to the

2()

century

norm of bi-polar or

multi-polar international systems. Meanwhile, the pace of political, economic, social,

military,

and technological integration reached unprecedented

and more destructive forms of resistance
and widely dispersed international

America has
its

American power, including well-organized

terrorist organizations. Despite these obstacles,

a unique opportunity to use

historic aspirations to spread

to

new

levels giving rise to

its

power and influence

in a

way

that

freedom and democracy. At the same time,

can realize

this potential

has been put to the test with regime changes in Afghanistan and Iraq that raised doubts

over America’s ability

government.

to foster nation building

Now more

and indigenous desires for democratic

than ever, America must clearly understand the dynamics of

democratic development,

in

order to effectively promote democracy around the world.

Past scholars have astutely observed that

it

would be tedious

to chronicle a full

catalog of historic declarations that reflect the importance of promoting freedom and

democracy
the

in

American foreign policy making.

1

Still,

it

is

important to understand

how

promotion of liberty and democracy has been a dominant concern of American

foreign policy since the Founding. America’s fundamental premise for revolt

universal principles that placed liberty at the core.

of American government
interests

in a

The Founders understood

broad historical context

that

was

a set

of

the creation

went beyond the immediate

of the Founders and the national interests of the new nation. The Founders were

1

unsure

if popular

government could work, but

world would be better
as

off.

This

John Adams, who argued

is

evident

if successful, the

in the colonial

Founders were certain the

writings of many founders, such

that liberty held an unparalleled capacity for

development even though rulers often impeded the natural desire for

human

liberty as a

means of

control.'

Despite universal conceptions of liberty and oppression, America’s independence

was

fragile.

George Washington famously

to “steer clear

early

that

America’s true policy was

of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world.”

American foreign policy was

isolationist in rhetoric, the

term vision of America's future. This ambiguity

ambiguous

1796

stated in

figures,

rapid multiplication

Thomas

Jefferson,

would “cover

the

who

is

'

Though

Founders produced

a

long

evident in one of the era’s most

foresaw an “empire of liberty”

whole northern,

if

in

which our

not southern continent, with

people speaking the same language, governed by similar forms, and by similar laws.”

Conventional thinking toward democracy promotion began with

4

Woodrow

Wilson who expanded the objectives of American foreign policy making beyond an
“empire of liberty” to a world of democracy.

Wilson

felt

In contrast to past foreign policy doctrines,

American intervention abroad must have

a moral rationale, rather than being

solely based on our interests or the interests of our allies.

famous statement

that “the

world must be made safe for democracy.

planted upon the tested foundations of political liberty.”
“the moral climax of this the culminating and final

the Senate failed to ratify the

postwar world.

In this spirit

war

11

Its

Wilson stated

for

human

Wilson made the
peace must be
after the

liberty has

war

that

come,” but

League of Nations, which undercut Wilson's vision

Importantly, however, democracy remains a dominant theme of

for the

”

American foreign policy

to this day,

though

it

is

1

an open question whether democracy,

may

and freedom are interchangeable terms. Indeed, they

liberty,

coexist only uneasily

and under special, not universal, conditions.
Franklin Roosevelt sought to build America into “the great arsenal of democracy”

to

overcome “the

threat to our

democratic

s

faith.

America fought Fascism

politically,

with the Atlantic Charter, economically, with the Lend Lease Act, and militarily,

response to the attack on Pearl Harbor.

'

Roosevelt died a month before the war ended

and Harry Truman became President. The
deteriorated.

Once

again,

fragile

America assumed

political ideology that did not share

in

peace of allied leaders soon

a hostile posture

toward a contrasting

American values of freedom and democracy:

Communism.
The Truman Doctrine understood Communism
forcibly

imposed on the majority,” which

“relies

upon

as “the will of the minority

terror

and oppression, a controlled

press and radio, fixed elections, and the suppression of personal freedoms.”

Truman famously defined American

10

policy for the next generation: “I believe

the policy of the United States to support free peoples

who

subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.”

1

In 1947,

it

must be

are resisting attempted

This meant that whenever

and wherever a popular government was threatened by Communism, the United States

would supply

political,

economic, and military support.

1

'

Throughout the Cold War, subsequent Presidents created various national
programs

that

focused on democracy promotion.

Progress and National

Endowment

for

for Progress in 1961 to further political

Two

examples include the Alliance

Democracy. John
development

3

in

F.

Kennedy

Latin

for

created the Alliance

America around

the belief

that

“economic progress and social justice can be achieved by

framework of democratic

1

institutions.”

continent so as to provide “an

hand

hand.”

in

14

example

'

The goal of the Alliance was

to all the

world

development of democratic
In 1991, the Soviet

significantly discredited

is

to

within a

transform the

and progress walk

that liberty

Ronald Reagan created the National Endowment

around the belief that “freedom

men working

free

for

Democracy

in

1983

a universal aspiration that can be realized through the

institutions, procedures,

Union collapsed, which from

Communism

a

^

1

and values.”

Western perspective,

as an effective political ideology.

There was much

optimism surrounding the future of democracy around the world throughout the 1990’s.

As George

II.

W. Bush

long held promise of a

stated in 1991 the world can seize the opportunity “to fulfill the

new world

order where brutality will go unrewarded and

aggression will meet collective resistance.”"’ This opportunity can only be realized under

American leadership because of America’s unique moral and
“has

made America
The

transformed

the

beacon of freedom

terrorist attacks

on the World Trade Center

a

preemptive military approach,

a deliberate contrast to the reactive

w ith America’s

Taliban.

The search

fight for a

searching world.”

in

in

which

1

2001, fundamentally

how Americans and our government approached

W. Bush adopted

evident

in a

military standing,

national security.

George

what the administration claimed was

approach of the Clinton administration. This was

invasion of Afghanistan shortly after 9/1

for a democratic world, articulated

1

to

depose of the

by the elder Bush, gave way to a

democratic world, implemented by the younger Bush.

In the

Middle East, President Bush’s current approach

to

democracy promotion

focuses on the consequences of failure and the need to do whatever

4

it

takes to be

”

successful. This

evident

is

in the

2003 invasion of Iraq and the policy of using military

force to simultaneously initiate regime change and establish a popular government as a

model of democracy
clearly stated that

would be

for the

Middle

East. Despite obstacles, the

America must stay the course because

take the shape of increased

in his

If policy

form a platform

we do

not, “failure in Iraq

changes are necessary, these should

American military involvement

the ability of Iraqi security forces to

by George W. Bush

1N

United States.

a disaster for the

if

Bush administration

to better

for popular

enhance security and

government. As stated

Second Inaugural Address, such an approach would

simultaneously promote American interests and world peace:

We

are led,

The

best

by events and

common

sense, to

one conclusion: The survival of

our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty

liberty in

hope for peace

world ...

So

it

is

in

our world

the policy

is

in

Bush administration

is

14

predominantly military approach to regime change pursued by
in Iraq,

contemporary studies of comparative

called the transitions

political structures,

in

such as elections and

dynamic process

attained

all at

once

development or

political

to

democracy

model and emphasizes the establishment of democratic

comparative political scholarship

as a

the

to seek

development focus on government structures. This second approach
promotion

all

and support the growth
every nation and culture, with the

ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world.

the

other lands.

the expansion of freedom in

of the United States

of democratic movements and institutions

In contrast to the

in

who

institutions.

It

is

named

after a

group of scholars

collectively understand democratic

in contrast to earlier

after the establishment

development

understandings of democracy as something

of a number of prerequisites, such as economic

a civic culture.

Notable scholars

in this

group, such as Samuel Huntington and Guillermo

O’Donnell, emphasize the role of elections and institutions

in successful transitions.

particularly the idea that the sooner they are established, the better.

The Bush approach

and transition approach are not mutually exclusive and instead complement one another.
After overthrowing the Iraqi dictatorship with military force, American officials quickly

sought to establish democratic institutions and elections were lauded as significant
indicators of progress toward democratic governance.

As with

Iraq,

contemporary studies of comparative

political

development are

in

need of a new direction. The predominant emphasis on elections and institutions does not
sufficiently capture

how

in

many

parts

controlled, manipulated, or eroded

of the world these formal mechanisms are easily

by undemocratic trends and behaviors

extent that the effectiveness of the transitions approach

is

to

such an

called into question. Elections

and institutions are certainly an important part of democracy building, but mainstream
scholarship over-emphasizes the establishment of such structures to the point that the

process of implementation

is

often dismissed or overlooked, while other equally

important factors, such as rule of law and independent media, are often ignored. The

consequences of institutional implementation and ignorance of necessary
supports has led to variety of concepts to describe

many

institutional

countries that are stuck

somewhere between democracy and authoritarianism.
Past scholars have sought to create

dynamic or called
evaluation. This

for the

new

abandonment of the

work seeks

categories of democracy to capture this

transitions

to take the transitions

paradigm without empirical

approach head on by evaluating the

effectiveness of elections and institutions in promoting democracy.

comparative

political

Many

scholars of

development accept the establishment of elections and

6

institutions

as the foundation of democracy promotion efforts, yet there

or discussion as to

To be
its

fair to

why

that

is

how

and

it

the transitions approach, the

own words,

in

a region where

history, culture, language,

many

is

surprisingly

should come about. This

model should be

is

little

research

a serious concern.

tested with empirical rigor, in

other variables, such as timing, geography,

and religion are

similar.

To my knowledge, no

critical

evaluation of this nature has yet taken place.

My

research question asks:

Have

elections

promoting political and economic development

and institutions been

in the

former Soviet Union?

argues that the predominant emphasis on elections and institutions
scholars

is

highly effective in

among

My

thesis

transition

largely ineffective in understanding democratic transitions in the former

Soviet Union and thus, hinders efforts to promote democracy. If the emphasis on
elections and institutions of the transitions approach

development

in

is

justified, then

democratic

Ukraine and Russia would be relatively successful and similar

case because elections and institutions were established and functioning early

transition process.

are ineffective

transitions

If,

on the other hand, development experiences

and divergent than the emphasis on elections and

in

in

each

in the

Ukraine and Russia

institutions in the

approach should be reconsidered.

In contrast to Latin

Eastern Europe

America, Africa, and the Middle East, the authoritarian rule of

was undertaken by

a single

regime with remarkably similar character and

terms of creation, implementation, consolidation, and collapse. Within the

timing

in

region,

two countries have shared

a particularly close historical connection:

Russia. This connection dates back to the

9'

1
'

century

when

Eastern Slavs settled to form

the powerful state of Kievan Rus along the Dnieper River in

7

Ukraine and

modem

Kiev.

Over

the next

14 centuries, the development of Ukraine and Russia shared

many

social

including ethnicity, language, culture, and religion. Today, a flight from

is

considered domestic, while

still

many Ukrainian

consider themselves an important partner,

historical, political,

citizens in Eastern

if

commonalities

Moscow

to

Kiev

and Southern Ukraine

not a part, of Russia.

The numerous

and social characteristics shared by Ukraine and Russia make these

two countries optimal cases
development since the

fall

to

measure the degree and dynamics of democratic

of the Soviet Union

institutions in a relatively similar

manner

in

1991

at relatively

.

Both established elections and

the

same

time.

This work focuses on five transition scholars: Samuel Huntington, Guillermo

O'Donnell, Phillippe Schmitter, Juan Linz, and Alfred Stepan.

works of these authors, two core perspectives emerge.

In

First, all

examining the seminal

provide relatively similar

understandings of functioning democracy that center on the electoral process. Huntington
adopts Joseph Schumpeter’s definition of democracy: a political system
the extent the

is

democratic to

most powerful collective decision makers are selected through periodic,
11

competitive elections with widespread voter eligibility."

O’Donnell and Schmitter

state that “the establishment

of certain rules of regular,

formalized political competition deserved priority attention by scholars and
1

practitioners.”"

The authors understand functioning democracy

where government authority

is

to

be a

political

system

derived from obligatory adherence to collective decision

making procedures and due process

is

enjoyed by

all citizens.""

Linz and Stepan offer a

multi-dimensional understanding of functioning democracy in which the public and

government accept democratic procedures and
and resolve

2

conflict.

'

institutions as the sole

means

to

govern

All three of these perspectives place democratic elections.

8

”

collective decision making, and related democratic rights and procedures

at

the forefront

of functioning democracy.
Second,
transitions.

all

emphasize

Huntington

institutions in successfully consolidating democratic

states that “all

democratic regimes the principal officers of

government are chosen through competitive elections
can participate. Democratic systems thus have a
establishes their identity .”

transition cases

movements,

is

-4

O’Donnell and Schmitter

“the extent to

which representative

interest associations,

to all

which the bulk of the population

common

institutional core that

state that an important

element

in

institutions- political parties, social

autonomous agencies,

survived from the period prior to authoritarian rule.”

common

in

2>

local

governments- have

“If there

our cases,” O'Donnell and Schmitter explain,

is

“it is

one characteristic
the omnipresent fear,

during the transition, and often long after political democracy has been installed, that a

coup

will

be attempted and succeed.”

that habituation to the

developed.
All three

A

-1
'

Linz and Stepan state that “consolidation requires

norms and procedures of democratic

high degree ol institutional routinization

is

of these perspectives emphasize establishing an

a

conflict regulation be

key part of such a process.

institutional core as a

democratic identity, the preservation of past legacies of representative

newly established avenues of institutional routinization

in

form of

institutions,

and

successfully consolidating

democratic governance.
Valerie Bunce, Michael McFaul, and

scholars

who have begun

to categorize

and

Thomas Carothers

criticize aspects

are a few prominent

of transition theories. This

has been met with resistance by transition scholars. In “In Partial Defense of an

Evanescent Paradigm,” O’Donnell questions

that

9

such an approach even exists

-

considering that transitions scholarship

that

is

a large and diverse

body of work/ The

O'Donnell does not actively consider himself a “transitologist” does not

mean

that either category

transitions approach

is

invalid, nor

exempt from

fact

in itself

The

classification or criticism.

large and diverse, but several prominent scholars within the

is

approach share certain basic core perspectives that justify the category.

O’Donnell may have forgotten about former coauthor
clearly described the

and Karl

Phillipe Schmitter

development of “transitology” with Terry Karl

state that the

widespread

political

change

in

the third

in

who

1994. Schmitter

wave of democratization

was accompanied by “the gradual and unobtrusive development of two proto-sciences:
transitology and consolidology.

applying a universalistic

set

The claim of these embryonic subdisciplines

Niccolo Machiavelli

Machiavelli was the

first

is

way from

modest.”

’"

“warned

“the founder and patron saint of transitology” because

great political theorist to “recognize the specific problematics

its

that the potential contribution

Hence, according

was bom “with limited

by

an autocratic to a democratic

and dynamics of regime change,” gave to transitology
uncertainty, and

that

of assumptions, concepts, and hypotheses, they together can

explain and hopefully help to guide the

regime.”

is

to

fundamental principle of

of the discipline would always be

prominent, self-proclaimed transitologists, transitology

scientific pretension

and marked

exactly this lack of scientific concern that this

1

practical concerns.’”

work seeks

It

is

to address.

O'Donnell defends the electoral emphasis of transition scholars on the grounds
that

genuinely free and

turn, the

fair elections

require certain fundamental political freedoms. In

combination of regular elections and relevant freedoms marks a significant

departure from authoritarian rule.

'

This mistakenly assumes that

10

all

freedoms

that

guarantee a free and

fair election

environment. Free and

process will produce a democratic electoral

fair elections regularly

occur

in

countries that do not necessarily

have democratic electoral environments because of government restrictions on freedoms
such as press, speech, assembly, and expression. Are these countries
Either way, elections can be

deemed

free

and

fair

role in democratic

democracies?

by international observers, yet

significantly tainted by limited freedoms, corruption,

This suggests that free and

still

fair elections in

still

be

and violence.

themselves may have

a

more limited

development than suggested by O'Donnell and other proponents of an

election-centered approach to transitions. Elections have certainly been a central pail of

American governance dating back

to the Election

power between

world history. In

political parties in

however, elections have had
in

the

Western

tradition.

1

little,

no, or different

do not question

of 1800, the

many

first

peaceful transition of

other parts of the world,

meanings than commonly understood

that elections

and

institutions can play an

important role in development, but instead seek to create greater dialogue about exactly

what

roles elections

and

institutions

have played

in the

development process and what

other factors are necessary for effective development to be best understood.

1

conclude

that scholars

of comparative political development need to reorient

predominant understandings of transitions away from election-centered,

institution-

centered models of democratic development toward a multifaceted approach that
incorporates the lessons of the

last fifteen

we must determine what should
institutions in understanding

label these considerations

years of post Soviet development.

.

Essentially,

be more seriously considered aside from elections and

how

a country can

move toward

a functioning

"environments" and develop seven that are w orth

democracy.

1

consideration:

I

)

popular environment; 2) historical-cultural environment; 3)

international environment; 4) institutional environment; 5) legal environment; 6)

economic environment:

environment. Environments are chosen to distinguish

7) civil

development that are

different aspects of democratic

static,

yet must be sustainable to be

effective.

The following research

is

divided into four main sections. The

first

section

introduces the project and discusses the development of the transitions approach to

democracy promotion

in

comparative political scholarship. The second section provides

detailed case study of Ukrainian development.

The

third section provides a detailed case

study of Russian development. The final section provides conclusions on

case studies

fit

a

how

well the

with the thesis statement and provides suggestions for where democratic

scholarship should go from here.

1

create ten indicators to

democratic development.

When

measure the effectiveness of elections
effective, elections fundamentally

and legitimate transition of power. Indicators of an effective

in

promoting

promote the peaceful

electoral process include

holding frequent elections, high voter turnout, popular candidate selection, effective
oversight procedures to resolve electoral disputes, low levels of fraud, low levels of
violence, wide acceptance of results, low levels of media favoritism, ideological variance

among

candidates, and candidates that represent stable and principled parties. These

indicators seek to cover informal and formal aspects of the electoral process.

I

create five indicators to

measure the effectiveness of democratic

promoting democratic development.

When

institutions in

effective, democratic institutions

fundamentally promote stable and representative government. Indicators of effective

12

institutional operation include the establishment

of a democratic constitution, low levels

of corruption, low levels of violence, wide acceptance of the

political system,

and

a

meaningful role for the opposition. These indicators consider both formal and informal
aspects of institutional development and operation.

The former Soviet Union

is

fairly

unique compared to other third-wave transitions

because post-Soviet transitions consist of three simultaneous transformations:

economic, and

must address

social.

this

As

a result,

political,

comprehensive studies of post-Soviet development

multi-dimensional nature. In turn,

1

create five indicators to measure the

effectiveness of institutions in promoting capitalist development.

When

effective,

democratic institutions fundamentally promote stable and sustained economic growth.
Indicators of effective institutional operation include a rising gross domestic product, a

balanced budget, significant privatization of state owned industries, rising wages, and
rising foreign direct investment.

that

measure basic health of a developing economy.

When
is

These indicators focus on macroeconomic indicators

all

indicators are present in a respective category, the development process

considered exceptional. Conversely, lower percentages correspond with lower levels of

effectiveness. If a percentage of effectiveness in a case study falls

category will be considered highly ineffective

The

scale

of effectiveness

is

in

below 60%, the

promoting their respective objectives.

as follows:

69%

•

Scores between

60%

•

Scores between

70% and 79%

will

be considered moderately effective.

•

Scores between

80%

and

89%

will

be considered effective.

•

Scores between

90%

and

and

1

will be considered ineffective.

00%
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will

be considered highly effective.

These twenty indicators and the corresponding scale of effectiveness
significant light

since the

fall

transitions

on the effectiveness of elections and

of the Soviet Union.

model

is

Still,

Ukraine and Russia

there are areas for improvement. First, the

understood through five major transition theorists that combined

form some of the most important works

ofBunce and McFaul, who have
light

institutions in

shed

will

in the

to

approach. This seeks to build on the works

reflected a certain assertions of transition scholars in

of post-Soviet development, and Carothers

who

called for the

transitions model, without clearly identifying the contours

abandonment of the

of the model and

its

proponents. Future works can further develop this foundation for understanding the

transitions

model by expanding the breadth and depth of what

is

presented. Second, the

case studies rely heavily on election and economic reports from the Organization for
Security and Cooperation

in

Europe and the World Bank because there were

the

most

frequent and detailed. Future works could incorporate comprehensive reports from other

NGO’s and

systematically incorporate social indicators, such

life

expectancy and

population growth, into the study.

Scholars of democratic development are currently met with a certain level of
disdain in American society.

democracy by force

in parts

Many

resist the idea that

America should be establishing

of the world that are unaccustomed to American occupation

and norms of popular government. Historically, however, the peaceful, as well as violent,
pursuit and promotion of political principles, such as liberty, and particular forms of

14

government, such as democracy, have been
generations.

The question

that

emerges

is

where

Given America's unique position as
globalization, the use of American

major

a

to

about the future of democratic development

it

consequences of failure are heightened. This

of American foreign policy

world superpower

prestige

is

in

an era of

uniquely important. In thinking

becomes abundantly

is

clear that the

not because non-democracies, such as

Iraq, will necessarily

become safe-havens

globally dispersed

unprecedented levels due to electronic media and the

turn, instant

at

for terrorists, but because information

knowledge of American missteps and

nor so damaging

for

go from here.

the sole

power and

part

to the basic national objectives

failures has never

of promoting

free

is

internet. In

been so widespread,

governments and

economies.

Now more

than ever, scholars of comparative political development need to think

of new and effective ways

emerged

to explain the

myriad of development scenarios

that

have

since Rustow developed the transitions approach that Huntington and others

pioneered for over

thirty years.

The predominant emphasis on

that has persisted throughout this

democracy proponents

in

in the

time has silently become core perspectives of many

and out of academia and government.

will create greater dialogue

perspectives

elections and institutions

If successful, this

work

over the usefulness and effectiveness of these basic

hopes of forging new and better perspectives

and timely area of study.
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in this

very important

.
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Political Science

CHAPTER

II

THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRANSITOLOGY AM)
The

current

Comparative
that the

body of scholarship

Politics

is

examines democratic development

that

called “transitology.” This

study of democratic transitions

political scholarship that

it

is

ITS CRITICS
in

name was developed around

so important to the

the belief

work of comparative

needs a separate category with a distinct name. The focus of

scholarship on democratic development over the

last

notion of transition. The placement of transitions

at the forefront

democratic development began

in

three decades has centered

upon

the

of understanding

1970 with Dankwart Rustow. Prior

to

Rustow,

scholarship on democratic development centered upon the notion that democracy

developed from certain prerequisites
and Sidney Verba

(

that

enabled democracy to emerge. Gabriel

Almond

1963) argued that a civic culture was necessary for democracy to

develop. Civic culture was defined as a pluralistic culture that places communication and

persuasion

at

the heart of the political process.

democracy emerges

in a civic culture

societies, while effectively balancing

Seymour

Lipset

(

because

According
this culture

to

Almond and Verba,

promotes consensus

in diverse

moderation with desires for change.

1959) focused on the economies of developing nations, rather

than cultures, claiming that democracy could have multiple prerequisites, rather than just

one. Lipset argued that national unity and

economic affluence were two preconditions of

democracy. Economic development allows democracy
middle class

w idespread

that

to

emerge by creating

can influence the political values of economic

elites,

which promotes

acceptance of democratic norms, such as economic redistribution.
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a large

Walt Rostow

(

1960) was a prestigious economist

who

also believed that

economic development must occur before democratic development can occur. Rostow
constructed a model of democratic development based on five stages of economic

growth. In the

first

stage of Traditional Society, political organization

is

and clan relationships and subsistence agriculture dominates economic
second stage. Preconditions for Takeoff emerge, such as a

based on family

activity.

rise in the rate

In the

of investment

and the development of one or more substantial manufacturing sectors. Takeoff

is

defined as an industrial revolution in which economic growth becomes a normal part of

social activity.

Approximately 50 years

after takeoff, there

is

a

Drive

to Maturity’ in

which the society masters modern technologies and the corresponding increase
of life produces

Consumption

,

political moderation. In the final stage, called th e

citizens begin to manipulate the physical

in quality

Age of High Mass

environment

for

economic

advantage and a large middle class develops.

Rostow argued

that all

democracies must pass through these

sequence. In turn, every society faces a similar

and

political

set

of choices

in the

five stages in

process of economic

development, which relevant scholars termed “modernization.” Modern

nations were considered to have capitalist economies and democratic political systems.

Modernization scholars sought
better understanding

to both explain

and promote democratic development by

what conditions were necessary for democracy

to

develop.

Modernization scholars incorporated many disciplines into understanding development
including Anthropology, Sociology, and Psychology.

The notion of democratic
1960’s and early 1970’s from a

pre-requisites

came under

new wave of graduate

18

fire

throughout the

late

students and young scholars

who

studied under modernization scholars. According to

Howard Wiarda

(2002), criticisms

included ethnocentrism, ignorance of how international events influenced domestic

politics,

exclusion of class and power relations, misunderstanding of indigenous

institutions

sequence

in

increasing

throughout the world, and misunderstanding of the role of timing and

democratic development. America’s involvement

number of field

studies led to

more

critical analysis

in

Vietnam and an

of American policy and

scholarship on political development. In 1968, Samuel Huntington’s Political Order in

Changing Societies was
economic growth and

the

first

in

Comparative

Politics to

social mobilization can upset national traditions

just as easily as these factors can

fits-all

major work

argue that rapid

and create chaos,

produce modernization. Consequently, the one-size-

understanding of democratic development, which sought to understand and

duplicate Western experiences on the rest of the world,

In 1970,

was

cast in serious doubt.

Dankwart Rustow transformed predominant understandings of

democratic development away from prerequisites toward more dynamic understandings
of political change. Rustow argued

move

that

democratic development

is

a process that can

forward, toward lasting democratic reform, as well as backward, toward repressive

government. Conceptually, Rustow understood a transition as a circular relationship

between democratic development and democratic regression, rather than
linear progression

from economic development

to

a universally

democratic development. In turn, the

democratic transitions need not be geographically, temporally, or socially uniform.

Huntington propelled Rustow's focus on transitions
with the article “Will

into a

More Countries Become Democratic?”

new body of theory

In the article, Huntington

claimed that scholars of prerequisites often confuse the correlation of democracy and

19

other economic, social, cultural, and psychological factors with conclusions that these
factors necessarily produce

political factors

same

democracy. Huntington also shared Rustow’s concern that

had been overlooked

time, Huntington did not

want

in

approaches that focus on prerequisites. At the

to completely

abandon previous democratic

scholarship.

Huntington argued

number of factors”

that “the

emergence of democracy

and cultural.” These factors include:

2) the absence

of extreme inequalities

in

1

)

higher levels of economic well-being;

wealth and income; 3) greater social pluralism,

including particularly a strong and autonomous bourgeoisie; 4) a

economy;

5) greater societal influence

that is less monistic

scholars

who

helped by a

“can be grouped into four broad categories- economic, social,

that

1

external,

in a society is

from existing democratic

more market-orientated
states;

and more tolerant of diversity and compromise.

2

and 6)

a culture

In contrast to earlier

focused on preconditions, Huntington argued that “with the possible

exception of a market economy, no single precondition
(democratic) development.”

'

is

necessary to produce

Huntington claimed that the optimism of the 1950’s, which

looked favorably upon the prospects of democratic development around the world,
returned in the 1980’s with greater caution and less naivety.

4

Political

developments

in

Southwestern Europe produced significant democratic transformation, which gave hope
that similar

developments would follow.

Huntington sought

and

in

doing

studied in

so,

more

to

examine

the extent to

provided several reasons as
detail. First, the correlation

to

which

this

new optimism was justified

why democratic

transitions should be

between democracy and individual

liberty

very high. Second, the more democracy prevails around the world, the more congenial

20

is

the world environment will be to

American

interests

and the future of American

democracy. Third, the increasing trend toward global interdependence

will not allow a

part-democratic, part-authoritarian existence for long. Fourth, the extension or decline of

democracy has implications
stability,

and social

These arguments

for other social values, such as

justice, that

laid the

comparative scholars

Americans tend

economic growth,

to believe are

political

normatively desirable.

foundation for normative perspectives of subsequent

who

focus on democratic transitions.

Huntington created four phases

to describe

Joseph Schumpeter’s definition of democracy: a

democratic development and adopted

political

system

is

democratic to the

extent the most powerful collective decision

makers are selected through periodic,

competitive elections with widespread voter

eligibility.

in

Huntington was most interested

understanding the fate of democratic transitions over time. The

1820 and witnessed democratic expansion

in colonial

first

phase began

in

America, Northern Europe,

Western Europe, and British dominions. Expansion peaked

in

1920, which led to a

second phase of democratic retrenchment, where democratic trends were extinguished

Germany,

Italy,

The

Austria, Poland, Spain, Brazil, and Japan.

third

phase of democratic development was a short-lived

democracies which began
established

in

democracy

in

in

1942 and ended

West Germany,

in

boom of new'

1953. During this phase,

Austria, Italy,

American

and Japan, while former

colonies, such as India, Israel, and the Philippines, experienced significant democratic

advancements. According to Huntington, “the fourth period

in the

evolution of

democratic regimes," which lasted from 1953 to 1984, was different from the other three
in that

there

was no dominant trend of democratic extension

21

or retrenchment.

"

Thus, the

number of democratic regimes expanded
and then expanded again

in the late

shrunk

in the 1950’s,

in the

mid

to late 1960’s,

1970's and early 1980’s. After examining

this

record

of democratic development, Huntington concluded that optimism toward the prospects of

democratic development was justified, though the future of democratic expansion

is

uncertain.

The Third Wave

development with
development

in

which appears
According

to

a

(

1991

)

tightened up Huntington’s earlier “phases” of democratic

more concise metaphor. Huntington chose

to discuss

democratic

terms of waves to capture the global pattern of democratic retrenchment,

to follow

each major phase of democratic expansion

in

world history.

Huntington, the world experienced three global waves of democratic

development. The

first

wave of democratic expansion

(

1

829-1929) was rooted

the

in

French and American Revolution and witnessed the gradual development of democratic
institutions in

European countries throughout the 19

1942) shifted

away from democracy and returned

or introduced

mass based,

brutal

lh

The reverse wave 1922-

century.

(

to traditional

forms of authoritarian rule

and pervasive forms of authoritarianism

like

Mussolini

in Italy.

The second wave of democratic expansion
liberation

of oppressed countries

in

World War

promoted the development of democratic
Japan, and Korea.

(

1943-1962) was rooted

West Germany,

The reverse wave 1958-1975) witnessed

1974-present)

(

first

manifested

a

second

Italy, Austria,

shift

from

largely took place in Latin America.

itself in

Latin America, Asia, and Eastern Europe.

in the

furthered by allied occupation, and

institutions in

democracy toward authoritarianism, which

wave

II,

(

The

third

Southern Europe, and then swept across

As can be seen

in figure

1

and figure

2, the

”

phases of democratic development constructed by Huntington

waves constructed by Huntington

not identical, to the

Waves

1984

1991
1:

Fi»ure2:

st

Democratic Expansion
(1829-1920)

1

Phase

3:

4:

Wave: Democratic Expansion

Reverse Wave: Democratic

2:

(1922-1942)

(

Phase

Development

of Democratic

(1820-1920)

Democratic Retrenchment
Retrenchment 1920-1942)
Phase

1984 are similar, though

1991.

in

Figure 1:
Phases of Democratic Development

Phase

in

IKl

Wave: Democratic Expansion

Democratic Expansion
(1942-1953)

2

Expansion/Retrenchment

Reverse Wave: Democratic

(1943-1962)

Retrenchment (1953-1984)

(1958-1975)
ul

3

Wave: Democratic Expansion
(

Since Huntington’s book,

many

1974-Present)

scholars have sought to prevent a reverse

wave of

democratic retrenchment by better understanding the consolidation aspect of the
transition process/'

transitions

Huntington defines a “wave of democratization” as “a group of

from nondemocratic

to

democratic regimes that occurs within a specified

period and that significantly outnumbers transitions in the opposite direction

period.”

According

to the Huntington,

“between 1974 and 1990 more than

in the

same

thirty

countries in southern Europe, Latin America, East Asia, and Eastern Europe shifted from

authoritarian to democratic systems of government.

s

Huntington described

development as a “global democratic revolution” and “the most important
of the

late

twentieth century.”

4

this

political trend

Rather than focusing on the cause of the third wave.
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which

“how

is

“complex and peculiar

third

to that

wave,” Huntington was most concerned with

wave democratizations occurred:

the

ways

in

which

political leaders

and

publics in the 1970’s and 1980’s ended authoritarian systems and created democratic

ones.

„io

What should
democratic identity

be the focus in studying democratic consolidations? For Huntington,

is

based on elections and

institutions.

“All democratic regimes the principal officers of government are chosen through

competitive elections

systems thus have a

in

which the bulk of the population can

common

participate.

Democratic

institutional core that establishes their identity.

Authoritarian regimes- as the term

is

used

study- are defined simply by the

in this

absence of this institutional core.”"
In

understanding

how

best to

implement functioning elections and

non-democratic systems.

transition scholars, such as Huntington, begin with classifying

According

to

Huntington, non-democratic regimes have historically taken

forms, which varied depending on the particular

institutions,

wave of democratization.

many

different

In the first

wave, non-democratic regimes “were generally absolute monarchies, lingering feudal
aristocracies,

and the successor

states to continental empires.”

democratic regimes were “fascist
1

dictatorships.”

’

military regimes,

In the

imposition.”

a

In the third

In the

second wave, non-

and personalistic military

wave, non-democratic regimes are one-party systems,

and personal dictatorships.

most recent wave, “one-party systems were created by revolution or Soviet

14

In these

systems, access to power

monopoly of power and

primarily

states, colonies,

1-

communist

is

controlled by “the party,” which holds
1

legitimates

countries.

its

rule through ideology.

One-party systems are

Military regimes “were created by coups d'etat replacing

democratic or civilian governments.”

16

In these regimes, the military exercised

24

power by

ruling as a junta in conjunction with sonic existing

government leaders or distributing top

government positions among top generals. Military regimes are primarily found

in

America. Personal dictatorships are distinguishable by an individual leader

who

is

source of authority, so that power

dependence

and support from the leader .”

on,

1

is

dependent on “access

to,

closeness

to,

Latin

the

Examples include Spain under Francisco Franco,

Philippines under Ferdinand Marcos, India under Indira Ghandi, and

the

Romania under

Nicole Ceausescu. Huntington concludes that “one-party systems, military regimes, and
personal dictatorships suppressed both competition and participation.”

After classifying non-democratic regimes, Huntington classified different types of

transitions. In

on

doing

so,

transition processes.

was

largely a product

in the third

power took

According

to

Huntington, democratization

of foreign imposition and decolonization,

wave was “overwhelmingly indigenous .”

analytical purposes

One

Huntington compares the role of external forces

it

is

is

“replacement.” Replacement

A

w hereas

democratization

111

Huntington states that “for

“transformation.” Transformation

the lead in bringing about

22

second wave

in the

useful to group the cases into three broad types of processes .”

type of transition

democracy .”

to internal forces

third type

is

democracy .”

21

A

is

“when

elites in

second type of transition

“when opposition groups took

of transition

is

20

is

the lead in bringing about

“transplacement.” Transplacement

is

“when

democratization resulted largely from joint action by government and opposition
groups.

,,

2^

The common theme
Huntington, “almost

all

in different

types of transitions

is

negotiation.

transitions, not just transplacement, involved

explicit or implicit, overt or covert

According

some

negotiation-

- between government and opposition groups .""

25

to

4

In

"

the third wave, “the crucial participants” in transition processes

liberal reformers,

and democratic reformers

moderates and revolutionary extremists

in the

were “the standpatters,

governing coalition, and democratic
^

in the opposition.”

.”"
three crucial interactions in democratization processes

6

Participants

engaged

in “the

These crucial interactions

occurred “between government and opposition, between reformers and standpatters

governing coalition, and between moderates and extremists

in the opposition .”

in the

27

After classifying non-democratic regimes, types of transitions, key players, and

transition processes,

Huntington discussed the relationship between the nature of

authoritarian regimes and the nature of the transition process. Transitions from military

regimes were characterized by transformation and transplacement.

regimes instigated regime change

power would be returned

Commonly,

military

of public pressure, rarely defined

in the face

themselves as permanent leaders, and stated

N

that

to political leaders. In

once the

doing

political situation

so, military leaders

was corrected

demanded

guarantees upon relinquishing power: a promise of no legal consequences for their
actions and respect for the institutional

transition process

to

made

it

autonomy of the

“relatively easy for military rulers to

resume professional military roles .”

military leaders to return to

29

At the same time,

power when exigencies and

''

In

it

their

Transformation and transplacement were also the
one-party systems.

As

military.

a result, the

withdraw from power and

was

also “relatively easy for

own

common

interests warranted.”'"

transition types for

one-party systems the party and the state were interwoven. This

created institutional and ideological obstacles in transitions to democracy. Institutionally,

the regular

armed forces had

to be “depoliticized.”

party defined the identity of the state.” " This

26

’"

meant

Ideologically, “the ideology of the

that “opposition to the party

-

amounted

to treason to the state.

risk its control

system.” °

any other

” 4

To

democratize, “the monopolistic party places

of government and becomes one more party competing

When

complete, the “former monopolistic party

political

According

group
to

to reinstate

is in

an authoritarian system .”'

no

in a

at

multiparty

better position than

6

Huntington, transitions from one-party systems are more difficult to

consolidate than transitions from military regimes because of the ideological obstacles, in
addition to the institutional obstacles. At the

systems are more likely to be permanent,
In transitions

if

same

time, transitions from one-party

completed, because of the ideological change.

from personal dictatorships, dictators rarely give up power voluntarily and

seek to maintain political power as long as possible.
typical transition process for transitions

As

a result, replacement

is

the

from personal dictatorships. Sometimes

replacement was the product of the violent overthrow of the dictator.
Several important observations emerge

in

’

7

examining the w orks of Samuel

Huntington. Huntington was instrumental in facilitating scholarly focus on the transition
process of democratic development, in contrast to the predominant literature focused on

prerequisites,

historical

for

w hy

and placed the study of democratic transitions within

development. In doing

the

for

broad view of

Huntington clearly articulated a normative position

greater study of democratic development

scholars in the subsequent

model

so,

a

is

desirable that

was adopted by many

body of literature. Huntington’s approach became an important

understanding and promoting democratic development

w ith

an emphasis on

two basic systematic components of functioning democracies, elections and

institutions.
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In 1986, for example, Guillermo

O’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter edited and co-

authored a seminal multi-set volume entitled Transitions

According

to the authors, the “eventual consolidation

per se a desirable goal.”

In turn, “the establishment

'

From

Authoritarian Rule.

of political democracy constitutes
of certain rules of regular,

formalized political competition deserved priority attention by scholars and
34

practitioners.”

O'Donnell and Schmitter seek “to capture the extraordinary uncertainty of the
transition, with

numerous surprises and

its

difficult

dilemmas.”

40

Given

that transitional

regimes, especially those from authoritarian rule, are very different from established

political

regimes so

“normal science methodology”

that

is

not appropriate.

As

a result,

scholars are unable to rely on “stable economic, social, cultural, and partisan categories to

identify, analyze,

and evaluate the

quo and those struggling
According

makes

it

to

to

identities

and strategies of those defending the

reform or transform

status

41

it.”

O’Donnell and Schmitter, the uncertainty

that

permeates transitions

“almost impossible to specify ex ante which classes, sectors, institutions, and

other groups will take what role, opt for which issues, or support what alternative”

because “most-

if not all-

of those ‘standard’ actors are

likely to be divided

and hesitant

about their interests and ideals and, hence, incapable of coherent collective action.”

a result, transitions

concepts,

from authoritarian rule “should be analyzed with distinctly

however vaguely delineated and

authors argued that this

is

difficult to pin

down

they

may

be.”

42

political
4

The

not “a denial of the long-run casual impact of ‘structural’

(including macroeconomic, world systematic and social class) factors.”

approach recognizes “the high degree of indeterminacy embedded

28

44

As

Rather, the

in situations

where

unexpected events fortuna), insufficient information, hurried and audacious choices,
{

confusion about motives and interests, plasticity, and even indefinition of political
identities, as well as the talents

determining the outcomes.”

of specific individuals

(virtu), are frequently

4"

O’Donnell and Schmitter define “transition” as “the
regime and another.”

4

"

Transitions typically begin

“legitimation problems.”

decisive in

Between World War

1

when

between one

interval

political

authoritarian regimes face

and World War

11,

example,

for

authoritarian rulers sought to legitimate their regimes by portraying themselves as “as the

best possible

modes of governance

for their societies, especially

impotent and divided parliamentary democracies elsewhere

when compared

Europe and

in

to the

This was done by “mobilizing

prepotent and monolithic regime in the Soviet Union.”

imagery of Fascism and references to more traditional forms of corporatism.”
After the demise of Fascism
authoritarian regimes

in

1945, legimitation

to

was more challenging. As

became “ideologically schizophrenic.”

4

*

In other

48

a result,

words, such

regimes practiced dictatorship and repression, while promising democracy and freedom

sometime

in

the future. This creates situations where “the often haphazard attempts of

these regimes at institutionalizing themselves clash with the limits imposed by their

discourse.’

00

As

a result, the

stamp of the regime “opens the ideological space within

which they can express what often becomes
the authoritarian regime and

Once

its

their

fundamental demand: the removal of

replacement by a democratic one.”"

the authoritarian regime “opens,”

of world history, believe

who

that the perpetuation

29

1

two groups of political

central to the transition process. Hard-liners “are those

this period

own

actors

become

contrary to the consensus of

of authoritarian rule

is

possible

and desirable.’

02

This

is

undertaken through outright rejection of democracy or “erecting

some facade behind which they can maintain

inviolate the hierarchical

and authoritarian

1

nature of their power.”'' According to O’Donnell and Schmitter, “the main core of the

hard-liners

is

formed by those who

reject viscerally the "cancers’

democracy and who believe they have

and "disorders’ of

a mission to eliminate all traces of such

pathologies from political life.” Ironically, this

is

the

same view

that

O’Donnell,

Schmitter, and other transition scholars have toward authoritarianism, seeing

it

(rather

than democracy) as a ""cancer” or “disorder” that must be eliminated from political

Soft-liners

acts

“may

be equally disposed to use repression and to tolerate the arbitrary

of the appropriate ministry or security agency,” but soft-liners are increasingly aware

that the

regime they helped establish

legimitation in the near future.

is

life.

4

will

Timing

0 The more

is

to

make

use of some form of electoral

very important

in

determining

if legimitation

regime cannot wait too long before reintroducing

feasible. Soft-liners believe that “the

certain freedoms.”

have

time that passes, the less likely moderate segments of the

domestic opposition and international public opinion will support the regime.
Transitional openings can take

many

Schmitter, a military defeat has been the

A

second type of opening

democracy.”
politics is

"

Most

is

forms. According to O'Donnell and

most frequent type of opening

“occupation by a foreign power which was

recently, the

most

common form

in recent decades.

itself a political

of opening in contemporary

domestic, internal resistance.

Like Huntington, O’Donnell and Schmitter are heavily concerned with
institutions.

According

cases

extent to

is ""the

to

O’Donnell and Schmitter, an important element

which representative

in transition

institutions- political parties, social

30

movements,

interest associations,

autonomous agencies,

local

governments- have

survived from the period prior to authoritarian rule.”" This reflects

development

in the cases

how democratic

they examine, primarily from Latin America and Southern

Europe, was typically a cyclical process between military-controlled authoritarianism and
democratization. “If there

Schmitter explain,

political

“it is

is

one characteristic

common

to all our cases,”

O'Donnell and

the omnipresent fear, during the transition, and often long after

democracy has been

installed, that a

coup

Thus, the primary challenge of democratization

is

will

be attempted and succeed.”

5*

“coaxing the military out of power and

inducing them to tolerate a transition toward democracy .”"

4

O'Donnell and Schmitter are “guardedly optimistic about the prospects for
controlling the behavior of those within the

democracy,” but acknowledge
on whether some

armed

that “the success

forces

to

come

to interim

agreements on rules and mutual guarantees .”

O'Donnell and Schmitter define a pact as “an

among

may depend even more

have the imagination, the courage,

a result, “pacts” are central to stabilizing the vast uncertainty

or justified, agreement

are antagonistic to

of the transition

civilian, as well as military, leaders

and the willingness

who

a select set

60

As

of transition processes.

explicit, but not

always publicly explicated

of actors which seeks to define

(or, better, to

redefine) rules governing the exercise of power on the basis of mutual guarantees for the

‘vital interests’

that

may “pave

conflicts .”

62

of those entering into
the

way

for

it

.”

61

Pacts are temporary solutions to avoid conflict

more permanent arrangements

for the resolution

of

Some elements of pacts may become permanent, however, by being

incorporated into legislation or constitutions.

31

O'Donnell and Schmitter observed

democracy by undemocratic means.”
typically negotiated by a small

that

"modem

pacts

move

the polity toward

Pacts are undemocratic because pacts are

number of participants who

represent oligarchic groups,

tend to reduce political competition, often seek to limit public accountability, control the
policy agenda, and deliberately undermine political equality. According to O'Donnell and

Schmitter, “the core of a pact”

is

“a negotiated compromise under which actors agree to

forgo or underutilize their capacity to harm each other by extending guarantees not to
threaten each others’ corporate autonomies or vital interests .”

64

This typically involves

abstaining from violence, prohibiting appeals from outsiders (military or masses), and

committing

to use pacts in future conflict resolution.

that “the general scenario for negotiating a pact

is

O’Donnell and Schmitter argued

fairly clear:

it

is

a situation in

which

conflicting or competing groups are interdependent, in that they can neither do without

each other, nor unilaterally impose their preferred solution on each other
satisfy their respective divergent issues.”

O’Donnell and Schmitter “are convinced
they are desirable- that

viable political

is,

6^

Pacts are not essential to

that

where they are

all

a feature

if they are to

transitions, but

of the

transition,

they enhance the probability that the process will lead to a
66

democracy .”

O'Donnell and Schmitter understand transitions
uncertain experiences in contrast to Huntington,

who

to

democracy as chaotic and

understands the history of

democratic development as a wavelike experience, characterized by universal and regular
periods of expansion and retrenchment. O'Donnell and Schmitter describe democratic
transitions as multilayered chess

move, pushing and shoving

games “with people challenging

the rules

to get to the board, shouting out advice

32

on every

and threats from the

sidelines, trying to cheat

whenever they can-

but, nevertheless,

mesmerized by the drama they are participating
committed

to playing

elaborated.”"

democracy

is

A

more decorously and

transition

in

becoming progressively

or watching, and gradually

loyally to the rule they themselves
”" s

is

not “a linear or a rational process.'

As

becoming
have

a result, “political

produced by stalemate and dissensus rather than prior unity and

consensus.”" " Or, put another way, transitions to democracy are highly contingent affairs
that are ill-suited to

be described by social scientific models that aspire

Several important conclusions emerge in examining the

to universality.

work O’Donnell and

Schmitter. First, political actors are central to understanding transitions because

underlying economic, social and cultural factors cannot satisfactorily explain a process of
constant, widespread, and idiosyncratic change. Second, the interests of political actors

shape transitions.

When

faced with significant opposition, authoritarian leaders seek to

preserve their interests by negotiating pacts. Pacts are normatively desirable and
empirically effective in reducing violence and promoting democratic reform. Third, the

timing of transitions

is

important.

The

shorter and

more unexpected

a transition, the

greater the likelihood a popular upsurge will produce a lasting impact on the

outcome of

0

the transition.

In

Regimes

(

Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan’s

first

major work. The Breakdown of Democratic

1978), the authors conclude the top priority of future

development

is

work on democratic

examining the process of transition from authoritarian

to

democratic

regimes, particularly the political dynamics of consolidation. Problems ofDemocratic
Transition

and Consolidation 1996) was an
(

effort to contribute to that research.

Like

O’Donnell and Schmitter, Linz and Stepan understood democratic development as a

33

4

multidimensional process, but provided a

transition process.

much more

Consolidated democracy

is

detailed understanding of the

divided into behavioral, attitudinal, and

constitutional dimensions:

•

“Behaviorally, a democratic regime

in a territory is

consolidated

when no

significant national, social, economic, political, or institutional actors

spend significant resources attempting

to

achieve their objectives by

creating a nondemocratic regime or turning to violence or foreign
intervention to secede from the state."

•

“Attitudinally, a democratic regime

is

''

consolidated

when

a strong majority

of public opinion holds the belief that democratic procedures and
institutions are the

most appropriate way

society such as theirs and
quite small or

•

more or

when

less isolated

become subjected

govern collective

life in a

from the pro-democratic forces.”

“Constitutionally, a democratic regime

and nongovernmental forces

to

the support for antisystem alternatives

alike,

is

consolidated

is

7-

when governmental

throughout the territory of the

state,

and habituated to, the resolution of conflict within
the specific laws, procedures, and institutions sanctioned by new
to,

democratic processes.”

7

'

According to Linz and Stepan, these three dimensions of consolidated democracy
are

produced by five interacting arenas

consolidation to exist

.”' 4

that “reinforce

one another

in

order for such

Linz and Stepan described these arenas as necessary and

supportive conditions of consolidated democracy.

development of a free and lively

civil society .”

7
’

"

First,

“conditions must exist for the

Linz and Stepan define

civil society as

an “arena of the polity where self-organizing groups, movements, and individuals,

relatively

autonomous from the

solidarities,

relatively

and advance

state,

their interests.”

autonomous and valued

society as an “arena in

attempt to articulate values, create associations and

Second, consolidated democracy requires “a
s

political society.”

which the polity

Linz and Stepan define political

specifically arranges itself to contest the

legitimate right to exercise control over public

34

power and the

state

apparatus .”

7

1

Linz and Stepan emphasized
distinctive, yet

how

civil society

and

complementary. This requires a third arena

political society are

that

provides “a working

consensus about procedures of governance, and constitutionalism and

According

to

a rule

of law .”

80

Linz and Stepan, constitutionalism and rule of law are virtually definitional

prerequisites of a consolidated democracy.

The

interaction between these three arenas

is

described as follows:

Democratic consolidation requires parties, one of whose primary tasks is precisely
aggregate and represent differences between democrats. Consolidation requires

to

that habituation to the

developed.

A

norms and procedures of democratic

high degree of institutional routinization

a

is

conflict regulation be

key part of such a

process. Intermediation between the state and civil society and the structuring of

compromise are likewise legitimate and necessary
short, political society, informed, pressured,

tasks of political society. In

and periodically renewed by

civil

must somehow achieve a workable agreement on the myriad ways
8
which democratic power will be crafted and exercised.
society,

The fourth arena necessary

for democratic consolidation

is

in

a state apparatus.

This

apparatus establishes rational and legal bureaucratic norms. The final arena necessary for

democratic consolidation

is

an economic society. Linz and Stepan argue there has never

been and “cannot be a non-wartime consolidated democracy
At the same time, “there never

economy.”
According

8

'

to

will

be

a

command economy.

modern consolidated democracy

Thus, an economic society “mediates between
Linz and Stepan, “any

in a

way

state

in a

82

pure market

and market .”

84

(they) analyze the problem, democratic

consolidation requires the institutionalization of a socially and politically regulated

market .”

88

Linz and Stepan use the tentative conclusions of O'Donnell and Schmitter to

develop

a theory

of democratic development that

is

much more comprehensive

than their

predecessors. Like O’Donnell and Schmitter, Linz and Stepan stress the importance of

making

citizens

accustomed

norms of democratic

conflict resolution, such as

role that institutions play in that normalization process. Unlike

and the key

elections,

to the

O’Donnell and Schmitter, Linz and Stepan incorporate economic considerations and

postcommunist cases

As

the third

Union

the Soviet

in their

model of democratic consolidation.

wave of democratic development unexpectedly unfolded throughout

in the early

1990’s scholars of democratic development faced a central

question: could theories of democratic transitions derived from the study of Southern

Europe and Latin America be applied

to other regions?

This led to a heated debate within

comparative political scholarship of democratic development. At the heart of this debate

were Philippe Schmitter and Terry Karl,

who

advocated incorporation of postcommunist

cases into previous models of democratic development, and Valerie Bunce,

questioned

how

well past models of democratization

tit

who

with development experiences

in

the former Soviet Union.

Bunce recognized

that the

predominant understandings of recent democratization

were heavily influenced by previous experiences
and was not surprised by

Europe and then moved
countries, virtually
s<>

half.”

According

development because the

to Latin

the Soviet

in

wave began

history and culture,

mode of transition, made

and between these two regions.
in

third

in

Southern

America. These regions “contained a large number of

Bunce, commonalities

differences of timing and

socialism

American and Southern Europe

of which had redemocratized over the course of a decade and a

all

to

this

in Latin

Bunce

for “instructive

also recognized that the

Union provided an opportunity

combined with
comparison” within

breakdown of state

to geographically

broaden the

discussion of recent democratization, but did not want to presume that post-communist

36

democratization was pail of a larger global process. “If recent democratization
a global process,”

Bunce argued, “then

ss

aim

at

Bunce sought

to use the

27 cases

9

In rethinking democratization,

Bunce took

O’Donnell and Schmitter.

Bunce

stated that analysis

assumptions, which
•

In turn,

and Central Europe “to rethink our

in Eastern

understanding of recent democratization.”*
direct

indeed,

the terrain of these studies (Eastern Europe,

Central Asia) should better reflect that fact.”'

of postcommunist development

is,

“that

come

of democratization

directly

is

premised on several core

from O'Donnell and Schmitter:

immediate influences are more important than

historical

considerations in shaping transitional dynamics;”

•

“that transitions are inherently quite uncertain;”

•

“that the central

dynamic

in a transition is

bargaining between

authoritarian leaders and leaders of the democratic opposition, with

outcomes
•

a function

“that the key issues

of relative power;”

on the table during the

transition are breaking with

authoritarian rule, building democratic institutions, and eliciting the

cooperation of authoritarians.”

According

to

90

Bunce, “the postcommunist experience seems to challenge

these assumptions about transitional strategies.”

mass mobilization. Contrary

was

to the third core

91

One such

experience

is

many of

the process of

assumption stated above, mass mobilization

often helpful to democratic transitions in the postcommunist context.

The most

successful cases of postcommunist transition, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,

Lithuania, Poland, and Slovenia,

Bunce argued
protests “signaled the

all

began with mass mobilization, except for Hungary.

that political protest

was valuable

in several

ways.

First,

breakdow n of the authoritarian order” and “created

37

a

popular

widespread

”

sense that there were alternatives.”

4-

Second, “popular protests pushed authoritarian

leaders ... to the bargaining table” and created “a large opposition united by

of the incumbent regime.”

9
'

rejection

its

Third, political protests “gave opposition leaders a resource

advantage when bargaining with authoritarian

14

elites.”

“mass mobilization

Finally,

created a mandate for radical change that subsequently translated into a large victory for

the democratic forces in the first competitive elections” and later led to “far-reaching

economic and

political

reforms.”

9^

Like mass mobilization, the role of uncertainty

in the transition

from the claims of O’Donnell and Schmitter. Bunce acknowledged

postcommunist countries were highly uncertain, but

asserts that

process differed

that transitions in

managing uncertainty did

not necessarily promote democratic outcomes, even after elections were established. In

most competitive

elections, for

example. Communists were victorious. According

Bunce, “the larger the victory, the more likely

postcommunist regimes were ranked
in

Latin

96

“Even

Bunce explained, “only one-third of the

ten years after the transition began,”

democratic development

continued .”

that authoritarian rule

to

fully free.”

This percentage

America and southern Europe.

is

much

less

than

In turn, “these patterns

suggest that the uncertainty surrounding postcommunist political trajectories varied

significantly.

environment

9S

in

This led Bunce to suggest that “the existence of a more certain political

some countries

calls into question both the necessity

outlined earlier, of safeguarding the

authoritarians and democrats.”

Bunce acknowledged

new democracy by

and the

logic,

forging compromises between

9

that

“many of the most

successful transitions in the

postcommunist area included pacting;” however, “the transitions

38

in the

postcommunist

region that combined pacting with demobilized publics- or what has been asserted to be
the preferred approach in the South- were precisely the transitions that were most likely

to continue authoritarian rule in the

“compromises

American

that

were deemed so beneficial

transitions
101

and the

like.”

postcommunist region.”

for the southern

were rejected by opposition leaders

Instead, these regimes

100

in

Furthermore,

European and Latin

Poland, Hungary, Slovenia,

“were strongly positioned

and sharp break with the authoritarian past.”

an immediate

to favor

10 "

Another significant difference between what Bunce termed “East,” Eastern
Europe and Central Asia, and “South,” Latin America and Southern Europe,
different role

American

of the military.”

specialists

was

In contrast, “there is a

goes

far

back

in

10

'

that the military is “the biggest threat to

democracy today.”

104

long tradition of civilian control over the military- a tradition that

demilitarization after the Civil War,

to the

relations, in short, constituted

that,

following the Bolshevik Revolution and the

was maintained

members of the Soviet

at

home and

bloc.”

l<b

then after

World War

II

Thus, “civil-military

one area where the authoritarian past proved

beneficial, rather than a burden, for democratization after state socialism.”

By

the “very

Bunce explains how the consensus among Latin

Russian history and

was projected outward

is

to

be

100

incorporating postcommunist transitions into contemporary scholarship on

democratic transitions, Bunce cast significant doubt on O’Donnell and Schimitter’s
understanding of global democratic development, specifically, experiences with mass
mobilization, uncertainty in the transition process, pacts, and civil-military relations. This

was

not the

however.

first

scholarly encounter between Phil lippe Schmitter and Valerie

In 1994, Phillipe

Bunce

Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl articulated their thoughts on

39

”

the future of “transitology” and “consol idology,”

which

instigated a series of scholarly

exchanges Bunce. In “The Conceptual Travels of Transitologists and Consolidologists,”
Schmitter and Karl argued that studies of democratic transitions should include cases

from the Soviet Union. In doing

so, the authors

explained what they

mean by

“transitology” and “consolidology,” provided advice for “apprentices” and “neophytes”

w ho

undertake either of these “proto-sciences,” and defended their position of

incorporating the former Soviet Union in theories of democratic transitions

According to Schmitter and Karl, widespread

political

change

10
.

in the third

wave of

democratization was accompanied by “the gradual and unobtrusive development of two
proto-sciences: transitology and consolidology.

ll,s

“The claim of these embryonic

subdisciplines,” Schmitter and Karl explain, “is that by applying a universalistic set of

assumptions, concepts, and hypotheses, they together can explain and hopefully help to

guide the

way from an

autocratic to a democratic regime .”

109

Schmitter and Karl claim

“the founder and patron saint of transitology” because

that Niccolo Machiavelli

is

Machiavelli was the

great political theorist to “recognize the specific problematics

first

and dynamics of regime change,” gave
uncertainty, and

modest .”

110

“warned

that the potential contribution

Hence, transitology w as

practical concerns .”

111

saint” and “reflects a

to transitology its

bom

fundamental principle of

of the discipline would always be

“with limited scientific pretension and marked

Unlike transitology, consolidology “has no such obvious a patron

much more

consistent preoccupation

with the conditions underlying regime stability .”

1

among

students of politics

12

Consolidologists seek to better understand political actors by adopting a primarily

retrospective viewpoint.

In the consolidation process,

40

“unpredictable and often

1

courageous individuals take singular risks and make unprecedented choices, and adjust
analyzing a

much more

settled

form of 'bounded

capitalist class relations, long-standing cultural

conflicts

rationality’ that

is

to

both conditioned by

and ethnic cleavages, persistent status

and international antagonisms, and staffed by increasingly professional

more

politicians tilling

predictable and less risky roles.”

must navigate around two

“Apprentice consolidologists”

special problems: “separating idiosyncratic and contingent

properties from eventual outcomes” and deciding “to

these past experiences can be applied to the present

what extent lessons taken from

dilemmas of neo-democracies.”

1

14

Despite these challenges, Schmitter and Karl asserted that both undertakings are

important components of comparative political scholarship and as such, should continue
to be

pursued vigorously.

Why

do

transitologists

and consolidologists want

to incorporate

postcommunist

cases into existing comparative theories of democratic development? Adding post-

communist cases

to transition studies enable scholars

“manipulate equations” so

that variables

of democratic transitions to

do not outnumber the cases and

“test their

tentative conclusions in cultural and historical contexts quite different from those

generated them

in

the

11

first

place.”

'"'

The

“initial

which

working assumption” of Schmitter and

Karl “is that, provided the events or processes satisfy certain definitional requirements,

their

occurrence

least initially,

in

Eastern Europe or the former Soviet Union should be considered,

analogous to events or processes happening elsewhere.”

1

at

16

In turn, “all

these cases of regime change- regardless of their geopolitical location or cultural context

should

(at least

hypothetically) be regarded as parts of a
1

causal interaction.”

common

process of diffusion and

Schmitter and Karl stressed that only after an effort of

41

incorporation, and not before, can conclusions be

drawn

as to whether or not “concepts

and hypothesis generated from the experiences of early comers should be regarded as
'overstretched' or 'underverified'

when applied

to latecomers.”

Ils

Schmitter and Karl were not surprised by “specialists on the area”

“cultural, ideological,

historical legacy

regimes .”

110

who

stress the

and national peculiarities of these cases- especially the distinctive

bequeathed by

totalitarian as

opposed

to authoritarian

anciens

Schmitter and Karl claimed that these specialists were resistant to “acultural

extrapolation,”

their countries

some of whom, “would bar
(now more numerous,

all

practicing transitologists from reducing

diverse, and

autonomous

pinpoints on a scatterplot or frequencies in a crosstabulation .”

in their

120

behavior) to mere

Valerie

Bunce

is

one of

the specialists Schmitter and Karl alluded to.

The

title

Bunce argued

of Bunce’s response asked “Should Transitologists Be Grounded?”

that Schmitter

and Karl “cannot justify their comparisons of east and south

by simply stating that these cases meet 'certain definitional requirements' or by arguing
that

we

should compare

comparability

compared
it,

rests

that the

is

is

first

and worry about comparability second .”

central to Bunce, particularly the justification that

similar to

enough

to merit

comparative methodology .”

122

is

what

The
is

issue of

being

comparison. The “burden of proof,” as Bunce puts

with self-described transitologists. According to Bunce,

debate about transitology

121

in fact a

debate

Thus, “to label

among

“all

of this suggests

comparativists about

critics area specialists, then, is to

misrepresent the concerns that have been voiced about comparative studies of
democratization, east and south.”

12

'

.

.

.

For Bunce the crux of the debate

is

not between transitologists and area scholars,

but whether differences between cases “constitute variations

is,

transitions

from dictatorship

to

on

a

substantial than Schmitter

'" 4

According

position and their critics the second.”

postcommunism and

differences between

authoritarian rule,

first

process- that

democracy- or altogether different processes-

democratization versus what could be termed postcommunism.”

“Schmitter and Karl take the

common

"^

to

is,

Bunce,

“The

more

the transitions in the south ar c far

and Karl's discussion seems

mode of transition,

1

that

to imply, ” including the nature of

international context

of transition, and the

transitional agenda.

According

to

postcommunist cases
dimension

Bunce,
differs

state Socialism, the nature

from previous

that economists, sociologists,

important.”

1

"

As

diffusion process

such, “there

we saw

in

is

and

political scientists

no equivalent
in

in the

1989 or thus to the role of international

Party's political

contrast,

“what

is at

among

monopoly.”

building blocks of the social order.”

In

a handful

stake in Eastern Europe

responding

to

is

recognize as

southern cases either to the

however, was the transitional agenda. Democratization
“a process involving interactions

in the

of political

~

Most

1

“

elites.”

and Schimmter “observed

*

In sharp

nothing less than the creation of the very

130

Bunce’s criticism, Karl and Schmitter claimed

that they

striking to Bunce,

south could be reduced to

mischaracterized their attitudes toward area scholars as one of hostility,

and Schmitter believed

in

transition experiences “along virtually every

Eastern Europe

Communist

factors in ending the

of authoritarian rule

want

to

that the field

that

Bunce

when

in fact

Karl

improve how area studies are conducted. Karl

of communist studies- and especially

43

its

subfield

of Sovietology- has long suffered a partially self-imposed isolation from major social
science disciplines.” Karl and Schmitter fundamentally disagreed “with those scholars

steeped

in this

academic tradition

who

rely heavily (if not exclusively)

on assumptions

about the allegedly unique legacy of "totalitarianism,’ "Marxism-Leninism Stalinism,’
"Soviet political culture,’ etc. as an excuse for eschewing

regions- even though

which are unique .”

who

we

1,1

fully agree that all countries

all

comparison with other world

and regions have some properties

Thus, Karl and Schimitter were concerned that “Bunce and others

a priori reject the application

of theories generated elsewhere to "post-communist

transitions’” will continue the aforementioned

and “unfortunate tradition of isolation .”

The second argument presented by Karl and Schmitter was

1

that the "‘exclusive

concentration on intra-regional studies can restrict the ability of area specialists to

understand their

own

region or particular country .”

“just because area studies

regions were

somehow

was

in the

"unique’ does not

remain forever unexamined .”
Karl and Schmitter

bom

were

1

that “a

4

The

third

13

,

Karl and Schmitter stressed that

untested notion that specific geocultural

mean

this

comfortable assumption should

and “most important” argument presented by

narrow insistence on intra-regional studies and the

consequent exclusion of cross-regional comparisons could have a deleterious impact on
the

development of theory.”

on democratic

transitions

falsifying concepts

Bunce’s

1

'

Postcommut cases

are so essential to developing theories

because they enable the “testing, verifying, modifying and/or

and hypotheses that have been generated elsewhere .”

final

response to Karl and Schmitter explained

why

1

'

h

the author preferred

intra-regional comparisons of postcommunist transformations over cross-regional

comparisons. Bunce was “not convinced that

we

44

are safe in

assuming

that transitions

'

from authoritarianism

south produce the same outcome as the processes involved

in the

1

in

leaving state socialism.”

independent
reasonable

'

and dependent

As

a result, “there will be too

variables- to narrow

number of plausible

factors .”

1

,

down

much

variance-

in

the field of explanation to a

s

There are some inherent problems with carrying out comparative research with a
large

number of cases. These problems

predetermined categories that do not
that every case

observed

fits,

making

1,1

In turn,

.

benefits to be

had from comparing
140

lit

them” or creating categories with such

ilexibility

difficult to accurately interpret the relationships

Bunce claimed

from authoritarian rule .”
east

it

include forcing “diverse countries into

that scholars

a very large

This was evident

had already “reaped most of the

number of cases involving
the differences that

in

transitions

emerged between the

and south, which have “exposed the limitations of the transitions approach as

developed by Phillipe C. Schimitter, Guillermo O’Donnell, Laurence Whitehead, Terry

Lynn

Karl, and others .”

comparison “allow us

is,
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For these reasons, Bunce concluded

to strike a useful balance

the ability to control

some

between the benefits of comparison-

factors while exploring variation-

working with good data and precise categories.”
Scholars on both sides of this debate

postcommunist cases

justified in using

from development experiences

democracy from

that intra-regional

in

and the benefits of

14 '

make

valid points. Karl and Schimitter are

to test theories

of democratic development derived

Southern Europe and Latin America. Transitions to

state socialism are in

some ways very

different than transitions

from

other types of authoritarian rule, but not so different that interregional comparison

completely

futile.

that

Transitions can vary both

in the

45

government

that precedes the

is

transition

and the type of government which results from a

transition. Including a specific

type of authoritarianism, state socialism, into comparative scholarship on transitions

useful,

because

this inclusion

complements, rather than

At the same time, Bunce
research

in

is

is

distorts, the

is

study of transitions.

justified in arguing that the benefit

from

this

type of

inherently limited because experiences with authoritarianism were so different

Eastern Europe compared to Latin America. Rather than advocating comparative

political scholarship

be limited

to intraregional

comparison, however,

I

advocate the

creation of hypotheses that test the effectiveness of predominant models of comparative

democratic scholarship

would enable scholars

in

capturing development experiences around the world. This

models, rather than debating

to empirically evaluate existing

comparative methodology or questioning contrasting assumptions; both of which

fail to

offer a path toward resolving the debate.

After the debate between Bunce, Schmitter, and Karl, critics of the predominant

focus on democratic transitions soon confronted a

new

question: should scholarship on

democratic transitions be modified or abandoned? As the third wave spread from Eastern

Europe

to Africa, critics

responded with varying degrees of skepticism toward the

of the transitions approach

prominent

critics

to capture

new and

different

development experiences.

ability

Two

of predominant understandings of democratic transitions were Michael

McFaul and Thomas Carothers. McFaul sought

some predominant assumptions of transitions
outright rejection of

what he

Like Bunce, McFaul

to use

a scholar

to refine

scholarship, while Carothers sought the

calls the transitions

is

development experiences

paradigm.

of Eastern Europe and Central Asia whose work

on democratic transitions illuminates several differences between postcommunist

46

transition

and other transitions

in the third

wave. McFaul acknowledged that “the

collapse of communism did not lead smoothly or quickly to the consolidation of liberal

democracy

Soon

Europe and the former Soviet Union.”

in

democratic movements occurred

after

independence, popular

Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, eastern

in the Baltic States,

Germany, and Western Czechoslovakia. “Quick and successful democratic
breakthroughs were the exception,” McFaul explained, but over time the “gravitational
force of the European Union” helped to pull non-democratic regimes toward

in

countries such as Bulgaria, Croatia, and Romania.

one

travels,

however, the weaker the democratic

144

pull.

The

farther

democracy

from Western Europe

Throughout most of Central Asia,

for example, full-blown dictatorships entrenched themselves

and semi-autocracies spread

to other post-Soviet states, such as Russia.

Russian development experiences
“protracted transition.”

criteria

14

'

McFaul argued

in

the 1990’s were described by

that

Russia did not

of consolidated democracy even “when Russia voters

and elected

a

new parliament.”

146

“Whether the end of the

fit

McFaul

as a

Linz and Stepan's

ratified a

transition

is

new

constitution

seen as 1993,

1996, or the year 2000,” McFaul explained, “the process has been a long one, especially

when compared
In fact,

The

first

to the

more successful

McFaul argued

transition

These measures
political change.

led to

new and independent

initiated

political actors

Gorbachev and other refonners within

In turn,

147

“Russia experienced not one but three transitions.”

began with liberalization measures

tried to negotiate a transition

movement.

that

transitions in Eastern Europe.”

agreement with moderates

“regime hard-liners

tried to roll

47

I4S

by Mikhail Gorbachev.

who

desired

more

radical

the Soviet regime unsuccessfully

in

Russia’s democratic

back reform by decreeing emergency

rule in

August 1991, an action

that Russia’s

democratic forces succeeded

in

144

defeating.”

The

failed

coup

democratic transition.”

new democratic

1991 “created propitious conditions for another attempt

in

"

1

Boris Yeltsin used this “unique

institutions

communist opponents.”

1

1

by negotiating a new

McFaul argued

subsequent elections could have helped
Yeltsin “devoted very

little

time

set

that the construction

designing

to erect

of political rules with their

to “legitimate a

at all to

window of opportunity

at

new

of a new constitution and

new democratic

order,” but

political institutions within

Russia, focusing instead on dismantling the Soviet Union and initiating economic

reform.”

152

Conflict between Yeltsin and parliament reached a violent crossroads in 1993,

which led

to a third

Russian transition. The uprising “represented a

real

blow

to

popular

support for Russian democracy” and the military was used to control the pro-Communist,
anti-Yeltsin MP's. Despite this

breakdown of institutions,

participated in subsequent elections,

major opposition

parties,

where

a

new

a majority

constitution

was

of Russians

rati tied.

Furthermore,

such as the Communist Party and Agrarian Party, participated

in

these elections. Throughout the rest of the decade, elections were competitive and

became “the only game

in

town

for

winning

political

power,” while the constitution

“survived as the ultimate guide for resolving conflicts between the executive and
1

legislative branches.”

McFaul explained
as a product the contested

In transitions

the prolonged and conflict-ridden nature of Russia's transition

agenda of change:

from authoritarian rule

in

Latin America and Southern Europe,

questions concerning the basic organization of the

48

economy were

generally off-

limits. Transitions

from communist

rule,

on the other hand, placed economic

questions squarely on the table, complicating the transition process. Multiethnic
states like the Soviet

Union and Yugoslavia also had

state borders. Soviet

and Russian leaders therefore faced a more complex

challenge in negotiating
let

alone Spain.

that really

was

the intensity

than did their counterparts

of opposing views on

in the

O’Donnell and Schmitter, McFaul argued

that stalemate

Poland,

in

agenda

this three-part

prolonged the transition processes and fueled confrontation.”

In contrast to

negative role

It

this triple transition

to face a third issue- defining

1

'

4

played a

Russian transition because “the relatively equal balance of power

fostered conflict,” rather than inducing compromise.

democratic development

in

The

protracted nature of

Russia created several outstanding obstacles that continue to

hinder progress. These obstacles include “superpresidentialism, an underdeveloped party
system, a disengaged

civil society, the lack

popular support for democracy.”

dynamism

in

lN

'

Since 2000, however, “democracy gained

the region in unexpected

democratic development was made

of an independent judiciary, and declining

ways and

I

places.”

v

new

Significant progress in

Georgia, and Ukraine. These “cases of

in Serbia,

democratic breakthrough resemble one another and differ from other democratic
transitions or revolutions in four critical respects.”

First, the

impetus for regime change was a fraudulent national election, not

division between ruling elites, war, or economic crisis. Second, democratic challengers

solely relied

on extra constitutional means “to defend the

existing, democratic

constitution rather than to achieve a fundamental rew riting of the rules of the political

game.”
to

1
’

Third, challengers and incumbents

made “competing and simultaneous claims

hold sovereign authority- one of the hallmarks of a revolutionary situation.”

“all

of these revolutionary situations ended without mass violence.”

161
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Fourth,

Finally, few

analysts predicted democratic breakthroughs. According to McFaul, “identifying the

49

common

factors that contributed to success in these cases

may

be our best method of

predicting future democratic breakthroughs not only in this region but perhaps

as well."

1

162

)

McFaul

others

in

states several factors for success:

a semi-autocratic rather than fully autocratic

regime;

2)

an unpopular incumbent;

3)

a united

4)

an ability quickly to drive

5)

enough independent media

6)

a political opposition capable of mobilizing tens

and organized opposition;

home
to

the point that voting results

were

falsified;

inform citizens about the falsified vote;

of thousands or more;

demonstrators to protest electoral fraud; and
7)

divisions

among

the regime's coercive forces.

u”

Both Bunce and McFaul use postcommunist experiences

to illuminate

conceptual

problems with the focus of transition scholars. Bunce emphasizes methodological flaws
in the transitions

approach and advocates intraregional comparison, rather than

interregional comparison, as undertaken by scholars of democratic transitions. McFaul,

emphasizes variations

in the

nature of transitions within the former Soviet Union and

between postcommunist cases and other
present their research as a

way

to

wave

third

transitions.

improve and correct how predominant scholars of

democratic transitions conceptualize transition processes.

prominent scholars of democratic

transitions,

Thomas

transition paradigm,” rather than modification

predominant models.

Both Bunce and McFaul

A

third

major

critic

of

Carothers, argued for “the end of

of methodological approaches or

164

Carothers observed that seven different regions converged

in

the

last

quarter of

the twentieth century to reshape the international political landscape:

1

)

the

fall

of right-wing authoritarian regimes

in

Southern Europe

in the

mid-

1970’s;
2)

of military dictatorships by elected civilian governments
America from the late 1970s through the late 1980s;

the replacement

across Latin

50

;

3)

the decline of authoritarian rule in pails of East and South Asia stalling in the

mid- 980s;
1

4)

the collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe at the end of the 1980s;

5)

the breakup of the Soviet

Union and the establishment of

1

5 post-Soviet

republics in 1991
6)

the decline of one-party regimes in
first

7)

a

many

pails of sub-Saharan Africa in the

half of the 1990s; and

weak

in the

but recognizable liberalizing trend in

1990s.

some Middle Eastern

countries

166

Carothers argued that “the causes, shape, and pace of these different trends varied
considerably,” but the “striking tide of political change was seized upon with enthusiasm

by the U.S. government and the broader U.S. foreign policy community”
referred to Huntington's third

wave

as “the

led

democracy promoters

to rapidly to

in

embrace the analytic model of

of the patterns of democratic change taking place, but also

works of the emergent academic

field

166

Southern Europe and Latin

democratic transition. This model was principally derived “from their

early

regularly

worldwide democratic revolution.”

Carothers argued that third wave transitions

America

who

16

interpretation

to a lesser extent

of ‘transitology,’ above

of Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter.”

own

When

all

the third

from the

the seminal

wave spread

work

to

Eastern Europe and sub-Saharan Africa democracy promoters accepted the transitions

model “as

a universal

paradigm

for understanding democratization.”

concluded that the transitions paradigm “became ubiquitous

way of talking

in

166

Carothers

U.S. policy circles as a

about, thinking about, and designing interventions in processes of political

change around the world.”

166

The paradigm “stayed remarkably constant despite many

variations in those patterns of political

change and

a stream

of increasingly diverse
1

scholarly views about the course and nature of democratic transitions.”

70

Carothers acknowledged that the transitions paradigm “has been somewhat
171

useful” in understanding a period of significant political upheaval.

“it is

increasingly clear that reality

expressed concern with

is

how “many

no longer conforming

way, more than

a

few are not following the model.”
its

useful life

evolution in the field of democratic assistance” and argued that

paradigm has outlived

In laying out the

explained

why

the

away from

its

“it is

retarding

time

recognize

to

usefulness and to look for a better lens.”

paradigm. The

first

useful. Carothers used five core

core assumption

that

is

dictatorial rule can be considered a country in transition

This was particularly pronounced

democracy.”

is

1
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argument, Carothers defined the transitions paradigm and then

paradigm was no longer

to define the transitions

Carothers

democracy, and of the democratic

Carothers stated that “sticking with the paradigm beyond

that the transitions

“

model.”

countries that policy makers and aid practitioners

persist in calling ‘transitional’ are not in transition to

transitions that are under

to the

Currently, however,

in the first

assumptions

“any country moving

toward

half of 1990’s,

when many

policy makers and aid practitioners labeled any former authoritarian country attempting

liberalization a democratic transition,

second core assumption
1

stages.”

"

The

first

is

stage

up

to

100 countries, Carothers estimates. The

that “democratization tends to unfold in a set

is

called an “opening.” This

is

when

sequence of

political liberalization

democratic ferment cracks the ruling dictatorial regime. The second stage
“breakthrough.” This

infrastructure

is

is

when

the dictatorial regime collapses

established with institutions and elections.

“consolidation.” This

is

the long process by

which

and

The

a

is

a

democratic

third stage

is

called

a democratic infrastructure

democratic political process a normal pail of social interaction.

and

makes

a

move

Carothers explained

how

Democracy

admit that

activists

the

two assumptions work

first

it

is

in practice:

not inevitable that transitional countries will

assumed path from opening and breakthrough to consolidation.
backward or stagnate as well as move
forward along the path. Yet even the deviations from the assumed sequence that they are
willing to acknowledge are defined in terms of the path itself. The options are all cast in
terms of the speed and direction with which countries move on the path, not in terms of
movement that does not conform with the path at all. And at least in the peak years of the
third wave, many democracy enthusiasts clearly believed that, while the success of the
dozens of new transitions was not assured, democratization was in some important sense
a natural process, one that was likely to flourish once the initial break-through occurred.
No small amount of democratic teleology is implicit in the transition paradigm, no matter
steadily on this

Transitional countries, they say, can and do go

how much

its

The

adherents have denied

third core

assumption

is

it.

that elections are deterministic.

democracy promoters do not believe

that elections

Carothers stated that

equal democracy, but promoters

tended “to hold very high expectations for what the establishment of regular, genuine
elections will

do

would give post

for democratization.”

dictatorial

elections "broaden and

the state to

just a

its

governments democratic legitimacy and the expectation

deepen

citizens .”

This included the expectations that elections

'

political participation

the democratic accountability of

1
1

Thus, democracy promoters assume that "elections will be not

foundation stone but a key generator over time of further democratic reforms.”

The

fourth core assumption

legacies, ethnicity,

is

that

when

“all that

seemed

a decision by a country’s political elites to

INI

forces.”

elites to

The

fifth

in

IMI

political history, institutional

democratic transitions. These

completely overshadowed by a focus on political actors. This was

problematic for Carothers

of those

economics,

and culture are not major factors

structural factors are

part

and

that

to

be necessary for democratization was

move toward democracy and

an ability on the

fend off the contrary actions of remaining antidemocratic

core assumption

is

that “the

53

democratic transitions making up the

)

third

new

wave

are being built on coherent, functioning states.”

electoral institutions, parliamentary reform,

modifications in an existing state framework.

1

t

'

"

In turn, “the creation ot

and judicial reform” are understood as

Asa

result,

democracy promoters “did

not give significant attention to the challenge of society trying to democratize while

it

is

grappling with the reality of building a state from scratch or coping with an existent but
1x4

largely nonfunctional state.”

assumed

that

When

the state

was considered, democracy promoters

democracy-building and state-building

activities

would mutually

reinforce

one another.
After conceptualizing the transitions paradigm, Carothers examined

development experiences around the world
transitions paradigm.

“Of the

lit

how

with the five core assumptions of the

nearly 100 countries considered as ‘transitional’ in recent

years,” Carothers explains, “only a relatively small number- probably fewer than 20- are

clearly en route to

becoming successful, well-functioning democracies or

made some democratic
democratization.”

Baltics,

ls

'

progress and

still

have

at least

enjoy a positive dynamic of

Most of these success

stories are

from Central Europe and the

such as Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Estonia, and Slovenia, with some

from South America and East Asia, such as Chile, Uruguay, and Taiwan. By

far,

Carothers argued, the majority of third

wave

countries “have not achieved relatively well-

seem

to be

deepening or advancing whatever

functioning democracy or do not

democratic progress they have made,” though most made some progress
IS(

efforts.

’

in liberalization

Thus, most transition countries “have entered a political gray zone.”

In this

1

*7

gray zone, countries “have some attributes of democratic political

life,

including a limited political space for opposition parties and independent civil society, as

54

well as regular elections and democratic constitutions.”

Iss

At the same time, countries

also “suffer from serious democratic deficits, often including poor representation of

citizens' interests,

low

levels

government

the law by

of political participation beyond voting, frequent abuse of

officials, elections

of uncertain legitimacy, very low levels of

public confidence in state institutions, and persistently poor institutional performance by
the state .”

1

M

The number countries between democracy and
of different terms that sought to capture

this

dictatorship led to a proliferation

dynamic, including semi-democracy, formal

democracy, electoral democracy, pseudo-democracy and
Carothers to

make

democracy. This led

the following conclusion:

Useful though these terms can be, especially
as O'Donnell's

illiberal

work on

when

rooted

in

probing analysis such

‘delegative democracy,' they share a significant liability:

By

describing countries in the gray zone as types of democracies, analysts are in effect trying
to apply the transition

the

paradigm

in

characterize countries as

sequence, usually

In the

to the very countries whose political evolution is calling
Most of the 'qualified democracy’ terms are used to
being stuck somewhere on the assumed democratization

paradigm

question.

at the start

of the consolidation phase

gray zone, two broad political syndromes

pluralism. In this syndrome, countries “have significant

190
.

exist.

The

first is

feekless

amounts of political freedom,

regular elections, and alternation of power between genuinely different political

groupings,” but despite these features, “democracy remains shallow and troubled .”

Trouble stems from a general perception
coupled with

a lack

of political participation beyond elections. As a

“extremely unhappy about the political

commonly found

that elites are self-interested

in Latin

America.

life

of the country.”

19-

191

and corrupt,

result the public is

This syndrome

is

most

The second

political

syndrome

in the

syndrome, countries “have limited but
contestation

still

by opposition groups, and

democracy.”

19

'

Still,

“one

gray zone

is

dominant-power

real political space,

at least

political grouping-

some

most of the basic

whether

it

is

a

little

political

institutional

movement,

extended family, or a single leader- dominates the system in such a
appears to be

politics. In this

way

forms of

a party,

that there

prospect of alternation of power in the foreseeable future .”

contrast to feckless pluralism, a “key

problem

in

an

dominant-power countries

is

194

In

the

blurring of the line between the state and the ruling party (or ruling political forces ).”

Elections are dubious, but not outright fraudulent. This

found

in

syndrome

is

195

most commonly

sub-Saharan Africa, the former Soviet Union, and the Middle East.

Given

that

most contemporary cases of transition did not

paradigm, Carother’s concluded that
to discard the transitions

paradigm.”

“it is

19

"

fit

with the transitions

time for the democracy-promotion community

As

a result,

it

is

no longer appropriate the make

any of the five core assumptions of the transitions paradigm. Carothers then presented

some suggestions

for

where

to

go from

here. First,

democracy promoters should begin

from some very different assumptions:

They should

start

by assuming

what

that

is

often thought of as an uneasy,

precarious middle ground between full-fledged democracy and outright dictatorship

is

most common political condition today of countries in the developing world
and the postcommunist world. It is not an exceptional category to be defined only in
terms of its not being one thing or the other; it is a state of normality for many societies,
for better or worse. The seemingly continual surprise and disappointment that Western
political analysts express over the very frequent falling short of democracy in

actually the

Transitional countries’ should be replaced with realistic expectations about the likely
•

patterns of political

A

life in

these countries.

second suggestion

is

1

97

that aid practitioners

and policymakers rethink their

analytic approach and predominant assumptions. Instead of asking
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“How

is

the transition

going?” scholars should ask “What

approach helps
blind alley.”

IW

to

is

happening politically?”

avoid “optimistic assumptions

In turn,

,s

This “more open-ended”

down

that often shunt the analysis

“democracy promoters need

patterns of each country in

1

to focus in

on the key political

which they intervene, rather than trying

everything according to a template of ideal institutional forms.”

- ""

to

do

a

little

to

of

Given the hopeful

vision and conceptual order of the transitions paradigm, Carothers recognizes

let

a

it

is

hard to

go of At the same time, the usefulness of the paradigm has been exhausted and needs
be discarded.

A number of scholars

directly

responded

to

Carother’s piece

in

the Journal

of

Democracy including Guillermo O’Donnell. O’Donnell agreed with many of Carother’s
,

statements, but criticized

how

Carothers lumped together

of “transition paradigm,” when
of work.”

-

was

in fact transitions scholarship is “a large

his past

work

democracy and do not unfold

truly a

explicitly stated that transitions

in stages. If

Transitions

and uneven body

do not necessarily

From Authoritarian Rule

seminal work, then O'Donnell contends that observers should takes seriously

the assumption that nothing in the transition process

complains about 'democracy enthusiasts’
inevitable,”

the heading

O’Donnell then responded to each of Carother’s core assumptions.

O'Donnell claimed that
lead to

many works under

who

was

that

Carothers explicitly state

transition paradigm.
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“When

Carothers

hold the naive view that democratization

O'Donnell agreed with him, but wondered

O'Donnell suggested

predestined.

who

these people are.

-"-

who proposed and adopted

In turn,

the

is

”

O'Donnell and Carothers face greater substantive differences over the

third core

assumption, which stated that elections are deterministic. O’Donnell emphasized his

agreement with the transitions paradigm on

I

do think

this particular point:

that fair elections are extremely important. This

elections will necessarily lead to

wonderful outcomes.

It is

not because such

is

because these elections, per se

must surround them if they are to be considered fair
(and consequently, if the resulting regime is to be democratic), mark a crucial departure
from the arbitrariness of authoritarian rule. When some fundamental political freedoms
are respected, this means greater progress in relation to authoritarian rules and gives us
ample reason to defend and promote fair elections.
and due

to the political

freedoms

that

In response to the fourth core assumption,

prioritized political factors in understanding the transition process.

predominant scholars believed that

it

took

why

O’Donnell explained

he

During the 1970’s,

long time for economic development and the

a

maturation of political culture to occur. O’Donnell claimed that scholars of Latin

America found

this

discouraging and engaged

in

“thoughtful wishing” by assuming that

“purposive political action could be effective and that good analysis might be helpful to
this end.”"

04

O’Donnell did not question the

develop within a coherent and functioning

As

a whole,

fifth

assumption

that third

wave

transitions

state.

O’Donnell questioned the importance granted

to his

work and

the

coherence granted the larger body of literature. O'Donnell disagreed with the criticism of

how

transition scholars

emphasize elections, but agreed

that scholars

have assumed

a

functioning state, and justified the optimistic approach of early transitions scholars as an

understandable byproduct of the time period. O'Donnell embraced serious discussion of
transitions, but

concluded

that the transitions scholarship “rests

on grounds

than the evanescent Transition paradigm’ that Carothers sketches.
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2(b

far

more

solid

Like McFaul and Carothers,

I

am

critical

scholars of democratic transitions, such as

Phil ipe Schmitter,
1

of assumptions made by predominant

Samuel Huntington, Guillermo O’Donnell,

Laurence Whitehead, Terry Karl, Juan Linz, and Alfred Stepan.

My

research seeks to engage the debate between Carothers and O’Donnell over the

deterministic nature of elections in the transition process and broaden this electoral focus

to include other institutions.

the

My

predominant focus of transitions theory should be abandoned.

by creating a testable hypothesis

and

research also seeks to engage the debate over whether

institutions in

that

Africa,

in

Latin

East.

I

am

skeptical that

and theories can be constructed from development

America and Southern Europe, then applied

and the Middle

engage both debates

measures the effectiveness of democratic elections

promoting democratic development. Like Bunce,

useful and accurate generalizations

experiences

1

to Eastern

Without in-depth, empirical analysis, however,

Europe,

1

am

prepared to advocate the outright rejection of a predominant focus on democratic

transitions.

This

is

the purpose of this project.
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“

CHAPTER

III

CASE STUDY OF UKRAINE
Ukraine

is

Home

fertile soil.

a land that

predominantly consists of rolling plains and exceptionally

“borderland.” This

the territory

fits

and exposed steppe and currently
its

villages have

is

which occupied

lies

the border between protecting forests

on the edges of Asia and the Mediterranean. Given

on main trade routes between Europe and Asia, the

location

Ukraine

communities of Europe, Ukraine means

to the earliest agricultural

traditional

been exposed to competing cultures for centuries. Aside from Russia,

the largest country in Europe, in terms of area, with a current population

comparable

Ukraine

to France.

is

arguably

among

the richest countries in

of natural resources because of its large amounts of coal and iron

Most contemporary accounts of Ukrainian history begin
Eastern Slavs settled

in

organization of this territory called Rus, but

Though

likely led

by patriarchs

a ruling class

in

century

when

terms

1

lh

in the 7

small villages on the right bank of Dnieper River. Villages

present-day Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia. Little

were most

Europe

ore.

gradually subdivided and expanded to form approximately fourteen

in

Ukrainian

emerged

w ith no

who made

(kniazi), land

communal property of extended

families.

is

As

known

tribal

confederations

about the political

centralized authority, various tribes

decisions based on

communal consensus.

and livestock was widely understood to be
a result, disparities

between property

holdings were minimal.
Historians debate which of the three East Slavic peoples were the original and

dominant

in

Rus.

Some

Ukrainian scholars acknowledge a shared origin

among

the

groups, but contend that subsequent development was unique. Others contend that

65

Ukraine predates Russia. Russian textbooks
cities”

and thus, the

city is currently located

Nationalist Belorussian historians portray

autonomy

for certain principalities.

’

state that

Kiev

is

the

“mother of all Russian

“abroad” because of mere formality.

Rus

as a loose federation with significant

Regardless of these scholarly divisions, a

groups of Eastern Slavic peoples clearly share historical and cultural roots

11

three

back

that date

several centuries to a time of great prestige and prosperity.

By

the middle of the

h
1

l'

century Kievan Rus was “a mighty political

conglomerate well on the way to creating one of the most sophisticated societies and
flourishing economies in

of the

territory.

Europe

4

at the

Kiev was an important

time.”

Location was

transit point

critical in the

development

between Varangian settlements

to the

North and the Byzanstine Empire to the South. Early Kievan princes were relentless
their pursuit

of wealth. The conquests of Oleh, the

were “a successful attempt

to unite

first

in

historically verifiable ruler Kiev,

and control both Kiev and Novgorod, the main depots

of the ‘Greek’ trade route.”"

Kievan princes controlled “a commercial enterprise composed of loosely
affiliated

towns whose garrisons collected

public order.”"

Still, political

were substantial. As

tribute

and maintained,

in a

rough

soil

of way,

organization was minimal and distances between territories

a result, regionalism prohibited the

formation of a unified political

establishment and thus interaction between rulers and the ruled was limited aside from
occasional payments of tribute ensured by the threat and exercise of brute force.
the death

become

of Sviatoslav

in

972, Kievan Rus underwent “the

first

outbreak of what was to

a chronic, debilitating political malady: internecine struggle

the Riurikid dynasty for

supreme power

in the realm.”
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With

among members of

Volodymyr

the Great Christianized

animism and paganism had ran
sophisticated

way

its

Rus

and

political values.

Both Islam and

dominant religions of the lands Kiev wanted

commercial contacts. Folklore suggests

the tightest

traditional

course and considered Christianity to be a more

to express spiritual, social,

Christianity were considered, the

Volodymyr sensed

in 988.

to generate

Islam was nixed because

that

its

prohibition of alcohol and the splendor of religious services in Byzanstine Christianity.

Christianity had roots in Kiev, evident in Prince Olha's conversion decades earlier.

Volodmyr demanded

the hand of

Anne

in

after helping to quell a rebellion in 987.

idols

that subject

To make

the best of what

demanded Volodymyr accept

situation, the Byzanstines

Determined

marriage, the sister of Byzanstine co-emperors,

was viewed

Christianity,

should quickly convert, baptisms were held

were destroyed, despite

from Constantinople, the

as a bad

which he did
in

in

988.

mass and pagan

resistance. Importing an organizational structure straight

political prestige

of the ruling empire was greatly enhanced

under Volodymyr. Kievan Rus was hence aligned with the Christian West rather than the
Islamic East.

The long tenure of laroslav

the

Wise 1036
(

to 1054)

of Kievan Rus. laroslav extended an already expansive

and family members

in

from

considered the high point

territorial

realm, married himself

other European dynasties, created over 400 churches in Kiev, and

codified a system of laws called

itself

is

isolated, forest

Ruska pravada (Rus justice). Kievan Rus transformed

bound

tribes crossed

with Scandinavian warrior-merchants to

an increasingly wealthy and urbanized society/ In less than a century, however, several

factors

would diminish

the influence of

Kiev as the dominant center of Kiev and

ultimately lead to the end of the dynasty in

1

132.
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Like

institutional

many medieval empires
means

Unity was achieved

transitions

in

Europe, Kievan Rus lacked the technical and

keep power effectively consolidated among widespread

to

when males of the

commonly

of power were

that their future

was

characterized by fratricidal wars. Over time princely

more autonomous and

in

During the

doing

weakened

existences. This

“it

became

tied to their hereditary holdings

continually being contested.

so,

power sharing, but

Riurikid dynasty agreed on

clans developed deeper roots in patrimonial lands as

them

territories.

,h

12

increasingly apparent to

and not

to Kiev,

which was

century principalities became increasingly

developed independent

political

and economic

the resources of Kiev, but did not diminish competition for

control of the city. Twenty-four princes ruled Kiev between

1

146 and 1246 on forty-

seven different occasions.

Meanwhile, the importance of trade between Varangians and Greeks declined as
“enterprising Italian merchants established direct links between Byzantium, Asia Minor,

and the Middle East on the one hand, and Western Europe on the other, thus bypassing
Kiev

in the

process.”

10

This development had a devastating impact on Kiev's

economy

as

did the pillaging of Constantinople by Crusaders and the beginning of a sharp period of

decline in Baghdad. With the loss of two major trading partners, tensions festered

different

economic classes

The deathblow

to

in

Kiev, which caused frequent upheavals.

Kiev ultimately came from outside intruders. The Mongols,

referred to as Tatars in Eastern Europe,

China

lh

in the 12

Khan of Khans,

were nomads along the northwestern borders of

century. United by Temujin,

the

Mongols became

civilizations in the region.

among

Though

who deemed

himself Jenghiz Khan or

a powerful military force that attacked sedentary

limited in number,

68

at

most 120,000

to

140,000

1

warriors,

Mongols were “extremely mobile, well organized, and superbly

was evident

in the

conquering of China, Central Asia, and

army, led by Batu, the grandson of Jenghiz Khan,

Kievan Rus and

the

This

Iran. In 1237, the

Mongol

approached the perimeters of

first

1240 took Kiev.

in

Though Prince Mykhailo

commander by

1

led.”

tied, residents

put up a strong resistance under a military

name of Dmytro who was dispatched by Danylo of Galicia.

After a

“long and bitter siege,” the Mongols penetrated the city walls, fighting broke out from
street to street,

house to house, and

in early

December of

1240, the city

fell.

The

story of

important to understanding the

common

historical roots shared

Ukrainians and Russians and appreciating the

fact that

Ukrainian ancestors were once

Kievan Rus

among

is

the elite of European civilization, even though

Ukraine as “backward”

politically,

many

by

Westerners today label

economically, and socially. Afterwards, however,

Ukraine experienced centuries of foreign invasion and occupation, which has bred

contemporary concern

for the protection

of Ukrainian culture and

identity, particularly in

the age of post-Soviet globalization.

After the

Mongol invasion Kievan Rus was divided between Poland,

and Hungary, while Muscovy became a power
maintained

much of their

structure, including the

legal

autonomy

Orthodox

in its

own

until 1569. In

religion,

remained

1

right.

doing

in place.

"

so,

Lithuania,

Territories around

much of the

The Cossacks

Kiev

social

resisted

Polish rule, particularly the threat of enserfment, and established a quasi-state called the

Hetmanate

after the

Great Rebellion

1

in

1648.

'

Today, Ukrainian Cossacks are revered

as a militant group of fierce warriors resistant to foreign domination and depicted in

Ukrainian textbooks as the forefathers of democracy.
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some

Western Ruthenian

territories

were absorbed by the Habsburg Empire

in the

1770’s where “relatively tolerant Austrian rule, and the intensity of the local competition

with the Poles, allowed the west Ruthenians to develop a strong sense of district identity

by 1914, and during the course of the nineteenth century,
‘Ukrainian.’”

14

The Ukrainian

national

to settle

on the name of

movement developed under “semiclandestine

conditions during the latter phases of (Soviet) imperial rule, mainly after political

restraints

were relaxed

in the

wake of the 1905

1

revolution.”

"

The

first

Ukrainian political

groups include the Society of SS. Cyril and Methodius, which developed

and

Hromada (community), which developed

and

illiterate

in the l<S60’s.

With

in

the 1840's

a small intelligentsia

peasantry, efforts to establish independence in opportunities that arose after

1917 were unsuccessful.

The Union of Soviet

Socialist Republics

ended attempts for Ukrainian

independence. The constitution of this newly created multi-republic federation formally
limited Soviet intervention in domestic affairs and protected the right of member states to

secede, while authority over foreign affairs, the military, commerce, and transportation

ultimately resided in

authority over

all

Party apparatus.

Moscow.

levels

Essentially, however,

Moscow

exercised extensive

of government via the military, secret police, and Communist

The Communist Party of Ukraine,

subordinate part of a single Russian

Communist

At the same time, Ukraine did enjoy

for example, declared itself to be a

Party, subservient in

a brief period

all affairs.

of cultural revival

1920’s, prior to Stalin's consolidation of power. This led to “brutal

in the

clampdown from

1929-30, a halt to further Ukrainianization in 1933, and worst of all, the Great Famine of
1932-3,

in

which an estimated

five to

seven million perished.”"’ Reform policies targeted
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)

kulaks (wealthy peasants) in efforts to redistribute wealth through progressive taxation,

form of

seizing of property, and even deportation. Resistance to collectivization took the

revolts, cattle slaughters,

By

delivery quotas.

industrial

workers

population.

bias

Heavy

and machinery destruction and was typically met with increased

the outbreak of World

tripled,

vast majority

industry

was

the

primary focus of industrialization, with a regional

is still

the center of industry today.

also witnessed a series of purges throughout the

of Ukrainian dissidents were

uprising in 1941,

industrial production quadrupled,

11,

and urban residents grew to over one-third of the overall

toward Eastern Ukraine, which

The 1930’s

War

when

the

killed.

As

a result, there

USSR

in

which

the

was no national

Germans invaded. Favorable sentiments toward shedding

Soviet occupation quickly faded with the brutal nature of Nazi rule. After the war, Uviv

and Kiev became the main hubs of a dissident movement

among

a

new

century occupation

KGB

made Ukraine more homogenous

of the population by the

In April

fall

as large Polish,

same

of the Soviet Union.

of 1986, the worst nuclear accident

long-term impact of this disaster

initiated a

in the

1960's

(

eliminated this movement. Demographically, 20

minorities were deported or killed in the holocaust. At the

20%

developed

generation of cultural intelligentsia. In three waves of suppression

66, 1972-73, 1976-80), the

over

that

is still

being

felt

1965th

German, and Jewish

time, Russians grew' to

17

in history

occurred

in

Chernobyl. The

today. That same year, Gorbachev

campaign of perestroika restructuring and glasnost (openness). Ukraine
(

proceeded cautiously with the advent of these reforms,
experienced

in

in contrast to

the Baltics and Transcaucasian Republics.

unofficial groups

began

in

1987, mostly in Lviv and Kiev.
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mass movements

The spontaneous

A

year

later

creation of

mass mobilization

emerged

in the public

demonstrations and the establishment of national organizations.

National revival became widespread and overt

1989. National leaders (re)emerged,

in

mostly cultural activists and dissidents of 1960’s. In the

language gained
history

of 1989, the Ukrainian

language. Intellectual attention toward

official status as the national

and religion resurfaced,

fall

new

in addition to

social

movements centered upon

economic and environmental concents.

The

first

contested elections for the

Soviet Ukraine, were held on

monopoly of power.

A

March

Soviet, the parliamentary

This ended the

4, 1990.

strong democratic block formed by

defections of Communist party

shifted

Supreme

members on

Communist

body

in

Party’s

May, which was aided by

various issues. Leadership positions rapidly

and Leonid Kravchuk, the former secretary of ideology

in the

Communist

Party of

Ukraine, was elected chairman of the Supreme Soviet. Kravchuk was a pragmatic
transitional leader

who

navigated between the

Communist majority and democratic

opposition.

On

lh

July 16

,

1990 sovereignty was declared. Full independence of Ukraine was

declared on August 24, 1991 after the failed coup in

the

Moscow

in

August of 1991 During
.

emergency session which established independence, MP’s brought

a

huge blue and

yellow banner into the chamber, the traditional colors of Ukraine, to symbolize their
break with the Soviet Union. The Rada passed a

boundary law

from

a

in

November. This

laid the

union republic to an independent

was held on December

s
'

I

along with the

new

citizenship law in October and state

foundation for the transformation of Ukraine

A

state.

national referendum
Ix

first

presidential election.
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on independence
Voter turnout was

84%

90%

and the referendum on independence passed with

elected the

first

support.

president of independent Ukraine and took office

Kravchuk was

December

lh

5

.

Ukraine’s statement of independence actually consisted of two documents, a
Declaration of State Sovereignty and

reflects the multifaceted nature

Law

of Economic Independence of Ukraine. This

of the transition process. These documents stated

Verkhovna Rada (Supreme Council), formerly called
body

that

the

Supreme

Soviet,

was

that the

the only

could speak on behalf of the Ukrainian people, and that the territory formerly

called the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic

was

indivisible within

its

current

boundaries. Seeking to emphasize economic, as well as political independence,

independent Ukraine expressed

fiscal

its

intentions to create independent price, customs, and

systems. Independent Ukraine claimed responsibility for

right to introduce

its

own

currency.

The country sought

development of the Ukrainian people, protect the
nationalities within the country,

and create

its

right

to

its

budget and reserved the

promote national-cultural

of cultural development

own armed

for all

forces and domestic security

services.

Future foreign policy was to be neutral, without participation in military blocks,

while adhering to anti-nuclear principles of never accepting, making, or purchasing
nuclear weapons.

The most pressing

task facing the

new government was

Ukraine’s relationship with former Soviet neighbors.

On December

8,

deciding on

1991 the

government leaders from Ukraine, Russia, and Belarus signed the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS)
Soviet

in

Minsk. The treaty eliminated the

Union and recognized

that all spheres

political existence

of the

of common activity betw een the three

73

5

nations

would be conducted on the

basis of equal rights. Later that month,

1

of the

1

1

former Soviet republics joined CIS on the same terms.

On

June 28, 1996 a new democratic constitution was

ratified, nearly five

after independence. This

gave Ukraine the dubious distinction of being the

Soviet republic to do so.

The

historic

between Rada deputies, ending

in

document was

The

political

principles of

its

an all-night, sixteen-hour session without breaks.

system was a “republic”

in

which

state

power

is

is

to “affirm

freedoms include the right

law-based

social,

“exercised on the

division into legislative, executive, and judicial power.”

duty of the state”

former

last

the product of intense negotiations

Ukraine was constituted as a “sovereign and independent, democratic,
state.”

years

and ensure human rights and freedoms.”

10

20

The “main
These

to:

freedom, thought, speech, religion, association, assembly, petition

life,

property, entrepreneurial activity, strike, rest, social protection, housing
sufficient standard

of living, safe environment, free access

to information,

marriage, education, expression, compensation for damages, to

know

rights, legal

assistance

According
^2
elections.”

vested

to the Constitution, the “will

]

in the

Citizens

at least

1

8 years of

of the people

is

age are eligible to vote. Legislative power

Rada. The Rada consists of 450 National Deputies

ballot to four-year terms based

who

is

are elected by secret

on universal, equal, and direct suffrage. Deputies must be

citizens at least twenty-one years of age with the right to vote

for five years prior to election.

exercised through

and residence

Rada elections are conducted the

the fourth year of the term. Deputies

must take an oath

that

last

in

Ukraine

Sunday of March

swears allegiance

to

in

Ukraine,

protection of the sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and compliance with the

Constitution and laws of Ukraine. Deputies are not to be “held criminally liable, detained
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or arrested without the consent of the

the

Rada begin on

the

first

Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine.”

Tuesday of February and on the

2

"

Regular sessions of

Tuesday of September

first

each year. Meetings are to be conducted openly, unless the majority of the Rada decide to
hold a closed session. According to the Constitution, the Rada has thirty-six enumerated

powers, which include making laws, approving the budget, declaring war, impeaching the
President,

and making appointments, such

as the

members of the

Central Electoral

Commission.

The President

is

territorial indivisibility

human and

the head of the state and “guarantor of state sovereignty and

of Ukraine, the observance of the Constitution of Ukraine and

citizens’ rights

and freedoms.”

2

'

Presidents are elected by secret ballot for

five-year terms on the basis of universal, equal and direct suffrage.

election

in

one must be

a citizen

who

is at

least

eligible for

35 years old, have the right to vote, resided

Ukraine ten years prior to Election Day, and have

command

(Ukrainian). Presidents are limited to two consecutive terms.

elect

To be

of the

Once

state

language

elected, the President

must take an oath administered by the Chairman of the Constitutional Court

swears allegiance to Ukraine and pledges
rights

to protect the

that

sovereignty of Ukraine and the

of citizens, as well as provide for the welfare of the Ukrainian people. According to

the Constitution, the President has 31

enumerated powers, which include signing

into laws, representing the state in international relations,

commanding

the

armed

bills

forces,

and appointing diplomats, the Prime Minister and Cabinet.

The Cabinet of Ministers
The Cabinet

is

is

the highest

composed of the “Prime

government body

in the

executive branch.

Minister, First Vice Prime Minister, three Vice

4

Prime Ministers and the Ministers.”" The Prime Minister
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is

appointed by the President

and approved by one-half of the Rada. The President, based on the submission of the

Prime Minister, also appoints other Cabinet members. The Cabinet has ten enumerated

powers including implementation of domestic and foreign policy of the

State

and the

execution of the Constitution and the laws of Ukraine.
In Ukraine, justice

is

“administered exclusively by the courts.”

2

^

The

Constitutional Court and courts of general jurisdiction undertake judicial proceedings.

become
in

judge on a general court, one must be

Ukraine for

have
in

a

at least ten years,

at least three

any

command

There are nine main principles

)

2)

membership

that

twenty-five years of age, resided

the state language, have a legal education, and

years work experience in law.

political activity, including

1

at least

"

Judges are prohibited from taking part

in political parties

guide judicial proceedings:

Equality before the law

Ensuring that

4)

Freedom

guilt is

proved

6)

and debate evidence
Prosecution undertaken by State representative
Ensuring right of accused to defend himself or herself

7)

Public

8)

9)

and trade unions.

Legality

3)

5)

To

to present

trial

Right to appeal

Court decisions are binding

The Supreme Court
Constitutional Court

is

is

the highest court of the courts of general jurisdiction.

the “sole

body of constitutional jurisdiction

in

The

Ukraine” and

“provides the official interpretation of the Constitution of Ukraine and the laws of
Ukraine.”"

The Court

consists of eighteen judges.

Judges, each appoints six judges.

must be

at least

To become

40 years of age, have resided

The

a judge

in
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President, Rada, and Congress of

on the Constitutional Court, one

Ukraine for the

last

20 years,

command

the state language,

law. Court

term.”

2

special

*

have a legal education, and have

members

ten years

is

elected by secret ballot to one three-year term

meeting of Court members. The authority of the Court

is

is

twofold:

1

)

to

of the actions of the President, Cabinet, and Rada; and 2)

meaning of the Constitution.
Ukraine

work experience

in

are appointed for nine-year terms without the right to serve a “repeat

The Chairman of the Court

the constitutionality

the

at least

at a

determine

to interpret

-

a federal republic with both centralized

and decentralized powers. The

Constitution defines local self-government as the right of a territorial

community

to

“independently resolve issues of local character within the limits of the Constitution and
the laws

of Ukraine.’"" District and oblast councils are bodies of

represent the interests of villages, settlements, and

secret ballot to four-year

cities.

local

that

Council members are elected by

terms on the basis of universal, equal and direct suffrage.

Council members elect a chairman to their respective council, whether
to lead the

government

district

or oblast,

executive staff of the council. The State participates in the creation of local

budgets and “financially supports local self-government.’”
Serhii Holovatyi,

1

one of the principal authors of the Constitution,

stated that by

adopting this Constitution Ukraine had “joined the league of European nations- nations
that

up

have chosen democracy and freedom, and there

his seat in the

Rada, as required

Minister. Other politicians

were

in

the

who

no going back.”

Moroz was

Anton Buteiko,

First
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Holovatyi gave

follow the newly instituted constitutional

a

key player

held various political positions to choose one.

politicians to court, such as

"

Constitution, to retain his duties as Justice

less inclined to

procedure. Rada Chairman, Oleksandr

politicians

new

is

in efforts to

Moroz took

force

several

Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs.

A

majority of Rada deputies took an oath of allegiance to uphold the Constitution on July
th

12

,

1996, but 63 deputies did not. 57 of these deputies were from the

faction.

Communists argued

were implemented

it

after they

that the Constitution

Communist

and corresponding oath of allegiance

were elected, which precluded deputies from being bound

to

during the current convocation.

The new Constitution

constituted a significant step in solidifying

The major challenge

the formal political system in Ukraine.

the application

that

and adherence

to the delineated

democracy

since ratification has been

powers and

rights.

Experience has shown

less to

do with constitutional

formal political power

in

independent Ukraine has had

much more

to

do with the allocation of resources. Listing dozens of

provisions and

freedoms

that

government may not infringe on makes sense, considering the generations

of foreign rule that repeatedly abused

human

rights, but constituting

extensive set of ideas with which the country had

difficult to

as

implement. The

political

creating apathy and cynicism for

The foundation

little

process has yet to

much of the

for real political

in

massive transformation from a Soviet-controlled

in

an

experience with has proved very

fulfill

first fifteen

power

Ukraine

constitutional obligations,

years since independence

independent Ukraine was

command economy

set

by the

to a capitalist

economy. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine inherited an economy based

in

heavy industry and dependent on outdated technology. Ukraine's primary challenge since
independence has been
steel, coal,

to diversify its

economy and reduce dependence on

and weaponry, which have become even

industries like

less viable after traditional export

markets broke down. Significant restructuring, however, has been impeded by vested
bureaucratic and economic interests. These interests seek to maintain elements of central
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planning for personal benefit, creating a lack of consensus
elites

among

regarding the direction and scope of economic reform.

progressed gradually

Oligarchy

a result, diversification

at best.

essential to understanding post-Soviet

is

As

and business

political

economic development

Ukraine. The meaning of “oligarch” in the contemporary Ukrainian context
different than political-historical understandings of oligarchy as rule

is

in the

slightly

of the wealthy.

Ukrainian oligarchs are individuals that serve as the primary owners of major

conglomerates and have direct access and influence with the most powerful
leaders. Oligarchic groups

developed with the end of Communism, though several

members previously served

as

regional lines and built their

powerful presidency

at the

political

Communist

power within

officials.

These groups largely formed along

a system that enabled oligarchy, through a

head of government, and a competitive economic structure,

with no foundation of law.

Commodity
decade after the

fall

trading

was

the

main source of revenue

of the Soviet Union. Commodities,

for oligarchs in the first

like gas, coal,

and

steel,

were

highly lucrative through the use of fraud and stealing additional profit from government

assistance. This practice took a variety

of forms, often simultaneously. The

regional monopolies to varying oligarchs for gas sales. Oligarchs

controlled prices and resell the gas at

would

refrain

state, as in the

much

from actually paying for

case of Russian gas imports.

would buy gas

higher, market-driven prices.

their purchases;

When

given through bailer deals, often reducing tax
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bills

state granted

some even gave

Many

at state

oligarchs

these bills to the

oligarchs paid, sizeable discounts were

with deliveries

in kind.

Oligarchs also

many

benefited from

legal

exemptions

allowed them

that

to

avoid paying taxes

all

together and government subsides which helped finance their enterprises.

Regional oligarchic groups expanded and consolidated power

in a variety

of ways.

Oligarchs compromised the idea of divided government by simultaneously developing
close personal connections with the president and constituting large party factions in the

Rada. This enabled oligarchs to control significant government officials across
offices in government. Oligarchic control over formal

democratic development

which enabled them

to

in the

law enforcement

many

powers was most damaging

sector. Oligarchs

owned media

to

empires,

manifest extraordinary leverage over government and society

outside of formal government structures. Those involved changed yearly based on

standing with the president. Violent crime was

rested

common

on just one gas contract. Gas oligarchs, such

from Donetsk, traveled with armies of up
Scherban

(in 1996)

to

given the amount of money that

as Ahati Bragin

and Yevhen Scherban

150 bodyguards. Bragin (in 1995) and

were both murdered, most

likely

by competitors, though

many

like

mysterious murders, these cases remain unresolved.

Kravchuk’s

flexible positions

toward democratic reform enabled him

to

provide a

moderating and compromising presence among both conservatives and reformists.
Substantive political change was limited, though formal sovereignty and relations with

the

West were

common

established.

military forces

Kravchuk faced

significant pressure

to retain

and currency within the CIS, but refused. Kravchuk’s prime

focus was nation building, though the president
policy, described by

from Russia

some

as “neglect.” ”

is

most remembered

Kravchuk

dominating Ukraine's privatization process.

A

80

small

for his

economic

failed to prevent corruption

from

number of individuals made

a

fortune, while prosperity

was elusive

for most.

Meanwhile, Ukraine's

inflation rate

reached an astronomical 10,000%. The demise of the Black Sea Steamship
constituted a symbolic low of the

was secretly sold

to foreign

itself

new

and President Kravchuk.

elections

would be

in

The

held.

to hold a public

If either

merchant

world

fleet in the

As

the

referendum or vote of confidence

in

referendum date approached, however, the Rada

new

elections in

June of 1994 for the president. These were the

parliamentary elections in Ukraine since
the All-Russian Constituent

largest

should not gain a majority of electoral support

decided to forgo the referendum and hold

and

era.

companies, mostly for fake debts.

Rada decided

In 1993, the

Kravchuk

Company

Assembly.

first

March of 1994

democratically contested

November 1917 when

4

Rada

for the

elections

were held

for

Deputies had faced steady pressure to resign

and hold new elections since the 1990 elections were characterized by widespread
intimidation of opposition candidates and their supporters.

The Rukh movement,

for

example, had no access to mass media were unable to contest half of the 450
constituencies because of obstructionist efforts by the

To guide

the

new

elections, the

Rada passed

1993. Every citizen 18 years old and over

the

Rada

was able

a

Communist

new

Party.

electoral law

to vote for

on November

one of the 450 deputies

via secret ballot. In contrast to other former Soviet republics, like Russia

Poland, the electoral system

was based

entirely on single

Candidates were required to be Ukrainian citizens,

Ukraine for

at least

two years prior

to the election.

member

at least

constituencies.

25 years

old,

who

difficult.
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lived in

Candidates could be nominated by

three different sources: their constituency, their workplace, or their party.

nominated by one’s party was the most

and

This was evident

To be

in the legal

1

8,

in

requirements. For example, prospective candidates had to generate a

members

in the regional party

number and

in degree.

of the

100

first

convocation, including occupation, address, passport

were similar

signature. Requirements

methods, but varied

list

in

nature for other nomination

For example, the necessary

personal background information

in a

constituency

Voting procedures required voters

list

was only

to cross out

of supporting voters and

ten.

each candidate the voter did not

support on a paper ballot. If these procedures were not follow ed, the ballot was discarded.

This was reminiscent of the preceding Soviet voting process where voters would receive
a ballot with

one name on

it

and then drop

it

the voting

voting booth. The cross-out method proved to be

w ith many

candidates on a single ballot.

was met,

cumbersome

A

cast.

Once

electoral law faced criticism

w ere disappointed
political parties. In

parties

that the

If at least

to criticism, Ihor

Commission, explained

was

who were

on many

new law did nothing

responding

at least

if the first

that the

must

half of registered voters in a

new

elections

would be

held.

fronts. Center-right party leaders

to stimulate the

development of new

Tsyluyko, Secretary of the Central

demands placed on

to ensure that proportional representation

quickly conceived just for the election.
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half

threshold

again, at least half of the voters in a constituency

constituency failed to participate in both elections, entirely

political parties

voting context

elected, at least half of the registered votes

participate in the run off for the results to be valid.

Electoral

new

run off between the top candidates was necessary

but not the second.

The new

in a

to enter a

constituency must participate and the candidate must receive

in the respective

of the votes

To be

box without having

the registration process for

was not abused by many

When

proportional

was removed from

representation

the law, party requirements sloppily

remained

in

0

place.'

Party development faced

many

obstacles in Ukraine, including the institutional

legacy of communism, the psychological legacy of communism, regional differentiation,

0

and burdensome electoral laws.
1990’s that

public.

showed

Some

Ukrainians possessed a “party allergy.”'

9% of deputies

example, only

same time,

>7

that

political parties

in the

the

won 40%

of the

1

1%

of the

total seats in the

laws hindered party development.

By

the 1998

coupled single-member

At the same time, significant

made

it

in

1993

Rada. The success of party candidates

Rada

elections,

how

many

in

relevant electoral

obstacles to party

Law was

replaced with a

districts with proportional representation.

social cleavages

were

tied to specific regions,

which

very difficult for genuinely national parties to develop. The three dominant

cleavages are ethnicity, language, and religion. The Russian minority

of about

in the

At the

number of registered

total

development were removed. The cumbersome 1993 Electoral
that

affiliation.

performed much stronger than anticipated

1994 Rada elections was particularly impressive considering

mixed system

In 1992, for

Rada declared any type of party

elections. Party candidates constituted just

candidates, but

in the early

were largely unpopular and largely unknown by the Ukrainian

parties

claimed

Scholars point to survey evidence compiled

1

1

million people,

w ho

primarily reside

in the east

in

Ukraine consists

and south. Ethnic Ukrainians

these regions speak Russian, in line with Russification policies under Soviet rule,

while ethnic Ukrainians

in the

west speak Ukrainian. Given that western regions were

absorbed into the Soviet Union

later

nationally-orientated population

than other regions, there

compared

now

exists a

more

to the country at large. Religiously,
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western

Ukrainians largely belong to the Greek Catholic Uniate Church, whereas most Ukrainians

at

large belong either to the Russian or Ukrainian

Orthodox churches.

are evident in electoral politics. National democratic parties, such as

s

These cleavages

Rukh and

the

Ukrainian Republican Party, receive most of their support from western oblasts, whereas

leftist parties,

such as the Communist Party and Socialist Party of Ukraine, receive most

of their support from eastern oblasts and rural central oblasts. Since independence, the
industrialized

in

and heavily populated

leftist

parties of the east

have been most successful

parliamentary elections.

A

second criticism of the 1993 electoral law was

high to be realistically met. Critics of the party
deliberately put in place to obstruct a

incumbents

meantime.

in the

A

smooth

in

that turnout barriers

power suggested these

electoral process

third criticism

was

that Central

were too

barriers

were

and prolong the tenure of

and

District Electoral

Commissions had too much power. Commissions were appointed by leaders of the Rada
and oblast councils, respectively. Responsibilities included registering candidates,
printing

campaign

literature,

organizing state-run media, counting ballots, validating

election procedures, interpreting electoral law, settling electoral disputes, and officially

releasing the results. In handling disputes, the Central

a District

Commission (DEC). Only

Commission, but

the

the

Supreme Court could overrule

Supreme Court was

Rada had not determined how

Commission (CEC) could

to elect its

overrule

the Central

practically nonexistent in 1994 because the

members.

These criticisms illuminate several problems surrounding post-independence
electoral procedures in Ukraine.

Former Communist

elites

had a significant impact on

conduct of new democratically-contested elections. This had a negative impact on
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the

democracy building

activities,

upon the creation of stable
next.

New

such as the construction of a stable party system centered

electoral coalitions that could persist

electoral procedures concentrated

appointed by leaders from the party

in

power

power

in the

in electoral

Rada.

oversight emerged from the Rada’s failure to determine

Court should be chosen. As a

result, the

power

commissions who were largely responsible

A

from one election

to the

commissions who were

lack of institutional

how members of the Supreme

to settle disputes resided

with the same

for administering the elections. This runs

counter to the purpose of divided government

in

democratic systems, which seeks to

promote competition among self-interested individuals

to

ensure one group or component

of government does not abuse power.
5,

833 candidates registered for the election with an average of 13 candidates per

constituency.

The highest number of candidates

in

one constituency was 3

1

Kiev.

in

Voter groups nominated 63.3% of candidates. Work collectives nominated 26.7% of
candidates, while just

the previous seats

1

1%

'

of candidates were nominated by

were uncontested. This, coupled with the

demographic elected was 41-50 (39%), suggests

was underway. Candidates tended

to be

that a

1

political parties.

fact that the largest

Half of
age

process of generational change

more educated than

the rest of the population

with engineers, lawyers, economists, and educators being the most popular professions.

About

75%

of candidates entered the race as independents. The lack of clear party labels

and high number of candidates made

it

very difficult for voters to

make informed

choices.

Survey evidence indicates that the electorate had serious concerns. The Kiev
International Institute of Sociology found that
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economic

crisis, relations

with Russia, and

The next

crime, were the three most important issues facing the electorate.

included the security of the Ukrainian

weapons

state, status

number of voters were able

to gain a national perspective

however. These voters had the resources

media

on the

Fleet.

Over 600

left

international election observers from

50

states

that the

themes from divergent

parties

dominated the

and 12 international

organizations declared the election generally free and democratic.

law were reported
all

a small

were dispersed unevenly throughout the country.

east. Centrists

investigate

Only

electoral process

to extrapolate consistent

National democrats dominated the west, whereas far

electoral

4"

Typical voters, on the other hand, tended to be saturated with regional

outlets.

politics.

of issues

of the Russian language, nuclear

and the future of the Crimea and Black Sea

in Ukraine,

tier

to the Central Electoral

41

Violations of

Commission who promised

allegations. Viktor Pohorilko, the deputy

to

head of the Commission, claimed

most common violation reported was the promising and/or actual delivery of

certain material

goods and services

supplies to villages.

4

"

to voters, such as

new

roads, bus routes, and gas

There were reports of violence, but these were not covered

w idely

by the mass media. Alleged acts of violence involved over a dozen candidates and
included activities such as physical assault and destruction of homes and property.

Among the most
Boychyshyn,

a

prolific

of these episodes was the disappearance of Mykhailo

key leader

leaders claimed that

in

Rukh who

sat

on

their electoral

committee. Fellow Rukh

Boychyshyn had been kidnapped because he had evidence against

high-level state officials that incriminated them in massive corruption. According to his

colleagues, this information

was about

to

be

made

remains a mystery.
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public.

The

fate

of Boychyshyn

still

75.6% of eligible voters turned out

made

for the first

the threshold of necessary voter turnout for the

450 constituencies

that took part

results to be valid.

This exceeded expectations.

votes in only 49 constituencies.

constituencies.

(

19)

and the

As

a result, a

Most candidates elected

far east

(

14).

round of voting and each of the

in

Still,

candidates received over

50%

second round of voting was held

round one were from oblasts

These candidates tended

in

in the far

of

400
west

to include national political figures,

such as Ivan Plyushch, Speaker of the Rada.

Two-thirds of eligible voters turned out for the second round of voting.
majority of eligible voters turned out in 380 of the

participating constituencies

new

elections

one candidate earned

were necessary for

a total

of

1

women were

Demographic

elected (3.6%), about half the

of newly elected deputies were between 25 and 50 years old.
largest electoral

group with 40.2% of the

successful party with 86 deputies,

vote.

289 of

vote.

round two, 338

trends favored

men under

number who ran (7%). 75%

4

The Communist

25.4% of the

In

majority of votes. This meant that

12 constituencies. After

deputies were elected, a constitutional quorum.

50 years. Only 12

a

400 constituencies involved.

A

Rukh was

136 were elected, the

Party

was by

far the

most

the largest National

Democratic Party with 25 deputies, 7.4% of the vote. The Interregional Bloc for Reforms

was the most successful
left

centrist party, electing 15 deputies,

orientated parties did the best, capturing approximately

Democratic parties took about
about

8%

of the

Soon

14% of the

seats,

4.4% of the

36%

of the

vote. Generally,

seats.

National

while Centrist parties assumed only

seats.

after the

Rada

election,

scheduled presidential election,

Kravchuk sought

in the

to

postpone the previously

belief that the election

87

would “intensify

destabilization processes, political polarization and the confrontation of political
44

In the

forces.”

feared that a

law, a

two months between

the

Rada and

“power vacuum” would emerge from

newly elected Rada, and

a presidential

presidential elections,

the

mix of a newly enacted

campaign.

effort received

Kravchuk ultimately decided

some

electoral

4

Left orientated parties,

very well in the Rada elections, did not favor postponing the elections.

postponement

Kravchuk

Though

who

the

support, particularly from National Democrats,

go ahead with the elections and registered himself as

to

did

a

candidate relatively late in the game.
Six candidates sought to unseat the incumbent. Like Kravchuk, Ivan Pluishch

(Parliamentary Speaker, 1990-1994) and Petro Talanchuk (Minister of Education, 19921994) both held prominent government positions. In

till

Kravchuk formally joined the

race.

Moroz was

fact,

Pluishch was the front runner

the sole Socialist candidate.

Volodymyr Lanovyi, Valeriy Babych, and Leonid Kuchma were

As

candidates of different varieties.

three liberal-democratic

the race quickly took shape, the

main

battle pitted

Kravchuk against Kuchma.

Kuchma
Kuchma’s

served as Prime Minister from 1992 to 1993.

political platform

of beneficial

ties to

to a

a presidential candidate

emphasized the creation of a new Constitution, the renewal

Russia, and the reduction of organized crime and corruption.

Kuchma’s economic platform emphasized

economy

As

a substantive transition

from

a

command

market economy, which included de-monopolization and greater

privatization in

all

types of ownership. Unlike Kravchuk,

by the opinions of his advisers.

4f
’

Kuchma was

heavily influenced

Voters tended to gravitate toward Kuchma’s

decisiveness and consistent calls for a powerful presidency.
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As

the

campaign unfolded.

Kuchma’s platform became increasingly muddled

as he sought support

from divergent

Communists and pro-market reformers.

groups, such as

During the campaign, Kravchuk and Kuchma had few positive things
one another.

Kuchma

tended to focus his criticisms on high-level political leaders that

surrounded Kravchuk,

who

power with the incredibly
Kravchuk’s rejection of
in

he described as “simply incompetent.”

difficult task

was portrayed

Kuchma campaign. Kuchma even went
should voluntarily resign.

Some

state, nation,

'

Kravchuk came

to

and economy.

as a sign of weakness and uncertainty

to

by the

so far as to suggest that President Kravchuk

scholars, such as Taras Kuzio, argue that

achievement may have been

elections

of building a

4

avoidance of direct confrontation, and use of compromise

force,

resolving political disputes

greatest

to say about

make Kuchma

possible.”

As

“Kravchuk’s

a whole, the 1994

were characterized by a lack of meaningful campaigning and harsh treatment of

independent election-monitoring groups from within Ukraine.

The

first

round of voting went

in

favor of Kravchuk

of the vote over Kuchma’s 31.2%. The only other candidate

Moroz with 13.4% of the

vote. Candidates

regarding the administration of the

number of absentee
a half million votes,

first

to

10%

in

some

reportedly took

to reach

37.7%

double digits was

and observers voiced several concerns

round. Foreign observers questioned suspicious

voters in rural areas.

up

who

The Kuchma campaign claimed

districts,

had been

falsified in

that as

many

as

Kravchuk’s favor.

Other grievances included violation of voter secrecy, manipulation of voting procedures,
ballot-stuffing,

and interference by

local officials.

The second round was very close

as well.

Kuchma

45%. Supporters of Pluishch and Talanchuk voted
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defeated Kravhchuk 52.

for Kravchuk,

1%

to

whereas supporters of

Babych gravitated toward Kuchma. Lanovyi’s
businessmen who supported Kuchma, and

Kuchma

Moroz-supporters backed

liberals,

was most

who

likely divided

between

supported Kravchuk.

4

*

Many of

as the "lesser of two evils,” though rural supporters

favored Kravchuk. The results surprised

outcome

9%

many

spectators as well.

Some

explained the

as a sizeable negative vote against the incumbent, rather than a demonstration of

widespread support for the challenger.

development

in

Others described the election a positive

Ukrainian democracy, but a negative development for the Ukrainian

independence movement.'

Kuchma was

°

1

Given

his desire to rekindle relations with Russia, a vote for

certainly not a vote for reform.

Not surprisingly, fraudulent

activities resurfaced in

round two. Voters

in

Kiev, for

example, were given ballots with Kravchuk's name already crossed out. American
election observers and election observers from the

Kravchuk administration were banned

from some voting booths

in

Odessa and members of the

Kuchma

in

Kharkiv. Meanwhile, the

campaigned
turnout

for

was boosted

in

electoral

commission openly

Kuchma campaign claimed

that

Lviv to aid Kravchuk. Given the surprising nature of the results

Kuchma’s

was

and multiple claims of fraudulent

activity,

within the electorate that

country between very different political identifies

far

west and

far east

The 1994

split the

first

task

heal sharp divisions

in the

of the country.

elections were the

first

exercise of democratic elections in independent

Ukraine. The electoral process created a constitutionally legitimate legislature. Formal
indicators, such as voter turnout

traditional democratic

demonstrated

that

norms

in

and popular candidate selection, met or exceeded
both the legislative and presidential elections. This

Ukrainians were very capable of certain democratic practices. At the

90

same

time, the presidential elections experienced a significant

irregularities

and

fraud.

particularly the central

unmotivated

As
not

To complicate

and

matters more, mechanisms of electoral ov ersight,

commissions, were either incapable or

district electoral

to effectively resolve these disputes in a legitimate

a result, informal indicators, such as

fit

amount of voting

low

levels

and transparent manner.

of fraud and electoral oversight, did

with norms of democratic governance. These trends would

common

in

at

ideal starting point for a

many

As

Ukraine's history,

of,

a result,

nor did

it

becomes

was not

clear that the country

fall

at

an

of the Soviet Union. In

have any democratic reformers who were

tradition or democratic leadership, the

some

part

of the old

democratic nation building was undertaken as a modest and restricted

problem with

establishment of elections and institutions

distorted for

it

democratic transition with the

process. Such a situation illuminates a

political

too

other Eastern European countries, Ukraine had no history of democracy

or dissent to speak

regime.

all

subsequent elections.

Looking back

contrast to

become

time, as

was

transition theorists

in the transition

outcome of the

who

focus on the

process. Without a democratic

transition can

become

the case with Ukraine. In turn, scholarship

in

quite

comparative

development would be better served by examining a country’s history with

democratic development, or lack of history, and evaluating whether

promote or hinder

a

democratic transition. Ukraine was certainly was headed on a new

path that differed from

President

who

this history will

its

Communist

consolidated

power

in a

occupation. This path, however, led toward a

system
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that

was democratic

in

name

only.

new

Kuchma’s campaign centered upon

fighting corruption, reforming the

and expanding economic links with Russia. Though positioned as a reformer,

economy,

Kuchma

previously served as the former manager of Ukraine’s largest arms factory and would

have been more accurately described as a technocrat. During his

Kuchma

first

year

in office

disrupted previously established networks of corruption, but only to enhance and

Yukhum Zviahilskiy from

consolidate his position of power. Early oligarchs, like

Donetsk, were out of favor. Zviahilskiy, a former prime minister, was prosecuted for

stealing

$25 million of state gasoline by depositing funds from government sales directly

into his personal

bank account. Unfortunately, reform efforts constituted a mere

reshuffling of power positions, rather than significant systematic change. After just a year

of promoting market reforms, dominant oligarchs reconciled with Kuchma.
In contrast,

Pavlo Lazarenko, a notorious oligarch, exemplified the prominent role

oligarchs play in Ukrainian politics, particularly after a falling out with the President.

Lazarenko partnered with Yulia Tymoshenko
Energy Systems of Ukraine.
Prime Minister

in

A

highly lucrative

company United

former governor of Dnipropetrovsk, Lazarenko became

1996. Widely considered

politicians for his manipulation

in the

among

the

most corrupt of Ukrainian

of the gas market, privatization, and agricultural

procurement, Lazarenko’s pow er soon rivaled that of Kuchma and he was ousted just a
year after taking office. Lazarenko had amassed a fortune from siphoning funds and

accepting bribes

in

exchange for government contracts as Prime Minister. The

foreign government leader tried in the United States since

was convicted of 29 counts of money laundering,
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fraud,

first

Manuel Noriega, Lazarenko

and extortion

in

June of 2005.

Kuchma sought

Larzarenko’s extradition on charges of money laundering and

involvement with three contract

killings, including the

murder of politician Yevhen

Scherban. Transparency International estimates that Larzarenko embezzled $1 14 to $200
million from 1996 to 1997, which ranked 8

decades.

2

lh

among world

leaders of the

last

Lazarenko’s legal team maintained his innocence and claimed

several

Kuchma

that

withheld evidence that would have exonerated Lazemko. Lazernko’s political fallout

with

Kuchma was

significant in terms

political leadership

transformed

Tymoshenko,

the President.

of building opposition because

allies, like

Tymoshenko

a

month

earlier in

Tymoshenko was

prime minister, was arrested

in bribes to

Lazarenko.

Kuchma had

in

fired

connection to charges of illegally exporting large

amounts of Russian gas and hiding over $1
prison,

from

Yulia Tymoshenko, into clear opponents to

also a former deputy

February of 2001, for giving $79 million

his fall

released

billion

when Ukraine’s

of the

profits. After several

weeks

in

highest court annulled the arrest

warrants and dismissed the charges. The President’s public pursuit of

Tymoshenko

transformed her from culprit to victim. Practically overnight, Tymoshenko became one of
the

most popular politicians

in

Ukraine.

Lazerenko was the sixth prime minister
In that time, there

were also

1

1

vice

continuity of economic policy and

investors.

'

first

in the first five

premiers and 28 vice premiers. This weakened

damaged

creditability in the eyes

Before being dismissed, Lazerenko formed

oligarchic political party, and one

years after independence.

opposed

Hromada

,

of foreign

the

first

to the president. In response,

purely

Kuchma

appointed a weak, but completely loyal prime minister, Valery Pustovoitenko, and sought
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to play the interests

of oligarchs against each other

toward

to deflect direct opposition

him.

What

is

often lost in discussions of Ukrainian oligarchs like Lazarenko

corruption in Ukraine

is

not so

much an

as often conceived in the West, but

external

problem

is

that infests the political

that

system,

something woven into the fabric of Ukrainian society.

For decades of Soviet rule operating outside of the formal system was the means for a
better life for

many

Ukrainians, rather than morally reprehensible behavior solely

associated with violence and organized crime. This social dynamic reflects the
disjuncture between theories of Socialist governance and the realities of varying satellite

everyone would be sufficiently provided

states. In theory,

their ability. In reality, great disparities in

for

power and wealth

resources were the only reliable and effective

and compensated justly by

existed.

means of social

Money and

mobility.

Many

transition

scholars emphasize the shortcomings of socialism in practice, but few emphasize

inherited

and institutionalized behaviors of the Soviet era have failed

though institutional

titles

been many problems

in

to dissipate

and structures have changed. As one scholar put

Ukrainian nation building after the

fall

it,

how
even

there have

of the Soviet Union, but

these problems exist today because they enable solutions, not because they are

unsolvable /

4

Oligarchy
his administration

was

in

Ukraine peaked under Kuchma. During

were central

a prerequisite for

power,

in

time the President and

to all oligarchic struggles. Direct access to the President

being an oligarch.

Many

oligarchs also held positions as

presidential administrators or advisors. This provided

political

this

them with a formal source of

addition to their overwhelming infonnal political power, manifested in
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extraordinary wealth. These interactions were not well documented

because of strict government restrictions on independent media
In 1996,

Kuchma

shut

down

in the

public sphere

outlets.

a television station in 1996 that ran a story

on the

mysterious departure of several of aides in Kuchma’s office. From that time on, phone
calls to editors

from the president’s office became commonplace. Heads of regional

administration would regularly contact networks

criticized the

when

a

government or interviewed an “undesirable”

elections, for example, the

OSCE

06

According

to the

media “clearly promoted particular parties over others.”
form of financial inspections or

freedom of the

press.

politician.

concluded “the media played a

election campaign, but not a neutral role.’

limit

newspaper or television

legal actions

by

7

the state and private

efforts largely

state authorities that

were undertaken

OCSE

concluded

that

it

was nearly impossible

Ukrainians to find an objective or neutral source of political information.
election law

was passed

in

December of 1997

parliamentary election procedure into the mixed system
elected in single

receive

is

50%

member districts and 225

it

that

for

transformed the

has today. 225 deputies are

deputies are elected in a party

list

proportional

if

the

an independent. The law waived the requirement that candidates must

of the vote

to

decide the election. Parties or blocks can nominate candidates

for proportional representation.

is

to

8

system. District candidates are nominated by parties, blocks, or by citizens,

candidate

took the

Although Ukraine had over 5,000 papers, 300 television

companies, and 150 radio stations, the

A new

1998

In the

critical role in the

OSCE,

These

^

station

4%. The candidates who take

The minimum threshold
office are taken

95

a party

must receive

from the top of the party

list

to gain seats

on down,

depending on the number of seats the party
party

list

appear on the

The

1994 elections

that

The

entitled to.

first

five

names of each

ballot.

law sought

electoral

is

to better facilitate general elections in the

wake of the

took nearly two years to complete. The mixed system was a

compromise between

a majoritarian system and proportional system/

candidates competed

in the

4

Over 6,000

1998 parliamentary elections with approximately 30 parties

and/or blocks vying for proportional seats. 400 foreign election observers worked

alongside local election observers to monitor the election.
million registered voters turned out for the election. This

for the first

round of the 1994 elections and the

of the vote and

Rukh (9.5%, 42

filling

seats).

Communist

Other parties

seats), the

for the

the

75%

most successful party, taking

who met

the

4% threshold

included:

(6.3%, 28), the People’s

Hroinada Block (4.5%, 20), and the Green Party
that

of the

Independents received 31.2% of the vote and assumed 138 seats, a

from the 1994 election. 206 deputies elected were between 41 and 50

years old, nearly double the second highest age demographic, 51 to 60 years old

seats).

Though

the total

the

number of women

number of women deputies was only 35

and lawyers

(

104

elected nearly tripled from the previous election,

out of 500. Engineers were by far the

most prevalent profession of newly elected deputies (162), with teachers
(57),

turnout

second round.

The number of seats gained by independents surpassed

Party.

slight increase

15 seats.

seats), the Socialist-Peasants’ Alliance

Democratic Party (6.3%, 28
(4.3%, 19

1

far the

of Ukraine’s over 37

was between

66% turnout

The Communist Party of Ukraine was by

26%

70%

(53), well behind.

96

(79),

economists

The new system presented many new problems
administration and oversight.

(OSCE)

reported that

The Organization

17% of observers noted

electoral process. This

was primarily due

is

terms of electoral

for Security

that voters

and Cooperation

in

Ukraine

is

and

local elections

highly fragmented.

separated into oblasts, which are separated into rayons (divisions) or

Rayons are then separated

into villages, settlements,

subdivisions elects council

and

cities.

members and chairmen of councils.

disputes.

second

set

According

The
cities.

Citizens voted with 5 or

in

Disagreements regarding electoral arrangements even prevented major

A

were

Each of these

6 ballots on which candidates were chosen, rather than crossed out as

such as the mayors of Kiev and Sevastopol.

Europe

in

had difficulty understanding the

to the fact that national

conducted simultaneously. Local government
country

in

1994.

local elections,
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of problems revolved around the resolution of election related
to electoral law,

complaints that seek to void elections results should

be submitted to the Central Election Commission within 10 days of the results being

made

public and then legal action can be taken through the court system. This led to

general confusion over which institution had ultimate jurisdiction to resolve disputes. In

several cases, complaints went directly to the courts; one

deadline.

An OSCE

was

tiled after the

10-day

fact-finding mission concluded that participants capitalized

on

this

confusion by shopping for the institutional alternative that best promoted desired

outcomes.
In

61

addition to jurisdictional issues, electoral review processes were inhibited by a

lack of standardization.

complicated by the

What

fact that

constituted appropriate evidence

many

candidates

in

97

was

unclear. This

was

disputed elections did not participate

in

review proceedings. Courts nullified elections for infractions that occurred inside polling

stations,

such as open voting, family voting, and unauthorized personal present.

Many

international observers witnessed these practices, but generally did not consider such

irregularities sufficient to invalidate election results.

According

to the

OSCE,

electoral

problems contributed

selective enforcement of election laws. In turn, the

OSCE

to public perceptions

strongly

electoral procedures be simplified in future elections to reduce the

systems being used

at

various levels and

training on the resolution

recommended

recommended

“

Though

the

that

number of electoral

that all election officials receive

of election disputes, particularly the principles and

underlying contemporary elections laws.

of

OSCE

interests

stated “the overall election

period was characterized by violence and criminal activity,” the organization concluded

that the “elections
r

i

framework.

were conducted under a generally adequate

legal

and administrative
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Violence was particularly prevalent

in

Odessa and Crimea.

A

mayoral candidate

Odessa, for example, physically assaulted another candidate and was detained. The

in

OSCE

report accentuates

how

difficult

it

is

to

understand elections as a binary variable.

Elections were simultaneously characterized as violent and criminal, as well as legal and

administratively effective. Violence and criminal activity

outcome of the election per

say, as the

OSCE

may

not have distorted the

contends, but the widespread fraud and

violence observed was significant enough to obfuscate the legitimate and peaceful

transition

of power.

There were

As

in

many

similarities

between the 1994 and 1999 presidential

1994, the 1999 elections were held

elections.

amid economic turmoil and accusations of

98
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corruption.

The

election

was

second round of voting

settled in a

that pitted a

candidate

who

portrayed himself as a democratic reformer, President Kuchma, against a candidate

who

sought

a return to Soviet style rule, Petro

Oleksandr Moroz

Marchuk

(Socialist), Nataliya

(Social Democratic Party).

registered for the

Vitrenko (Progressive

Twelve of the

campaign held government

Kuchma’s

Symonenko. Other

top candidates included

Socialist),

fifteen candidates

and Yevhen

who

officially

posts.

term witnessed three years of economic recession and minimal

first

democratic advances. In turn, analysts criticized

Kuchma

for failing to

make

significant

progress in escaping past political trends and advancing with the president's 1994
electoral platform/

0

economic decline and
the State.

Kuchma

In the

1999 elections,

to portray

attempted

government. According

to

Symonenko

to the President, a

was necessary

sought to downplay Ukraine’s

as a radical

who

threatened the stability of

frame the election as a referendum on representative

Communist

victory

Symonenko, on

repressive and unresponsive government.

strong leadership

Kuchma

to revive the

would

result in a return to

the other hand, argued that

Ukrainian economy. Both candidates

attempted to position themselves as the rational choice for overcoming contemporary
challenges.

Kuchma
22 2
.

finished atop the

% for Symonenko.

support,

round of voting

Moroz and Vitrenko

while Marchuk received

Kuchma's

first

8.

1% of the

55%

strongest in the east (33.7%) and south (3

Though Kuchma won

finished in a virtual

of the vote compared

tie

w ith

1

1% of the

vote,

Western Ukraine provided the base for

vote.

where he received

w ith 36.5%

1

of the

vote. In contrast,

Symonenko was

.5%), compared to a paltry

a plurality, a run-off election

99

4.9%

in the

west.

between the top two candidates was

"

implemented

in line

A

with electoral law.

Kuchma was no

second round victory for

combined

thing, considering that the top four opposition candidates

to earn

over

sure

50%

of

the votes in round one.

Kuchma

Marchuck supporters, but

figured he could depend on votes from

appointed Marchuck Secretary of National Security and Defense Council to be sure.

The
In

fact that

two

far left candidates

20% combined

received

round two, both top candidates largely retained their

however,

Kuchma

combined with
finished

attracted

78%

vote compared to

voters tended to be younger,

western Ukraine, whereas

Symonenko

eastern Ukraine. Despite these

majority

among

of Vitrenko voters and

of Marchuck voters resulted

w ith 56.2% of total

Kuchma

45%

in a

37.8%

more

categories.

In

round voters. Surprisingly,

35%

of Moroz voters. This

Kuchma

religious,

this is

voted

in

enough money

income does permit them

two-thirds of Ukrainians

who perceived

favor of President

and predominately from

that

to

win

a

40%

of the population

buy food and similar percentage

buy clothes.”" Amazingly, approximately
’

economic conditions were getting worse

the first year of this term.

voted for Kuchma, however, thought the

still

to

to

puzzling to outside observers

Kuchma. One-third of those voting

economy would improve during

year, but

Kuchma

Symonenko.

for

considering that economic conditions were so poor that “over

reveals that their

victory."

voters tended to be older and predominately from

some ways

reports that they regularly do not have

"

cause for concern.

demographic differences, Kuchma was able
s

all

first

still left

'

economy would

for

believed the

Roughly 15% of those w ho

actually

voted for him. This suggests that Ukrainian voters

100

Kuchma

still

worsen

in the

in the

next

1999 elections

divided their personal economic problems from their attitudes toward reform and were
willing to bear difficult times if the hope of future improvement.

According

to the

OSCE,

70

the first round of the 1999 presidential elections

manner despite minor

largely carried out in a “peaceful and orderly

was

irregularities in very

few polling stations.” The second round, however, witnessed several serious
1

irregularities.

The campaign period was

arrests, illegal seizure

involvement of state

filled

with allegations of obstruction,

illegal

of campaign materials, circulation of defamatory materials, and

officials in the

campaign. The

OSCL

report confirmed that

“many of

these allegations were true” and “substantial breaches of the legal framework” took

place.

2

The most notorious

allegation of violence

was

the grenade attack on presidential

candidate Natalya Vitrenko.

According
a note the

come

'

eyewitness Nataliya Sokurenko, an aid of Vitrenko, Vitrenko found

evening before visiting supporters

to the

word).”

to

in the

Kryvy Rih region

that stated:

meeting with N. Vitrenko or you will be blown up together with

The planned meetings went ahead without

that

“Don’t
(swear

a disturbance. After the meeting,

Vitrenko walked to her car with a small group of political officials when an unknown

man suddenly

hurled a grenade

Ovcharenko, spotted

the grenade

The grenade exploded
leg

and

fell to

at

the ground.

A

them.

One of the

and was able

three meters

political officials,

to kick

it

Volodymyr

away.

away from Vitrenko, who was wounded

bodyguard jumped over Vitrenko,

in

the

prior to a second grenade

being launched by a second unknown man. The second grenade exploded a good distance

from the presidential candidate, but injured

others.

from the incident, 18 of whom were seriously

101

47 people sought medical treatment

injured.

Two

suspects, both Russian

citizens,

were arrested shortly

involved

in the attack, but this

after the attacks. Local police suggested that

was

Moroz was

largely dismissed as a ploy to settle personal scores

between Moroz’s chief of staff and law enforcement

officials in

Kryvy Rih. Several

eyewitnesses contacted Vitrenko's staff claiming the suspects were not the ones
hurled the grenades. The case

A

was never

who

solved.

second significant attack involved Vasylii Khara, a Communist deputy

Rada and supporter of Symonenko. Three men assaulted

KTiara

and

for the attack

Police rarely accepted political motivations as the cause of attacks.

the

his driver outside

Khara’s Donetsk apartment. Khara claimed the attack was directly related

of Symonenko. Local police blamed “local hooligans”

in

74
.

to his

support

This was typical.

Still,

leading

opposition candidates filed dozens of complaints claiming their ability to freely campaign

was obstructed by personal

threats, physical threats,

obstruction of campaign meetings. °

campaign materials were taken
Kharkiv, and Donetsk. The

When

The Moroz campaign,

in the oblasts

and national

for

example, claimed their

of Zaporizhiya, Mykolaiv, Dnipropetrovsk,

Symonenko campaign

the election officials discussed

Interior, at the local

removal of campaign material, and

raised similar complaints in Donetsk.

some of these concerns with

the Ministry of

levels, the Ministry stated that materials

during routine spot checks by traffic police or

in

were seized

searches of allegedly illegal campaign

offices.

The
in illegal

OSCE

campaign

also confirmed

activities.

many

The President

Oblast State Administration (OSA).

from campaigning according

reports of senior political officials participating

As

is

responsible for appointing the Heads of

civil servants, these individuals are prohibited

to electoral law.
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After the parliamentary elections.

”

President

officials

Kuchma

witnessed

OSCE

appointed 20 of the 27 heads of the OSA’s. In Vinnytsia,

OSA

officials giving

bundles of pro-Kuchma materials to the police

for distribution. In Kharkiv, observers witnessed the police actually distributing materials

at a

Mayor

concert. In Kerch, observers were given copies of a full-page article by the

which encouraged voters

many

to support

Kuchma.

blatant violations of electoral law

According

to the

OSCE,

elections fell short of

"

These are just a few examples of the

committed by

state officials supporting

Kuchma.

both the 1998 parliamentary elections and 1999 presidential

OSCE commitments

and international standards.

Yuri Scherbak, a foreign policy adviser to President Kuchma, declared that

Europe should be happy with the outcome of the presidential election because

“it

means

that

Ukraine will develop towards a market economy, towards integration with Europe,

and

will

become

a

normal country which belongs

to the

European region.”

7

Scherbak

*

emphasized the large number of young voters “who rejected the ideas of communism.”

Symonenko had
then I'm

100%

on the outcome, stating “if these had been

a different take

certain that

we'd be able

Commission disagreed however.
"there have been

to

Vasil Spivak, a

0

The Central

at least

no reports of any have

sl

immense campaign funding from

oligarchs.

of frequent attacks on opposition personnel and offices surfaced from

None of the opposition groups were

irregularities

claimed

blatantly abused his political position to significantly further his

reelection chances and received

candidates.

elections

Electoral

member of the commission,

no serious breaches of electoral law;

reached the Central Electoral Commission.

Kuchma

claim victory.”*

fair

74

opposition

satisfied with the degree to

were investigated. Though Kuchma expressed
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all

a desire to

Complaints

which these

work with

the

European Union and
the

way of results

NATO,

during his

International Monetary

neither economic, nor political reforms, produced

first five

Fund (IMF)

years in office. In

told

December of

much

in

1999, the

Ukraine that greater reforms must be

implemented before further financial assistance would be granted. The statement was
given after an

IMF

IMF

inquiry into whether loans to Ukraine should be resumed.

have been frozen several times

in the past.

loans

Authorities in Kiev acknowledged their
O')

inability to collect revenues, a condition ol the loans.

was

that if things did not

change disillusionment with

‘

new

After the election, the

liberalization

fear

would emerge among

the populace, mirroring neighboring Russia.

Still,

differ

Communists sought

from contemporary

example, a

fight

to obstruct

economic reform, often through means

that

institutional practices in the

West. In February of 2000, for

Rada between

rival factions

when one group

who brought

a

broke out

in the

Communist

seize the seats of a striking

faction,

Communist

tried to

flag into the

chamber. The Communists were protesting changes supported by centrists and right wing
factions, led

by newly appointed Prime Minister Viktor Yushchenko, which would

accelerate the pace of economic reform. Interestingly enough, the

had rejected Kuchma’s

first

left

dominated Rada

choice for Prime Minister, Valery Pustoviotenko,

the position until the customary resignation with the presidential election.

who

held

Many blamed

Pustoviotenko for Ukraine’s poverty and economic decline, which led to significant
tension between the president and the

Kuchma had hoped
term, but this

was not

Western investors

lost

that

Rada

Kuchma’s

in

first

term.

working with the Rada would be easier

in his

second

the case. Squabbles and personality clashes created gridlock, while

patience and economic troubles failed to dissipate quickly enough.
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”

Yushchenko

cast swift

and serious reform as an urgent matter

overlooked any longer. “These months

Yushchenko

in

December of

beyond

the country has been living

far left

1999,

may

means.”'

all

recognize the

s4

interests.

Rada and holding

sessions in a nearby hall. At the alternative sessions a

MP’s on

a

when

hunger

with Ukrainian politics

^

at

a

years

IMF and

puppet of the

incident continued with

alternative parliamentary

new speaker was

elected, igniting

members returned and were met by

center and right wing

strike.

is

The February 2000

the pro-reform contingent storming out of the

further scuffles

fact that all these

Natalya Vitrenko, representative of the

Progressive Socialist Party, claimed that “Yushchenko

works against Ukraine’s national

could not be

turn out to be Ukraine’s last chance,” stated

“we should
its

that

wing

left

Confrontations such as these illuminate the great divisions

the turn of the century and

by western standards, the

extraordinary use of parliamentary institutions to implement the collective will of varying

factions.

Kuchma’s

brief efforts toward stabilization and reform in the early nineties had

came and went. Post-Soviet

many

to find support in a

economy

in 1998,

elites

and oligarchs dominated the economic realm, forcing

grow ing underground economy. The collapse of the Russian

however, frightened many oligarchs. Oligarch parliamentarian Viktor

Medvedchuk assembled

a coalition of centrist

from external default. This helped lead
the Central Bank,

all

becoming prime

to

and right party factions

minister.

Kuchma, Tymoshenko knew

Ukraine

Yushchenko, the widely respected Chairman of

Yushchenko appointed Yulia Tymoshenko

the important position of deputy prime minister of energy.

outs with

to prevent

the internal

As

a former oligarch

dynamics of the highly

on the

lucrative

energy sector. Yushchenko, Tymoshenko, and a handful of assistants orchestrated a
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to

economic turnaround

substantial

in

2000.

A

direct assault

on oligarchic practices lay

at

heart of this transformation.

One

focus was deregulation. In contrast to

independent Ukraine tended to pay the least in

much of the West,

tax.

the wealthiest in

Immediately, Yushchenko’s

supporters eliminated 270 pieces of legislation that provided subsidies, tax, or regulatory
privileges for entrenched, oligarchic businesses.

barter. Barter

was an important means

turn, the State accepted only cash

privatization.

50%

to

payments

The government increased

60%. Many

were willing

to extract

large

to outbid

for

A

second focus was the reduction of

economic perks from government.

goods and

services.

the private share of the

companies were

A

third focus

In

was

economy from about

sold, largely to Russian

businessmen,

who

Ukrainian oligarchs. Prime Minister Yushchenko’s reforms raised

state revenues, turning the

1999

deficit into a surplus in 2000.

For the

first

time since

independence, Ukraine experienced economic growth.
Oligarchs turned to the

steel

business to extract the profits previously extracted

from the gas industry. Significantly, however, rent seeking was seriously reduced,
transforming oligarchs into producers, rather than mere parasites of state resources.

Yushchenko and Tymoshenko distinguished themselves
opposed

to oligarchs.

The Yushchenko-led

as strong political leaders

efforts saved the country

only diminished the role of oligarchs, rather than remove
Several important changes did emerge

enterprises

became

in

how

from

default, but

it.

business was conducted.

increasingly privatized, oligarchs accumulated

As

more property and

increasingly sought to publicity defend their holdings. This led to an enhanced focus on

production and investment, a sharp contrast to past rent seeking. The courts worked

poorly

in settling disputes,

however, leaving partners and shareholders with few

Oligarchs increasingly relied on vertical integration

subcontractors.

As

a result, enterprise

order to diminish reliance on

ownership became highly concentrated, even more

so than Russia. Competition increased, even

among

These changes, coupled with Ukraine’s desire

economy and

in

rights.

giants like

SCM

and 1SD

in

for greater incorporation into the

Donetsk.

world

international financial associations, brought greater transparency of

financial activity. Until 2000, there

was

little

public

knowledge regarding ownership of

major corporations. Oligarchic enterprises have since clarified corporate structures and
released organizational information, though journalists

such

hope

this is

only the beginning of

efforts.

In the first

capital

became

a

decade of independence, Kiev

modern

city,

making

itself

the leap from strict

democracy. The situation was much different beyond
however. Desperation was relleeted
of males.

In 1999, the life

fell

in the

this

government control

from 52 million

and other urban centers

decreased population and the

much
at

less than in Soviet times.

This sentiment

is

life

expectancy

independence

to

Meanwhile, the population of

50 million.

Given the oligarchic nature of the regime, Ukrainians struggled
continues to be a problem

to liberal

expectancy of a newborn boy was 65 years, 10 years below the

average of Western Europe,

Ukraine

was evidence of progress. The

in a society

to find hope.

This

with such large divisions between rich and poor.

encapsulated by one young professional:

one day at a time. do not want to think about what tomorrow could bring.
change nothing and we have stopped hoping. A few days ago met
my old music teacher in the street. She had trained at the Moscow Conservatory. Now
86
she sells eggs to earn a living. That is what we have come to in Ukraine.
I

Our

live

I

politicians will

1
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In

President

November of 2000,
was never

President

able to recover.

audiotape, produced by

Kuchma’s popularity began

Moroz

a steady decline.

The

publicized over a thousand hours of

Kuchma’s bodyguard. The tapes documented Kuchma

Gongadze and discussed Kuchma’s

orchestrating the murder of journalist Georhiy

criminal harassment of other political opponents and involvement in prolific corruption.

Kuchma was

revealed

Though played only
Gongadze was

at

the center of a corrupt

for the

and criminal system of governance.

Rada, transcripts were soon publicized on the internet.

a persistent critic

of the administration

who

mysteriously disappeared

in

2000. Though Gongadze's body was later found, his decapitated head was not, nor were
the murderers brought to justice.

a catastrophic event in

In response,

in relations

analysts,

Kuchma's

Kuchma

Gongadze soon became

hero whose murder was

political fate.

increasingly exceeded his formal powers to maintain

with oligarchs, often resorting to outright fraud and corruption. For

Kuchma pursued

parties to create

s

In public,

grew

in the

in

Kuchma

forums and protests a threat

“Ukraine without Kuchma,” was unique
generated and

many

in the level

cooperation generated

frequency and

labeled the unification of opposition

to national security.

among

This effort, called

of civic activity the movement

previously splintered coalitions.

Kuchma

size. President

blackmail beyond the scope of law. President

Kuchma

see “a single constructive proposal from their side.”

In April

power

neither eastern nor western agendas, but sought to rule

Ukraine as a personal fiefdom.

protests

a fallen

described the actions as a form of
stated publicly that he could not

NN

of 2001, the Rada passed a vote of no confidence

in

Prime Minister

Yushchenko’s government. The vote was secured through an alliance between
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As

Communists and oligarchs whose business
efforts.

While the vote was

Kuchma

V)

in

Instability

experienced

in

1

liberalization

Kuchma

am

convinced

that

Further solidifying himself as the

to retire

from

politics, but

more powerful. Kuchma did not look favorably upon

and popular unrest were festering

to a

degree never before

independent Ukraine. In the hours prior to the decision, Kuchma, Prime

Minister Yushchenko, and parliamentary leaders held urgent negotiations

resolving the dispute. Despite the vote,

in

out,

10

loss.”

movement, Yushchenko vowed not

leave temporarily, in order to return

move.

chanted “shame, shame,

tallied, protesters

Ukraine has suffered a serious

leader of the opposition

the

were hampered by

After the vote, Yushchenko stated that “as a citizen,

out.”'

democracy

interests

Yushchenko remained

Ukraine. According to Yushchenko, “those

Government today showed

means

parting shot at parliamentary oligarchs

hopes of

most popular

politician

voted against the Ukrainian

ready to recognize the legal economy and

that they are not

public politics as the only possible

who

the

in the

for public

who were

development.”

01

This was a final

essential to his dismissal.

The media was another component of Ukraine’s “suffering democracy.”
Pravda aired an

the 2002 parliamentary elections Ukrainska

Translated as "themes,” temnyky

was slang

article explaining

for the guidelines

on

how

Prior to

temnyky.

television networks

should cover major stories. These guidelines were secret instructions that were regularly

sent

down from

the administration to state-controlled and private

example was as follows: “This week Viktor Yushchenko
his political bloc

evident

in

journalists

Our Ukraine.

Please Ignore

Them.”

160

will

The

reports provided for

109

outlets.

make some

effect

numerous commonalities throughout news coverage
would expectedly receive

media

them

in

An

statements on

of temnysky was

Ukraine. Sometimes

directly from the

I(

'

1

presidential administration.

initiation

The response by journalists included

resignations,

of parliamentary hearings on freedom of press, and the establishment a new

Independent Media Trade Union. The impact was minimal.

State-owned UT1 was the only network, as of 2002, which had nation wide
coverage. This

is

particularly significant considering that television

of information for

75%

1

of the population.

f,

‘

Still,

the

was the main source

2002 elections provided

a broader

range of media that facilitated more diverse political views than the 1998 and 1999

elections.

The

OSCE

concluded

lacks a strong and independent

coverage of the campaign.”

Over

media

that

developments, “Ukraine

”

came

to self-regulate their behavior

of government pressure. Most television stations, for example, maintained

of politicians the government did not want to receive publicity. This trickled

reporters,

who

avoided working with

listed politicians in

personalities. This shift illuminates the uncertain nature

the Soviet system, the

Communist

networks were trapped

staying in business

was

of media

in

in a risk/reward

in the

modem

system of oppression. As

environment, where the reward of

best maintained by eliminating

media networks were no

addition to

restraint in Ukraine.

all

information that might

provoke the “key viewer,” Kuchma’s nickname among television managers.
Essentially,

to

Party distinguished between acceptable and

unacceptable behavior. Such clarity did not exist

a result,

down

order to avoid confrontation

with editors. Eventually, pressure began to include the coverage of events,

Under

still

could provide the electorate with objective

the next several years, media networks

in anticipation

lists

I(

that despite these positive

4_

different than other business in the country;

dependent on the ultimate approval of the President.

all

were

Punishment took several forms. Government responses
typieally be exclusion

that

minor

irritations

would

from the president’s press pool. More serious responses included

tax inspections, lawsuits, destruction

however, denied

to

of property, and/or disbandment. The government,

censorship existed. Instead, the

Kuchma

administration described

such practices as a form of editorial policy. These efforts focused on suppressing
criticism of the current administration

and financial backing of media

Though

the

and information regarding top-level management

outlets.

2002 elections witnessed reoccurring problems of favoritism, fraud,

and violence, the elections were significant

in

ending complete presidential dominance of

government. The success of Our Ukraine propelled a genuine and capable opposition
force into a position of national prominence for the

five presidential vetoes, a

to the

OSCE,

new

significantly

Election

Law was

in the

in

coordinating

Electoral

new

finally

time since independence. After

adopted

in

2001

that,

according

enhanced how democratic elections were conducted. Some

confusion was created due to the proximity of the
delays

first

new law

to the

impending elections and

legislation with past election related laws. ^

Law promoted

Many

provisions

transparency and accountability in the electoral process,

such as the introduction of multi-party representation on various election commissions,
detailed rights of international, party, and candidate election observers, and streamlined

appeal procedures for elections commissions and related courts.

At the same time, the
electoral

framework was

OSCE

argued

the failure to

that the

amend

main weakness of the

the Administrative Code,

the imposition of penalties for violations of election legislation.

number of provisions

related to

campaign

violations.

resulting

which deals with

Kuchma

The Rada declined

objected to a

to revise

contested points and instead largely acquiesced to the President's concerns. This created

where some

a situation

electoral rights in the Electoral

Law were

properly, undermining the overall fairness of the elections.

The

election

was administered

unable to be enforced

M

system that consisted of the

in a three tiered

Central Election Commission, 225 District Election Commissions, and 33,

Stations

Commissions (PSC). According

to the

OC'SE, the

elections in an “efficient, orderly, and timely manner.”

contends that most DEC’s performed well, particularly
did raise concerns that the

20%

of the DEC’s

experience

suggested

administered the

OSCE

Furthermore, the

’

in

meeting deadlines. Observers

commissions were also hampered by

a lack

administration and unfamiliarity with electoral law.

was primarily

13 Polling

applied legal provisions impartially as witnessed

visited. Elections

in electoral

this

DEC’s

CEC

1

a training issue, considering only chairpersons

The

in

of

OSCE

of the PSC’s

received training.

Only
proportional

political parties

and blocks were able

component of the

to register candidates for the

elections and this could only occur if the organization

registered with the Ministry of Justice at least one year prior to Election Day. This

requirement went before the Constitutional Court on March

7,

2002, but the court

declined to hear the case until after the election, fearing a judgment would be considered

“political.”

Independents were permitted to run for single

registered party

lists,

practices, parties

while

DEC’s

registered district candidates. In contrast to past

and candidates were no longer required

citizen signatures. Instead, parties

$50,000 (U.S.) with the

CEC

member districts. The CEC

were required

and candidates

to collect a

minimum number

to deposit the equivalent

in district

of

of roughly

races were required to deposit the

equivalent of roughly $200 (U.S.) with DEC's. Funds deposited by parties would be

reimbursed

reeeived over

if parties

4% of the

challenged before the Constitutional Court

Law

(Article 43)

was

who

The requirements were unsuccessfully

ruled that this portion of the Electoral

91

constitutional

.

33 parties and blocks, representing a
Central Election

vote.

Commission

to

3,504 candidates were registered

compete
to

total

of 4,002 candidates, registered with the

for proportionally allocated seats.

compete

for district seats.

incumbents, 233 representing parties and 180 independents.

There were a

69%

Another
total

of registered voters

The

took part in the election, which was monitored by 944 international observers.

President

Kuchma and

the direction of Ukrainian foreign policy

contentious issues. Both the

a

Communist

of 403

fate

of

were two highly

Party of Ukraine and the

pro-Kuchma

block. For

United Ukraine (FUU), condemned what they believed to be American led support of

Our Ukraine.

Critics of the president, such as

Kuchma might
mandated

single

I

12 seats,

more than any other

proportional representation. 42 seats were

member

districts.

FUU

won

through majority voting

in

proportional representation.

in

were won

The

Party of Ukraine finished a distant third with 66 seats, 59 proportional seats

and 7 majority
in the

party or block. 70 seats were

finished a close second with 102 seats. 66 seats

through majority voting, compared to only 36

Communist

concerns that

so.

Our Ukraine won

won through

to

not relinquish power, even though the President was constitutionally

do

to

Our Ukraine, appealed

seats.

This was disappointing considering the Communists

won

1

15 seats

previous election. The Socialist Party of Ukraine, United Social-Democratic Party

of Ukraine, and Tymoshenko’s block,

all

finished with just over 20 seats each, nearly

all

won 95

through proportional voting. Independents

Both

Kuchma and Yushchenko

5%

member districts.

4S

quickly sought to recruit independents to support of their

The number of women delegates

respective organizations.

2002, just

seats, all in single

from 35

fell

in

1998, to 24

in

of the chamber.

Analysts concluded that the 2002 election was by far the most contentious
election since independence.

w

Less than a week after the election, the

complaints that requested that results
includes

Roman

words “dropped
95

in

in

out”'

were stamped on across

the Donetsk region.

A

challenger Ishtvan Haidosh. Kovach was

in the

is

Kovach

when competitors

case.

Deputy Kovach was challenged by

in a

40-vote

a

farmer

at

four

someone with

new

be

split in

the

same name

as

confusion. In this

named Mykola Kovach,

in

addition to

10(1

OSCE, campaigns w ere

election, despite provisions in the

until losing to

loss. In addition to this

to enter the case, so that votes will

Haidosh, the main opposition candidate.

Electoral

the

most problematic aspect of the

Law

campaign environment. The abuse of state resources,
elections,

ballots in constituency

declared the winner, but results

secretly convince

primary challenger

to the

alleged that the

also encountered what analysts refer to as “tw in

their

According

name on

Zakapatska region

initially

polling stations were later cancelled, resulting

syndrome.” This

who

second example includes incumbent deputy Mykola

Kovach, who represented constituency 72

peculiar series of events,

the party's

received 99

One example

constituencies be annulled.

Bezsmertnyi, a representative of Our Ukraine,

CEC

that

a

for

fair

common

feature in Ukrainian

OSCE

observers witnessed

once again distorted the campaign environment.

improper or preferential use of state resources

sought to create a

campaigning purposes

in a

majority of

the constituencies visited. Electoral

inducements

to citizens in the

Law

goods and

also prohibits the distribution of free

hopes of gain electoral support. Observers witnessed

practice in 38 constituencies. In Lviv, for example, the local head of

coal with official vehicles during

working hours.

block were invited to receive free appliances

if

In

LUU

this

distributed free

members of an apartment

Kharkiv,

LUU

they would support

101

candidates.

Several opposition parties filed complaints regarding the obstruction of election

campaign. This was particularly pronounced

in

Eastern Ukraine and Crimea where

observers received complaints of obstruction

in

47 constituencies. Obstruction took

several forms, including poor access to advertising resources, difficulties renting meeting

space, smear campaigns, and vandalism of campaign offices.

constituencies, substantiated reports of “intimidation and

employees of local administrations, schools,
enterprises”

were

10

tiled.

pledge to support the

'

In

LUU

102

one third of

In

undue pressure exerted on

hospitals, universities,

and state-owned

Lugansk, for example, one association circulated a written

and threatened

that if

employees did not

sign, they

would

lose

their jobs.

Multiple acts of violence occurred during the campaign, including the murder of

Mykola
was

Shkribliak, oblast director of the Social Democratic Party in Ivano-Lankivsk

shot nine times by an unidentified assailant outside of his apartment

to the election. Local authorities

opponent, contended that

if

104

Shkribliak

Roman Zvarych of Our

the

murder were

invalidate the elections or cast a

prior

claimed the incident was a “contract hit” and did not

exclude the possibility of a political connection.
the oblast energy department.

two days

who

was

assistant

Ukraine, Shkribliak’s primary

politically motivated, the

shadow over

his

chairman of

name. Zvarych was

purpose was to

bom

in

America

and a Ukrainian citizen in 1994. Flyers that were distributed throughout the
suggested that Zvarych was a
papers to speculate that the

CIA

1(b

oil,

other accusations, leading

to

do with the

a suspect in the case.

gas, and timber industries,

was

Given

local

“just plain

that Shkribliak

Zvarych suggested

Shkribliak’s discussion of high level corruption involving regional elites

factor.

some

killing.

issued a statement that this speculation

Zvarych was not considered

an important player in the

among

CIA had something

The American embassy
wrong.”

spy,

district

was

that

may have been

a

After extensive deliberation, local election authorities decided to go ahead with

election as planned. Multiple cases of physical assault

and harassment of both candidates

and campaign workers were also reported. Affiliates of the Socialist Party, Our Ukraine,
and Tymoshenko’s block were the primary

targets. Incidents

were reported

locations, including Kiev. Odessa, Rivne, Donetsk, Kirovohard, Poltava,

The
problem

recent Election

in the

complaints (281

).

total

streamlined procedures for resolving disputes, a major

The remaining

1

13 complaints

were handled by

the

CEC. According

to

involved “candidate registration, the composition of

commissions, undue influence against election subjects, obstruction of

campaigns, and
reports

1116

of 394 election-related complaints. The courts resolved most

OSCE, 70% of complaints

electoral

and Lviv.

previous parliamentary election. The number of complaints was a concern

however. There were a

the

Law

in several

illegal

campaigning.”

10

The Ministry of Interior

of election related violations. Criminal cases were begun

also received

in 51

1

76

of these cases,

including 37 for placing campaign materials in places that violated electoral law.

The 2002
several levels.

elections were a dramatic

The power of both

the

improvement

Communist

for Ukrainian

democracy on

Party and the President

was

limited

by

the rise of a

genuine opposition group, which was pro-Western and pro-democracy.

Despite these developments, violence and fraud were
election process, though a

disputes.

The stage was

new

Electoral

still

Law enhanced

a set for a presidential battle

pervasive components of the

procedures for resolving related

between

rising forces

of change, led

by Yushchenko, and President Kuchma’s handpicked successor, Viktor Yanukovych.

Kuchma’s

rise to

democratic elections

power illuminated how democratic

when

this

Kuchma was no democratic
enough

to capture sections

“democratic” candidate

is

rhetoric can be effective in

pitted against a

Communist.

reformer, but he effectively portrayed himself as one just

of the country, such as Western Ukraine,

inclined to support greater democratization. Ironically, however,

that

were most

Kuchma moved Ukraine

toward oligarchy, rather than democracy. There was no overt and widespread fear that
Ukrainians would vote out democracy, but there was no genuine democratic contender

either.

This lack of ideological variance was a significant problem up until 2002.

A

second problem was the fact

institutions, yet

Ukraine had

a

democratic constitution and

without a viable legal system, independent media outlets, and

government recognized

civil liberties, the

overall political landscape.

manipulate and

that

formal political process was only pail of the

Such lack of transparency allowed

steal millions

of dollars

in state

the

Kuchma regime

to

resources over a period of several years,

with profound political implications. This illuminates a problem with transition theorists

who

focus on formal mechanisms, such as the establishment of elections and institutions,

with

little

or no discussion of supporting

mechanisms

that help provide legitimacy

support. Ukraine had a Constitution, but these civil libeilies were not regularly

recognized as a true check on political power. This suggests that elections and

and

institutions alone

do not constitute democracy. As such, definitions of democracy should

incorporate government recognized civil liberties to

President

The

elections.

Kuchma’s

position grew increasingly tenuous after the 2002

strength of the growing opposition

of the popular vote for proportional

Kuchma

some degree.

seats.

evident.

The Communist

same

get reelected, dissipated. At the

was

Rada

The opposition won 70%

threat,

which helped President

time, the opposition failed to create a

cohesive ruling coalition and capitalize on their success. This was due to ideological

economic repression from outside

divisions within the coalition as well as bribery and

groups.

Despite the electoral success of the opposition, the Rada was as oligarchic as ever
as half the

Rada was composed of loose oligarchic

approximately 300 of 450 MP’s were millionaires
the

Rada

to the

concluded

that

American Senate of the

first

stage of a coup

become increasingly involved
their past roles as

legal

American

dollars)

Later that year,

880’s.

to

and compared

Yushchenko

an oligarchic system of power,”

was being cemented

in political activity as

in the

Rada.

11,4

Oligarchs had

members of the Rada,

in contrast to

predominately private businesspeople with extraordinary informal

influence on government.

power were

(in

Observers noted that

I,,s
1

“Ukraine has never been so close

claiming that the

factions.

The prime incentives

immunity from

illegal

for oligarchs to

pursue formal political

business practices, the ability to block

undesirable legislation, and the extraction of state benefits via tax exemptions, subsidies,
trade reform, and privatization deals.

There were three main groups of oligarchs between the 2002 and 2004 national
elections.

One group was

led

by Rinat Akmetov, who owns System Capital Management

(SCM)

in the

eastern oblast of Donetsk,

Eastern Ukraine

is

the

which

by

is

that primarily

ore, as well as

owning

company

most industrialized portion of the country. Nearly on

country’s richest oligarchs conduct business in the

company

far the largest

produces

steel, but

Donbas

Korespondent Journal, Akemtov

is

SCM

is

Ukraine.

third

of the

a holding

has expanded to develop coal and mine iron

brewery and regional media

a

region.

in

the wealthiest

outlets.

man

in

According

to

The

Ukraine with an estimated net

worth of nearly $12 billion American and Forbes Magazine named him among the richest
2005. Akmetov took control of regional governance after

in the

world

in

Yanukovych

left to

pursue national office in November of 2002.

people

A
Interpipe,

second dominant group of oligarchs was led by Viktor Pinchuk, whose
is

the second wealthiest

company

in

Ukraine. Interpipe

Dnipropetrovsk, an oblast adjacent to Donetsk. The

rail

wheels. Pinchuk’s also

net

worth

is

estimated

owns Ukscotsbank and

is

located in

company produces

steel

pipes and

three televisions channels. Pinkchuk’s

$3.7 billion U.S., though the oligarch’s most notable asset

at

is

his

marriage to Leonid Kuchma’s only daughter. Akmetov and Pinchuk are the wealthiest

men

in

Ukraine. The political influence of these oligarchs

extraordinary economic

third oligarchic group.

no

company around which

is

central

sometimes called the Dynamo group,
in

Kiev,

immense due

their

power and personal connections.

The holdings of the
because there

is

the

after the soccer

many of the companies managed by

others outside the group,

Surkis-Medvedchuk are

the

is built.

These oligarchs are

team controlled by Sutkis. Centered

Surkis-Medvedchuk group are owned by

most notably government

typically hidden through offshore headquarters

group

less clear

officials.

As

a result,

ownership

is

and transactions. The group’s reach spans

regional electricity distribution corporations, large real estate holdings in Kiev, and the

three largest television channels in Ukraine (Inter,

Medvedchuk, an experienced

politician, has held

1

+ 1,

prominent positions. These posts

enabled Medvedchuk to wield tremendous power over
particularly regional administrators

staff.

Medvedchuk sought

to the

to

many government appointments,

and the Ministry of Interior. All of the three major

groups supported Yanukovych openly

Kuchma’s response

National Channel).

First

in the

2004

election.

2002 elections was

convince businessman

to

appoint

in the

Rada

Medvedchuk

as chief of

to support the oligarchs.

Considering the wealth of these men, repression was a more effective tool than bribery.
Typical incursions included raids from tax police and arrests of top business managers.

Those who did not give
the administration. In

in

became increasingly dedicated

to

Yushchenko’s opposition

November of 2002, Kuchma dismissed

his

to

government and

appointed Yanukovych as Prime Minister.

Yanukovych was more popular than other

aspiring oligarchs. Concerns were

quickly raised, however, over Yanukovych twice being jailed

in his

youth for violent

crime. Oligarchs were limited by their inability to create consensus and act in a unified

fashion.

Kuchma responded

to his declining public approval

the law and increased corruption.

Both were used as

a

means

President increasingly sought to appear unpredictable to

and foster cooperation. Though highly corrupt,

Kuchma

as

it

with increased disregard for
to preserve control.

make

oligarchs

would be inaccurate

The

more insecure

to describe

dominated by oligarchs. Rather, Kuchma's relationship with oligarchs would

be more accurately described as “symbiotic.”

110

120

1

Unlike the Rada,

Kuchma had

long controlled the judicial branch. In 2003, for

example, Ukraine’s highest court ruled that
retain

power

ceremonial

as Prime Minister and

role.

would

surprising.

potentially pave the

however,

that

Kuchma

way

would be

downgrade

The Supreme Court

was more disturbing than

it

constitutional for

Kuchma

to

the office of the presidency to a largely

typieally rules with the president, so the decision

The opposition feared

that the court's decision

for a coup. This did not happen.

The

court did rule,

could not be prosecuted for crimes committed while

in office.

This protected the president from countless accusations of corruption involving hundreds

of millions of dollars.

In addition,

Kuchma

could not be prosecuted

in the

Gongadze

murder, which he denied being a part of all along. With bleak prospects of a publicly
supported political future and immunity secure for the time being,
1

content to have a handpicked successor take his place.

The media, on

the other hand,

Kuchma appeared

1

became much more

difficult for

Kuchma

to control.

Resistance to censorship was sparked by the disappearance of Georhiy Gongadze. Fellow
journalists asserted their right to cover the investigation at the outset, often in direct

contradiction to the wishes of managers and

journalists

from covering

a story so deeply

ow ners.

It

connected

was very

to their

difficult to

everyday

prevent

lives.

This

resistance reached a breaking point with the discovery of the aforementioned audiotapes.

Though

television stations largely ignored opposition rallies and the political motives

surrounding Gongadze’s murder, journalists began to

fight,

word by word,

for greater

control over their reporting. In the face of this resistance authorities granted journalists

greater

autonomy

in

determining the content of news reporting; however, the government

simultaneously sought to manipulate the dissemination of information to the public by
countering with false commentaries and deliberately obfuscating the investigation.
After the 2002 elections, the opposition deliberately sought to

weaken

the

government’s control of media. Purchasing an established network was not an option due
to cost

and government obstruction. Instead, the opposition purchased

broadcasting

east.

When

company

purchased,

that

a small

reached twelve regions, including the Kiev, the south, and

NBM’s

audience consisted of 8 million Ukrainians out of a

population of 48 million, which spanned only

Poroshenko controlled Channel

5, the

30%

of the country’s

total

territory. Petro

Leninska Kuznia shipyard, Rosen chocolate

and Pravda ukrayiny (Truth of Ukraine) newspaper. Channel 5 quickly gained

factory,

popularity and

government

who had

became

the only station that aired content

which diverged from the

line.

Many

factors

came together

to

make Channel

5 successful. Talented journalists

resigned in the face censorship joined Channel

5.

Anchors brought with them

popular followings and reputations for professional integrity.
the

NBM,

To ensure

the integrity of

working environment, journalists and owners publicly signed agreements that

guaranteed management would not interfere with the creative process. The public nature

of this process helped
the

most up

to date

The format,
and fear made

to gain the trust

of prospective viewers.

In turn, the station

became

and undistorted source of opposition news.
as well as the content, differed

live television talk

from coverage of heavily scripted

shows

extinct.

from competing networks. Censorship

Channel

political events,

5

was

which held

the only station to stray

little

information, and air live talk shows. According to a survey by the

to

no substantive

Academy of Ukrainian

Press and the Institute of Sociology at the National

news coverage

in the

summer prior

90%

single viewpoint nearly

networks included the
This

of funding, and

2004

presidential election

of the time or higher for

all

major

was

stations.

limited to a

The most limited

National Channel (98%), Ukraine (96%), and

First

not to say that Channel 5

is

to the

Academy of Sciences of Ukraine,

blossomed without setbacks, such

difficulties with live reporting. Still, the support

1

+ (92%)."'
1

as inexperience, lack

of Poroshenko, coupled

with a staff of liberal minded journalists, enabled Channel 5 to successfully develop into
a relatively

genuine alternative

to existing television stations, a small, but

important step,

toward reasserting an independent press.

The growth of civil
civil society in

society helped to offset restrictions on the media.

The

Ukraine date back to a strong tradition of analytical centers, akin

tanks and watchdog groups, which

first

emerged amidst Gorbachev’s reform

roots of

to think

efforts.

Organizations like the Razumktov Center helped to organize coalitions and political
activities in addition to their

primary duties of providing policy analysis and research.

These groups were independent of government, but
society,

had no leverage

to

In

political activity,

such as voting records and media

1,1

addition to analytic centers, religious institutions have been an important

component of civil society
Maranovich, argue

1

Orthodox

in

Ukraine.

Some

resident scholars, such as Mvroslav

that religious organizations

collective mobilization.

the

Western notions of civil

keep government accountable to the people. Importantly,

however, analytic centers monitored
regulation.

in contrast to

14

97%

have been the primary mechanisms of

of Ukrainians are Christian, but the fragmented nature of

tradition in Ukraine has

made

it

nearly impossible for the government to

control religion as a whole. Furthermore,

less

much of central and

western Ukraine

is rural.

In

populated and industrial areas, churches constitute the only consistent and lasting

institution.

Though

religious institutions are largely ignored as instruments

of democracy

assistance from the West, the church has a long history of promoting national heritage

and liberalization

in

Ukraine, particularly in the west.

Differences between

civil

society in Ukraine and

America

reflect different

perceptions of the State. In the American tradition, limited government

important political principles.

Though Americans

intervention in people's lives and criticize

how

like to

among

the most

complain about government

inefficient

minimum

is

government can be, Americans

have expected the State

to

provide some

Great Depression. Even

in

highly conservative areas like the Great Plains, Americans will

quality of

life for

citizens since the

simultaneously state strong preferences for reducing the size and spending of the national

government alongside equally strong preferences

means

that

Americans tend

power and scope should be
potential

do good and/or

other hand, the State

is

to

view the State as

limited, yet realize

act in a

largely

way

for

expanding social programs.

a potentially

'

"

This

dangerous entity whose

and appreciate

that the State

has the

that directly benefits citizens. In Ukraine,

viewed as a negative force

1

on the

that operates in currents

chaos, corruption, and nepotism, rather than binding political principles

of

beyond a shared

belief in independence.

This was immediately evident

who was

in

a language professor in Lviv.

university

was

rephrased

my

politically active.

I

my

first political

conversation with a Ukrainian

began the conversation by asking

The professor questioned what

I

if

meant by

the

political.

inquiry to ask whether students demonstrated a strong interest in

124

1

government. The immediate response was no, students are more interested

good” and “helping people,” which were understood as

By no means

activity.

a

middle and lower economic

level in

The more people

I

poignant considering that Western Ukraine

in

this

was

spoke with, particularly

Western Ukraine, the more

have very different conceptions of government than

“doing

social activities, not political

comprehensive assessment of the public opinion,

nevertheless, an insightful statement.

in

I

at

the

realized that Ukrainians

America. This

is

particularly

the most nationalistic part of the country.

is

Ukrainians often laughed and described Ukrainian politics as circus-like. Ukrainians have
very serious concerns about the fate of their country, but conversations such as these
suggest that Ukrainians seldom believe that government has the will or the means to

work

toward the benefit of society.

Such

attitudes

began

to

change with the 2004 presidential

elections.

Kuchma’s

connection to the murder of Georhiy Gongadze quickly propelled the unpopular leader's

fall

from power.

In April

of 2000, Gongadze had created a web forum entitled Ukrainska

Pravda (Ukrainian Truth), which published investigative pieces on Ukrainian
business.

Gongadze was

inability to prevent

an open

letter to the

critical

of President

Kuchma on

a variety of fronts, including his

Lazerenko from fleeing the country. In June of 2000, Gongadze wrote
prosecutor general claiming that he was forced into hiding because

of harassment by the secret police. Gongadze disappeared on

September 16

Kuchma

lh
.

On September 20

that they

th
,

his

way home

2

nd

the night

of

the International Press Institute informed President

were deeply worried about the whereabouts of Gongadze. The Rada

then created a special commission to investigate Gongadze's disappearance.

November

and

politics

a decapitated

On

coipse was found near Tarashcha, 75 miles north of Kiev.

Gongadze's colleagues helped identity the body by describing shrapnel wounds

Gongadze received from work
to

move

the

body

to Kiev, the

in his native

Georgia.

th

28

,

Socialist leader

Kuchma

the

was Gongadze, then acknowledged

the

Oleksandr Moroz played the audio tapes for

which Kuchma discussed Gongadze with

in

first

in police possession.

On November
Rada

made

preparations were being

body was reported missing from the morgue. At

prosecutor’s office questioned whether the corpse

body was

When

allegedly rants “Drive

him

out!

Interior Minister Yuri

Throw him

out!

Give him

Kravchenko.

to the

Chechens!”

Mykola Melnychenko, one of Kuchma's bodyguards, recorded over 1,000 hours of tapes
in all.

Melnychenko’s defection was monumental

President

Kuchma. The tapes

Gongadze's death and

a host

in turning

public opinion against

constituted verifiable evidence of the President’s role in

of other

illegal activities.

The Kuchma administration

claimed the insinuations surrounding the tapes were groundless and threatened

to press

charges on the basis of slander. Secret services members expressed doubt that one of their

own would produce such
tape

was

against

his, but

tapes. Later,

however, the President admitted the voice on the

claimed the tapes were edited

Kuchma began

in

December of 2002

to rearrange the

words. Demonstrations

as prosecutors questioned the President and

related officials.

Several factors led to public demonstrations against

Kuchma. One

factor

was

the

increasing political instability surrounding the President’s involvement in Gongadze’s

murder case and

the resulting lack of

government support. Simply having public

officials

question the President’s legitimacy constituted a political crisis because of the vast power

of presidency

to that point.

This led to sharp polarization between the status quo and
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growing opposition
institutional

in

A

search of change.

mechanisms

second factor was the lack of effective

to resolve the crisis.

The public was informed of the Gondadze

investigation, particularly in urban centers like

Kiev where the Melnychenko tapes could

be bought. At the same time, official press and television networks were quiet and/or
controlled, the

Rada was deadlocked over how

and everyone knew

to proceed,

enforcement was under the president's control. This

law'

few options for increasingly

left

discontent citizens to influence the course of government, but the streets.

Young members of the
to

undertake the

Socialist Party

were the

first

mass demonstration. Other groups,

first

Assembly and Young Communists, quickly followed
sides of the political spectrum.

to pitch tents in

like the

suit,

Maidan and

Ukrainian National

coming together from opposite

The unifying slogan of the movement became “Ukraine

without Kuchma.” The imprisonment of Tymoshenko
the dismissal of Yushchenko as

Prime Minister

February of 2001, coupled with

in

in April

of 2001, significantly accelerated

organizational efforts for change.

Between April of 2001 and the Rada
organizations increasingly

worked w ith

March of 2002,

elections in

civic

the opposition. During this time, civil society

organizations provided assistance in efforts to mobilize voters, monitor polling stations,

and conduct

exit polls that

important difference

could be used

in civil society

much more

Kuchma/Gongadze

affair civic organizations

tended

protective of their activities in order to preserve relationships with

Western donors. After the

among young

judge the legitimacy of official results. The

organizations before and after 2000 was their

willingness to cooperate. Prior to the

to be

to

election, civil groups grew' in

people.
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number and scope,

particularly

Important youth groups like Pora. Cysta Ukraina (Clean Ukraine), and

Know) were formed from young people who had previously
campaign or were active
Plast, the

that to

than

in similar

Znayu

participated in the

(I

Za Pravdu

organizations like the Ukrainian Youth Association or

Ukrainian scouting organization. The

new youth groups shared

the assumption

be successful methods needed to be more innovative, active, and confrontational

in the past.

Pora, for example, had

two wings with

different levels of intensity,

though the groups often worked together during training and protests. The goal of Yellow
Pora was to ensure a legitimate electoral process by training and organizing young
activists.

Black Pora was more intense and sought to challenge the government’s

authority on the frontlines through civil obedience tactics inspired by the Serbian youth

group Otpar.

1

There was a significant gap
administration and

many of those

Communist legacy and displayed
that

at

Kuchma

Maidan. The older generation came from Ukraine’s

a level

of ignorance, even arrogance, toward the

fact

popular pressure could be powerful enough to influence important political decisions.

In contrast, the

fear

age and perception between the

in

younger generation was largely born

of authorities

like their elders did.

Many

in the

1980’s and did not exhibit a

traveled west as tourists, students, or

workers, not east to the CIS. These experiences produced exposure to different societies

and influences, foreign to the older generation.
Ironically, President

become

active, rather than

technologies.

to talk, text

Young

Kuchma,

himself, inspired

many young Ukrainians

to

remain apathetic. This new attitude was enhanced by new

activists relied

on

modem communication

methods,

like cell

message, even film unsuspecting members of government engaging
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in

phones

questionable activities. The internet was not subjected to the same restraints as television,

which enabled

critical
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of information.

Young

discussions of contemporary politics and the timely dissemination

activists

were particularly talented

at

using

humor

as a tool

of

mobilization. In Kiev, for example, activists dressed up in prison uniforms and

campaigned
cars

for

Yanukovych on Khreshchatyk,

the

on weekends. Another prevalent medium was

common joke
prisoner

was:

Why have

concerned that

is

Yanukovych’s criminal
challenged.

relations in prisons

his or her

the

improved

lately?

and jokes. One

Because each

often chided for his use of criminal slang and

numerous grammatical mistakes discovered

candidate registration documents and his habit of signing his

name

in his

as “professor.”

Yanukovych's image as a physically imposing man was forever tarnished when
protester in Ivana Frankivsk threw an

knocked him down and/or caused him

egg

at

him. The egg

to faint. Either

hit

Yanukovych

way, Yanukovych’s

in

fall

a

the face and

was

videotaped. In a severe political miscalculation, Yanukovych’s people claimed that

a brick, not an

to

tended to portray Yanukovych as intellectually

The former Prime Minister was
in

political cartoons

closed to

that is

neighbor could be the next president. In addition

past, these efforts

alleged illiteracy, evident

main thoroughfare

it

was

egg which was thrown.

Another equally bizarre incident involved Yanukovych’s wife, Lyudmila. After
visit to

Kiev during the electoral dispute, Lyudmila made a speech

Donetsk where she explained

that the

Orange Revolution was

States drugged oranges so that protestors

the capital

was

full

in their

home

a conspiracy.

would crave oranges. As

a

oblast of

The United

a result, she alleged

of drug crazed Ukrainians wanting more and more oranges. Like the
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previous incident, the speech

was filmed and

clips sent throughout the country via the

Internet.

Polls reflect that Ukrainians believed that

Moroz and Yushchenko were

the

two

candidates most likely to defend the country’s national interests above clans, while

Yanukovych placed
and

intellect.

at

the

In January

'

DNA testing confirmed
President

that

Kuchma

published

letter

he did not

According

to

bottom of the

in

list

of contenders when rating levels of morality

of 2002, Prosecutor General Mykailo Potebenko asserted

with

99%

certainty that the corpse in question

was Gongadze.

expressed his “deepest condolences” to Gongadze's family
Financial Times a London newspaper. In the
,

know Gongadze,

but

was aware of Gongadze’s

Kuchma, Gongadze was not

Gongadze's death, though

the government’s

grounds for

tragic, should not be

that

in

Kuchma

letter,

criticisms

an open

explained

of him.

most vicious

critic.

In turn,

political adversaries to

accuse

him of murder.
Studies of public opinion after the 2002 elections revealed that Ukrainians did not

trust

Kuchma.

In fact, a

Sociology revealed that
1

14

trusted the president.

elections

fair. ~

16% of Ukrainians
Few

The

electorate

was mobilized by

As

a result,

2004

trusted astrologers

future elections

of

a lack

Institute

compared

to just

office,

election, an

they had a right to protest publicly

would

in fact

more than

politically active out

belief in

of

13%
fair

not be free or

faith that existing institutions

many more became

Yanukovych from taking
Prior to the

Academy of Science’s

Ukrainians trusted authorities to conduct free and

(20%) and most (58%) believed

operate legitimately.

prevent

study conducted by the

would

of desire to

Yushchenko or

his policies.

overwhelming amount of Ukrainians (84%) believed

if electoral

fraud occurred, while only
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6%

did not.

Furthermore,

67%

of Ukrainians supported taking action against oligarchs.

oligarchs were aware of the growing animosity toward

possible Ukrainians could

come

to entertain the idea

them and

realized

Centrist

was

entirely

of an anti-oligarch coup. Oligarchs

supported Yanukovych, but in private some rode the fence

mostly belonged

to parties that

or favored either

Moroz or Yushchenko. Divisions emerged among

traditionally sought to maintain tight connections with the

Some

it
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oligarchs,

who

incumbent administration.

oligarchs preferred greater integration with the West, while other others preferred

greater integration with Russia. Socially, civic nationalism

of mobilization

in central

became an important element

and western Ukraine. Civic groups

rejoining Europe abroad and promoting

European values

at

rallied

around the notion of

home. These underlying

divisions in Ukrainian society rose to the surface in late 2004.

The 2004

election

a

new

Presidential Election

of 2004 and a new law relating

into force in April

2004.

was guided by

to the

CEC

was adopted

In contrast to past election laws, the Presidential Election

support

in the

Rada. The new law incorporated several

OSCE

Law which came

Law

in

June of

received widespread

suggestions, though several

concerns remained. Positive developments included efforts toward greater transparency,
such as permitting election observers to accompany the transportation of ballot boxes.

Concerns ranged from

limits

on

free expression to granting parties certain

advantages

self-nominated candidates did not have.
Potential candidates were required to

August

6th,

which

the votes, this fee

is

pay

approximately 80,000 euro.

a registration fee

If a

of 500,000

UAH

candidate received more than

would be reimbursed. 26 candidates sought

registration, but 18

by

7%

of

were

denied because required documents violated legal provisions. The remaining candidates

were then required

to

submit a

minimum of 500,000

nomination. Election observers

employees were pressured by

CEC
and

was required by law

this

in 15

of their

valid signatures in support

out of 27 regions received complaints that public

their superiors to sign for particular candidates.

to verify all signatures,

Though

the

no particular procedure was specified,

requirement was largely ignored.

Yanukovych’s presidential campaign emphasized

his current

power

as

Prime

Minister and heavily relied on ceremony and imagery reminiscent of the Soviet past. The

campaign centered upon greater integration with Russia, both economically and
culturally.

Ukraine had decreased trade with Russia from nearly

quarter, while

much of eastern Ukraine

made of sharp

division between east and west in Ukraine.

a pro-Russian,

pro-managed democracy,

Yushchenko’s more

nationalistic,

more

is

fearful

trade to about one-

Much

of western nationalists.

politician

liberal,

all

of the

Yanukovych

is

has been

the epitome of

east, in contrast to

pro-American, politician of the west.

Regardless of these divisions, support from central Ukraine, particularly the capital,

is

essential to political success at the national level. Contrary to traditional impressions,

Yushchenko

is

not from western Ukraine, but a native of the

northeast. Early in the presidential campaign,

that

was determined

emphasized idealism
(“1

to build his

Sumy

Yushchenko adopted

region

in

the

a pragmatic

approach

base from the bottom up. Yushchenko’s main slogan

(“I believe”),

voter comprehension of publicly withheld information

know”), and confidence, despite

many

obstacles (“we can”).

Yushchenko focused

heavily on attacking a corrupt status quo, claiming that the fair distribution of recent

economic growth was being impeded. Yushchenko also reminded voters

that

under his

tenure as prime minister higher wages and pensions were

made

possible through stricter

government control of oil and gas barons.

The nature of the campaign

raised serious questions regarding the

Ukrainian authorities to hold democratic elections. According to the

commitment of

OSCE,

“the

authorities did not attempt to create conditions that ensure a free expression of

opinions.”

'

Though

the voters had a genuine choice

campaign was highly divisive with
President

Kuchma

did not

a large

campaign

for

between multiple candidates, the

amount of inflammatory

material and rhetoric.

Yanukovych, but also did not take action

to

prevent or condone blatant misuse of State resources to support the incumbent Prime
Minister.

The

OSCE

concluded

that

even though a number of campaign events were held

by a variety of candidates and their supporters, “fundamental freedoms necessary for a

meaningful election process were

at

times infringed upon.”'“

4

In turn, the multiple acts

of

coercion, intimidation, and obstruction led election observers to claim that the
prerequisites for free and fair elections were violated.

of violence w as the attempted murder of Yushchenko,

The most memorable of these

who was

mysteriously

administered a near lethal dose of poison, which scars his face to

The

election

Commission was

was administered through

the only

president appointed the 15

The president chose members from

CEC

this day.

a three-tiered system.

permanent election administration body

members of the
a

list

CEC

to a 7-year

The Central Election

in the

Ukraine. The

term on February

7,

2004.

provided by parliamentary political groups. The

then appointed and supervised 225 Territorial Election Committees (TECs).

organized the electoral process

in

225

acts

districts
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and appointed members

to

TECs

33,000 Polling

Stations Committees.

PSCs were responsible

for the administration

of the polls on

election days.

According
genuine desire

CEC

to

OSCE,

to the

the

CEC

lacked transparency and did not demonstrate a

conduct democratic elections. This was evident

did grant relief on legitimate complaints; 2) the

TECs, who

selectively enforced electoral laws; 3) the

CEC
CEC

in several

CEC

modified electoral data after the

several examples

The

first

first

39%

a

1

Kuchma

never allow an aggressive minority to dictate the political logic
'6

Kuchma

in the past.

As

figured that Ukrainians

triumphantly declared that the “authorities

would respond passively

early as 2000, however, polls demonstrated that

75% of whom

at

odds with Ukrainian

ol

Ukrainians considered their country a democracy, while

A run

voters,

w in

a legitimate election

st
.

1
'

of Ukraine’s

to egregious fraud as

managed democracy was

favored greater democratization. Just

off election, as required in the Constitution,

two candidates on November 21

and

dead heat between Yushchenko and Yanukovych

will

1

ballots;

'

both received

future.

the

failed to establish transparent

who

of the vote.

)

round of voting. These just some of the

of negligence provided by the OSCE.

round of voting was

1

failed to effectively supervise

and accountable practices for creating, distributing, and collecting absentee
4) the

ways:

59%

was

to

did not.

be held between the top

The Yushchenko camp was convinced

that they

would

and anticipated clashes with authorities. Former opposition

Taras Stetskiv, spokesperson for Yushchenko’s

strategists,

16%

claimed

that plans for

MP

mass

demonstrations were started a year prior to the election. Opposition efforts focused on
spreading their belief that government would seek to overturn a legitimate Yushchenko
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victory.

The opposition purchased

relevant supplies, such as tents, mobile military

kitchens, and old buses, to be used as barricades.

The response plan had two components:
protests

and devise ways

to get

thousands of activists to lead

train

concerned voters to the

streets.

of Yushchenko’s campaign was practically nonexistent and
government, mass

rallies

Because media coverage

tightly controlled

and face-to-face meetings were commonly used

and create regional hubs of support. Again technology was instrumental
During the

rally

on September

campaign speech
instrumental

in

IK,

in

these efforts.

virtual rallies

were

creating broad based support within the confines of a government-

controlled media.

1

8

Official results of the second round stated that

Yushchenko (46.61%). The following day

Yushchenko refused

to accept the

unrest and civil disobedience emerged.

began on November 25, 2004.
truth. Natalia

Dmytruck,

the

CEC

Yanukovych (49.46%) defeated

declared Yanukovych the winner.

outcome, which prompted supporters

despite frigid temperatures. Channel 5

of the

support

to build

2004, for example, satellites beamed Yushchenko’s

25 giant screens throughout the country. These

to

by

was

to flood

the only channel to broadcast on site

Commitment

Ironically, the

to

Maiden

when

coverage without interference

deaf were among the

a sign language interpreter

on

first to

become aware

state television,

ignored the

scripted text regarding the election results, instead scripting:

from the Central Election Commission have been falsified. Do
not trust them. Yushchenko is our president. I’m really sorry that had to translate
lies before.
will not do this again. I’m not sure if I will see you again.

The

official results

1

1

Dmytruk's statement was followed by similar declarations on other channels. For
the

first

time, the opposition

movement was shown on

nation television and government-

controlled stations portrayed

Yushchenko

focus of Ukrainian television, as well as politics. Channel

from Maidan, rose

ul

to the 3

most popular station

Yanukovych pressed Kuchma
averse.

On November 21

st
,

for example, there

that inclement weather

there

was not

would reduce

that violent

most

elite

remained

to seize control

go home for the

to

directly

country.

was no attempt

risk-

of Maidan

night. Instead, authorities

number of protesters. This

the

to crack heads, but to consult the

were several reports

which broadcasted

the

1

in the

demonstrated “the semi-authoritarian nature of the
instinct

5,

to take direct action, but

even though Yushchenko asked the crowds

assumed

Maidan soon became

in a positive light.

Kuchma regime”

weather forecast.”

in that “its first

1

'

1

At the same time,

measures were seriously considered. Over

0,000

1

troops were deployed to Maidan under Serhii Pophov, the head of internal forces, and

supposedly supplied with

22

nd
,

but the

live

ammunition and

crowd of 100,000 did not

tear gas.

disperse.

The

lights

The following day some 30,000
1

Yanukovych supporters were brought

to

were turned off on the

> >

Kiev from the Donbas.

After reviewing an appeal by the opposition, the Supreme Court decided to

suspend publication of the election

results,

which would have made them

order to allow time for an investigation. Amidst the growing turmoil,

Yushchenko

Yanukovych and

tried, but failed, to negotiate a resolution to the electoral dispute.

sticking point

was Yushchenko’s demand

binding vote of no-confidence
election invalid.

President

official, in

in

for a

the electoral

new

election.

A

The Rada passed

a

a

major supporter of Yanukovych, declared

be necessary to resolve the stand

off.

non-

commission and symbolically declared

Pro-Yushchenko supporters surrounded government buildings

Kuchma,

major

Ukraine was stuck
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that

new

in

elections

in a political stalemate.

the

Kiev.

would

The Supreme Court broke

The decision “dropped

the election results.

fraud on

the deadlock on

all

December

rd

3

when

the Court annulled

pretence of equivocation, and of ‘equal

and squarely blamed the authorities.” " The Court declared
1

all sides,’

numerous

legal violations occurred.

verification

of voter

lists,

that

These included the unlawful formation and

the unlawful intrusion of government officials into the electoral

process, and the unequal access to

mass media. Taken

collectively, the Court decided that

such violations excluded the possibility that the results were a credible and accurate

of the Ukrainian electorate. The decision could not be appealed and changed

reflection

the

dynamics of the

political confrontation

Tymoshenko and
to accept

among major

players.

other prominent supporters of Yushchenko

an emerging comprise plan that sought

constitutional reform with limits on presidential

to

exchange

power

after

a

new

one

became

less inclined

election for

year. Conversely, the

regime did not simply cave, though their options were more limited. Yanukovych could
decide not to participate

in a

new

election,

which would prevent Yushchenko from

obtaining a popular mandate, or create a sufficient amount of fraud that the Supreme

Court would be faced with the prospect of invalidating another election. Kuchma,

however, was most concerned with ensuring

Yushchenko verbally offered both

Kuchma's

his

immunity and

several times, but things

financial security.

were complicated by

escalating material requests and the lack of long term guarantees. All involved

realized that the longer the crisis went on, the greater

chance of economic

fallout

due

to

trade disruption, falling confidence in currency, and the plundering of resources bv the

old guard.
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An agreement was

reached on December 8

“packet” of constitutional reform that included a
reform, shifting of powers

at the national level,

lh

in

new

the Rada. Deputies passed a

election law, local

government

and Kuchma's agreement

to fire the

prosecutor general and chair of the Election Commission. Yaroslav Davydovych became

new

the

Station

for

chair of the

CEC

and on December 15

Commissions were reconstituted on

Ih

the

a bipartisan basis

To remedy

Yushchenko and Yanukovych.

225 TEC's and 33,000 Polling
with equal representation

past problems with absentee voting,

those eligible were limited to the disabled and immobile. Local government reform called

for direct election

of local leaders, rather than being appointed by the President as was the

case since 1994. At the national level,

MP's would

serve for five years, not four, and be

elected solely via proportional representation with a reduction in the

from
a

4% to 3%.

Those elected had

to serve

newly elected representative switched

minimum

an “imperative mandate,” which meant that

parlies, their party

mandate would be

Deputies were also prohibited from holding other well-paid positions or serve

government

deputy factions,”

in

would be permitted
unclear,

party or group of parties

nominee

to dissolve the

Rada.

which created problems

for

in other

was supposed

to

form

a “coalition

of

for

in

How

a majority should be formally recognized

2007 when the President dissolved the Rada. The

Prime Minister, but the President ultimately selected

Rada approval. The Rada would appoint half the Constitutional Court,

rather than one-third,

would

lost.

other words, a governing majority. If this did not occur, the President

Rada would propose candidates
a

if

positions.

The most popular

was

threshold

and the President would appoint the other

select the overall

half.

The Prime Minister

composition of the national government, including the heads of
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Committee, which was responsible

the State Property

Television and Radio board, pending Rada approval.

the

power

to

series

the hopes this

in

that.

under strong executives, so

to

President, meanwhile, retained

a platform that

at

1

°

advocated a stronger role

would strengthen Ukrainian democratic development.

of reforms did just

interests

The

and the

propose the Minister of Defense and Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Yushchenko had campaigned on
Rada

for privatization,

for the

Clearly, the

Ukraine had certainly struggled, democratically speaking,
the time the reforms appeared to be in the long term

of Ukrainian democracy. Ironically, however, Yushchenko was well positioned

be elected head of the executive branch and problems of overlapping powers between

the Prime Minister

and President would create future conflicts between the same two

men

well after the election.

Yushchenko triumphed
vote

compared

occurred

to

44%

in the East,

for

21

was genuinely
optimism

election.

Yushchenko did

many
1,6

s1

very difficult for

it

Yanukovych

oblast in the west and center, whereas

oblast in the east and south.

closely resembled what

the third and final presidential contest, with

not

win

of the

to question the results.

Yanukovych took every

in a landslide. In fact, the results

observers believed were the actual results from the

For the

first

time

in

Ukrainian independence, the public will

reflected in a free and fair election process.

that the

52%

Yanukovych. Fraud was significantly reduced and mostly

which made

Yushchenko took every

November

in

new government

elected via the

Many

believed with great

Orange Revolution would produce

important and lasting change.

Looking back

at

Kuchma’s demise,

can crumble under popular pressure

if

it

becomes

clear that “soft" authoritarianism

the authoritarian leader chooses not to use force to
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ensure the desired outcome of an uncertain political situation.

were more than willing

to

lie,

cheat,

and

steal their

way through

Being responsible for mass bloodshed on the

liberalization.

Kuchma and

his supporters

elections and

streets

economic

of the capital was

another matter however. There was certainly a risk this would happen, and Ukraine came
fairly close to

such an outcome, yet

Kuchma

never gave the order to forcefully remove

the protesters. This suggests that civic activity

development, particularly
status quo, yet

do not

rely

is

a very important part

of democratic

semi-authoritarian regimes that promote an underwhelming

in

on massive violence and coercion

to

maintain power. In

Ukraine, there appeared to be a tipping point for regime that corresponded with a level of

comfort regarding overt violence on the part of the

The legacy of Cold War

State.

Communication

geopolitics, coupled with the

Revolution, showered the Orange Revolution with international attention and prompted

powerful States

in the region

and beyond

another problem with transition theorists
institutions. In the

involved in some fashion. This points to

who predominantly

age of globalization, the political context

influences and concerns.

of comparative

to get

political

international forces

As

a result, to best

focus on elections and

is

not limited to domestic

understand democratic development scholars

development should appreciate the significant influences

on democratic development. In doing

so, scholarship

would be

served by taking into account which external actors are seriously involved
transition process

to

and what incentives and disincentives are available for

choose one path of development as opposed

to

competing

The Orange government was simply unable

to live

better

in the

political leaders

visions.

up

to their

own

and the ones placed on them by their followers. As Andrew Wilson puts
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that

it,

expectations

“a political

and economic was promised,” but
great cathartic trial, or ‘Truth

1

apartheid.

'

that

and Reconciliation Process,’

Ukraine would stage some
like

South Africa

The outgoing administration convinced Yanukovych

appeals process so they could “settle

documents as they could.”
cassettes

seemed unlikely

“it

were submitted

1

'

s

to

embark on

a long

minute accounts” and “destroy as many

last

Hundreds of printed documents, audio

to the

after

CEC. Many complaints were simply

and video

cassettes,

duplicates of other

complaints.

Yanukovych resigned

who was

as Prime Minister as

largely responsible for securing

full

presidential salary, the use of state

two

cars, four drivers, free travel, free

electric bill, all

dacha 72 and

its staff,

to

modify

this lofty

These included a

benefits.

an adviser, two assistants,

medical care for him and his wife, and half off his
19
life.

The new government

package, but they had problems of their own. The

of the People Agreement signed by Yushchenko and Tymoskenko

2004 was leaked

to the public.

shot at Prime Minister with the

authority’ to ensure that

support her candidacy

positions

Kuchma’s retirement

of which would be paid by the State for

would soon seek
secret Force

was replaced with Mykola Azarov,

would be

process by which

The

Our Ukraine
140

The second clause

by Our Ukraine and

transparency that did not

political

fit

Tymoshenko would

‘force

deputies would join the

Tymoshenko assumed

many Ukrainians of past

clause stated that

Yushchenko using “the

‘in full.”'

filled

first

her

23%

new

get the

of his personal moral

Tymoshenko

stated that

for the

in July

bloc to

55% of government

Tymoshenko

block.

The

position as Prime Minister reminded

appointments premised on secret deals

that lacked

well with the spirit of the Revolution, nor Tymoshenko's

corruption in past stints in public service.
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of

first

The
realities

unrealistically lofty rhetoric

on the ground.

wanted the Gangadze

when

In

of the new administration did not keep pace with

February of 2005, for example, Yushchenko declared that he

affair to

be solved within a few months. These hopes were dashed

Yurii Kravchenko, the former interior minister, shot himself hours prior to

was supposed

to

provide evidence to authorities.

A

second example

is

how Yushchenko

triumphantly declared that government would be separated from business, but as

Wilson points

out, “all

of Our Ukraine’s key financiers had key jobs.”

when he
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Andrew

Oligarch Petro

Poroshenko became the new head of the National Security and Defense Council and

Yevchen Chervonenko became

the

new head of the

corruption-plagued transportation

ministry, while he operated a transport business of his

whether new oligarchs would

try to

own. This

led

many

to

wonder

recover the losses their businesses had experienced

over the past couple of year. In addition to fanciful rhetoric, several undemocratic

political

behaviors persisted under the

new government. Yushchenko,

for example,

adopted Kuchma’s practice of issuing secret decrees and issued 40 of them during his

first

two months. Without

a political

agenda

in place,

many of the

confirmed suspicions that victory came as a surprise to the new

decrees were hasty and
14_

political leadership.

Not surprisingly, tensions soon emerged within the new government over sticky
issues,

such as re-privatization. Yushchenko was

critical

of the privatization process, but

not the goal, and wanted the State to purchase privatized enterprises and sell

open competition for

fair prices.

The Cabinet, on

them

via

the other hand, favored immediate re-

privatization of particularly suspect transactions, such as the sale of the steel mill at

Kryvorizhstal, which

was sold

competing bid of $1.5

billion.

to

Pinchuk and Akmetov

Tymoshenko

for

$800 million despite

a

called for thousands of re-privatizations
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whereas Yushchenko spoke of dozens. The
leaders were not strong

enough

to get

away Western

investors.

of the matter was that

bogged down

Furthermore, the erosion of property rights
likely scare

fact

As

in favor

a result,

it

in a

major

battle

new

political

over redistribution.

of retrospective justice would very

appears that re-privatization will be

limited to a few select cases and as a result, old oligarchs will retain most of their

holdings.

There

is little

doubt

that

Yushchenko’s administration

At the same time, the long term

development

in

sustainability

and effectiveness of the Orange Coalition

Ukraine than

Ukraine heads from
efficient

its

will better serve democratic

his predecessor.

is

far

from

certain.

Wherever

current crossroads, the country has certainly not been a

democratic transition throughout the

conclusion raises the question of exactly

how

first fifteen

model of

years of independence. This

effective elections

and

institutions

were

during this formative period of Ukrainian development. If the core principles of transition
theory are valid, one would expect that elections would play a significant role

promoting the peaceful and legitimate transfer of political power,

would play
economic

a significant role in

institutions

first six

political institutions

promoting stable and representative government, and

would play

a significant role in

economic growth. This has not been the

The

in

promoting stable and sustained

case.

national elections fulfilled several indicators of legitimate and

peaceful transitions of power. Elections were held frequently: 1994, 1998. 1999, 2002,

2004. All elections required by the Constitution were held without postponement or
cancellation.

The 1994

political forces

presidential election

was

the only instance

where

openly advocated postponing pending elections, but
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this

significant

was

a unique.

unpopular and unsuccessful effort on behalf of President Kravchuk. Electoral turnout has
been consistently strong, evident

in

how

both parliamentary and presidential elections

consistently produced turnouts of well over a simple majority.

parliamentary elections

is

70% of registered

voters,

typical Congressional election in the United States.

normal component of Ukrainian politics
participates

in.

which
14

'

is

The average turnout

for

over double the turnout for

a

This suggests that elections are a

which much of the public regularly

in

Ukrainians have widely accepted the results of elections, even fraudulent

ones, aside from 2004.

All candidates in post-independence national elections

Though

processes that were open to the mass public.
candidates, such as the collection of a certain

significantly prevent candidates

from being

financial deposits to register candidates

are

more problematic because

and

money

for

if electoral

a

whole so

The

on

amount of signatures, these did not

selected.

More

parties, as

recent requirements of

witnessed

in the

2002

elections,

as candidates. Financial deposits,

which are

like

Western

U.S. for district candidates). At the same time,

politicians, tend to

that candidate deposits are not

first six

restrictions

thresholds are met, do constitute a fairly significant amount of

many Ukrainians ($200

Ukrainian politicians,

were some

in

the requirement can effectively prevent less affluent

segments of the population from registering
reimbursed

there

were also selected

be

much

wealthier than society as

beyond the reach of most aspiring candidates.

national elections also failed, however, to

fulfill

several indicators of

legitimate and peaceful transitions of power. First, electoral oversight has been

inconsistent and often ineffective. Electoral commissions, the primary

electoral oversight, exercise significant power, but
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mechanisms of

do not have an independent and

constitutionally protected base of power.

As

a result, other

components of government,

such as the President and Rada, have strongly influenced and/or manipulated the

composition and activities of electoral commissions
development.

In the 1994 election, for example,

to the

detriment of democratic

Rada party

commissioners and the Rada leaders were Communist

leaders appointed electoral

elites that

secured power

in the

undemocratic elections of 1990. Meanwhile, the Rada failed to determine the selection
process for the Supreme Court, which crippled the role of the judicial branch

constitutional

and

legal issues.

largely been the responsibility

As

a result, electoral administration

of the same

institution: electoral

in

solving

and oversight have

commissions.

This runs counter to American notions of popular government, such as the ideas
articulated in Federalist #5

1,

which contend

that

powers should be divided

branches with separate purposes and sources of power so that competition

into separate

among

branches will limit one branch from abusing power. In Ukraine, central and

commissioners have been incapable or unmotivated
and transparent manner for much of the

to resolve disputes in a legitimate

fifteen years since

independence. Though

subsequent electoral laws have sought to reform electoral commissions,

emerged

in

district

new problems

the form of jurisdictional disputes between the commissions and courts, voter

confusion regarding appeal processes, and a lack of standardization
electoral complaints

and confirmed

in

dealing with

violations.

Second, the nature and extent of violence and fraud

in

Ukrainian elections have

not reflected legitimate and peaceful transitions of power typically found

in

established

democracies. Fraudulent activities included ballot stuffing, invalidation of legitimate
ballots, preferential treatment for certain political

groups and leaders, defamation,

intimidation, coercion,

and

illegal

imprisonment. All elections experienced the

inappropriate use of state resources toward political ends.

Most

elections did not

accurately reflect an electoral process of one person, one vote. Without an effective legal

system, political crime and violence in Ukraine was systematic

in

scope and shrouded

in

mystery. Candidates, supporters, and political figures regularly experienced physical

assault

and destruction of property. The most

Yushchenko during

the

2004

prolific case

was

the poisoning of Viktor

which according

presidential campaign,

to public

knowledge, was never solved.
Third, Ukraine has experienced high levels of media favoritism contrary to

Ukrainian law and to the detriment of legitimate and peaceful transitions of power. Under

Kuchma,

the

media was used as

a

means

and expand the power of the

to preserve

incumbent president. This was most evident

in secret

government

policies designed to

shape the content of media coverage and the various forms of legal and financial

government harassment of independent networks. After 2005, the press has regained
freedoms

lost

throughout the post-Soviet period.

outlets exist as a tool

of wealthy

In

many ways, however, major media

interests to further specific political

outcomes, rather

than serve as a genuinely independent collection of various viewpoints.

Fourth, candidates have not represented stable and principled political parties, nor

presented a sufficient degree of ideological variance.

A

disproportionately powerful

executive dominated the political landscape from Kravchuk to Yushchenko. Ideological
variance emerged surrounding the 2002 Rada elections as

Yushchenko and Tymoshenko

began

Kuchma

to establish

themselves as genuinely opposed

to the

regime. Ideological

variance intensified prior to the 2004 presidential elections and solidified after the Orange
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Revolution. Even with ideological variance, parties have a long

way

go before

to

becoming stable and principled. Unfortunately, the most apparent ways

in

which

Ukrainian parties have adopted Western norms have not been positive.

The term "black PR" has been used
parties

have duplicated, and

in

some

to

describe the ways in which Ukrainian

cases Hat out hired. Western marketing and

advertising agencies to discredit opponents via

television

mass media. Given the

watched by Ukrainians nationwide, competing

image conscious

who

very clear

at the

the

expense of substance.

owner of each

When

politicians

around the

will

have become very

watching television

in

Ukraine

it

is

television station supports based on the frequent and

monolithic support of a particular candidate in advertising spots.
parties experience greater

large percentage of

freedom

to operate after

2004,

many

Though competing

parties

still

operate

of a single candidate, typically the creator, rather than principled

organizations of public will.

In

considering these ten indicators as a whole,

been highly ineffective
Ukraine from 1991

to

in

it

becomes

clear that elections have

promoting the peaceful and legitimate transition of power

in

2006. Even with frequent elections that witnessed popularly

selected candidates, high voter turnout, and

wide acceptance of results, comprehensive

empirical assessments demonstrate that competitions for

power and

transitions

were neither legitimate nor particularly peaceful. This strongly suggests

of power

that the

mere

existence of elections do not necessarily promote the peaceful and legitimate transition of

power. This raises the question of whether experiences with institutional development
mirror the trajectory and results of electoral development or exhibit different patterns of

behavior.
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When

effective, democratic institutions fundamentally

promote stable and

representative government in the political realm. Ukraine experienced

some

indicators of

effective institutional operation. Ukraine adopted a democratic constitution and has

experienced wide acceptance of the

new

political system.

Though Ukraine was

the last

former Soviet republic to do so, the historic document was the product of intense
negotiations between Rada deputies. Ukraine

and independent, democratic,

power

“republic” in which state

legislative, executive,

ensure

human

activity in

social,

is

was

law-based

officially constituted as a “sovereign

state.”

The

political

“exercised on the principles of

system was a

its

division into

and judicial power.” The “main duty of the state”

rights and freedoms.”

Though

a large

is

amount of significant

to “affirm

and

political

Ukraine has taken place outside of constitutional boundaries, the existence of a

democratic framework has helped to promote stable and representative government by
the

new

structure of government

Ukraine has also
operation.

part

of the

has provided.

failed to experience several indicators

Under Kuchma,

much of the

it

there

was no meaningful

institutional

role for the opposition throughout

post-Soviet period because of cooption and coercion. This changed in early

new

century as

Kuchma’s popularity plummeted and

post-revolution government. Ironically, the current problem

opposition between

levels

of effective

now Prime

Minister

political roots in the

in sight.

under the

particularly divisive

Yankovych and President Yushchenko. High

of corruption have not changed, however, and remain

no clear corrective course

is

fully reversed

Even current reform

a systematic

leaders, such

most dishonest comers of Ukrainian

politics.

problem with

Tymoshenko, have

Violence, like

corruption, has plagued institutional operation in Ukraine. Prominent political figures
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have disappeared throughout the post Soviet period. Some,
have never

to

Mykhailo Boyehyshyn,

been heard from again. Others, such as Georhiy Gongadze, were

found decapitated, apparently

As

like

in fulfillment

and representative government from 1991
did exist, such as the adoption of a

new

of the wishes of the chief executive.

were largely ineffective

a whole, democratic institutions

to

in

promoting stable

2006. Though some basic formal indicators

constitution

political system, institutional operation in

later

and wide acceptance of the new

Ukraine has been unable

to

overcome

the

corruption and related problems inherited from their Soviet past and recreated during the
transition process. Institutional operation in Ukraine has not been a transparent

and

representative process undertaken within the confines of the Ukrainian constitution and

laws. Without the establishment of a genuinely independent judiciary and rule of law, this

does not look
in

power

to

change

in the

near future, regardless of whether the reform forces remain

or not. Unfortunately democratic institutions were no

more

helpful in promoting

economic development, another very important component of the Ukrainian

transition

process.

Economic development
year periods. The

first

period

(

in

post-Soviet Ukraine could be understood in three five-

1991-1995) witnessed widespread

demise. The real gross domestic product
out in 1994 with a

inhibited

by

a lack

23%

(GDP)

steadily declined

and economic

instability

till

finally

bottoming

drop from the previous year. Development was severely

of new

elite

leaders in independent Ukraine

able to

manage

were career

framework of government, but offered

a capitalist

politicians

little in

the

economy. Many

who

political

adapted themselves to a

way of innovative

new

thinking or

experience with Western business practices. The preferential treatment given to oligarchs
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by the

state

granted drained valuable resources that could have been used to further

production.

The second period 1995-1999) witnessed gradual
(

decreased from

fivefold,

-10%

in

1996 to

-3%

growing from $483 million

investment proceeded slower

in the

in

in 1997.

stabilization.

The

GDP

Foreign direct investment (FD1) increased

1995 to nearly $3 million

in

1999. Foreign

Ukraine than central European countries such as

Poland and Hungary. Ukraine experienced limited exposure to market ideas early
transition process

Soviet republics.

of the ruling

and tended

As time

to

in the

view Communism more favorably than other former

passed, the primary problem

became

of interest on behalf

a lack

control over economic and bureaucratic powers. In

elite to relinquish strict

2003, for example, the size of Ukraine's economy was an estimated $50 billion

American, three-quarters the size of Hungary’s economy, despite having five times the
population.

The

third period

wages rose between
an

all

time high.

15

GDP

(2000-2004) witnessed

and

25%

a significant

each year. FD1 grew

rose in double digits

(

12.1%)

in

to

$16

economic turnaround. Real
trillion at the

2005, another

first.

end of 2005,

Each year

experienced positive growth, the lowest being 5.2%. Ukraine became a viable
investment option and the West flooded the liberal-minded opposition with support as the

government standoff unfolded. Many
being opened

in this geo-politically

Clearly, the

institutions

economic

in the

West believed

a

window of opportunity was

important neighbor of Russia.

results

of reform were mixed.

When

fundamentally promote stable and sustained growth

and Ukraine did experience some indicators of effective
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effective, democratic

in the

economic realm

institutional operation in the

post-Soviet period. There were slow, but fairly steady, levels of foreign direct investment

and

the

GDP

rose since

1

994, after a steep decline since 1991. In terms of raw numbers,

Ukraine also privatized a large amount of formerly State-owned enterprises, though

would be disingenuous

to categorize this

development as

the negative political, economic, legal, and social

As

privatization process.

the

corrupt transition practices

repercussions. At the

same

difficult to turn a blind

in the

Orange government quickly

time, if genuine reform

who

is

it

also very

for

of effective

institutional

example, have not been

government spending was

difficult for the

used State resources to consolidate power, and the Orange

other hand, dropped throughout

how ever,

from the

realized, rectifying grossly

truly the goal,

to experience other indicators

Government, who early on sought

turnaround,

is

economic realm. National budgets,

regime,

that resulted

very difficult to do without serious political and economic

consistently balanced in Ukraine. Cutting

Kuchma

consequences

because of

eye toward such massive injustice.

Ukraine also failed
operation

is

a wholesale success

it

to protect

much of the

and extend the welfare
1990's.

the dominant trend of falling

state.

Wages, on the

With the aforementioned economic

wages reversed

as the

economic

situation improved.

Given these trends, democratic
stable

institutions

and sustained economic growth from 1991

1994, growth

was not

were largely

to

ineffective in

2006. Though the

GDP

promoting

rose since

positive as a percentage of the previous year until 2000.

Furthermore, the budget was not balanced for most of the period as

real

wages

fell.

The

most resounding “success,” massive privatization of State-owned enterprises created as

many problems,

if not

more, than

it

solved.

Thus, like elections, democratic institutions

have been ineffective
stable

in

promoting both

stable

and representative government as well as

and sustained economic growth. This casts significant doubt on the

transition theory to accurately capture the

analysis

is

ability

dynamics of democratic development. Greater

necessary, however, before definitive conclusions on transitions theory can be

drawn. The next section examines Russian development over the same period.
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CHAPTER

IV

CASE STUDY OF RUSSIA
In the late 19

largest in the world.

lh

century and early 20

The

Tsarist regime

11
'

had

century, the Russian Empire

free enterprise, but with

was among

heavy

the

state

involvement. The dominant rural institution was the village land commune, which

w itnessed

a

degree of egalitarianism, a tradition of mutual responsibility, and a process of

collective decision

making, but as Robert Service puts
1

short for

most peasants.” Under Alexander

average, were actually

left

with

13%

II,

it,

“life

was

nasty, brutish,

and

peasants were freed from bondage, but on

less land to cultivate"

Alexander’s reforms did

enable franker public discussion of Russia’s problems as society was rapidly changing..
Industrialization did not occur until very late in the 19

class,

th

century and the working

both urban and rural, quadrupled. Industrial workers became more politically

sophisticated, while the intelligentsia

elections or representative

became more

government

at

politically active.

’

There were no

the national level until 1906. In the face of

widespread lawlessness and upheaval, Nicolas

II

had two main options

to

maintain order,

military rule or popular concessions, and opted for an ineffective mix.

Reforms, such as freedom of the press and freedom of assembly, were limited by
the imposition of martial law in turbulent provinces

was believed

that State security

created, the State

Duma,

was jeopardized.

4

A

and bureaucratic violations when
popularly elected legislature

but could be dissolved by the

crown

so to punish aggressive Duma’s. Liberals and radicals in the

immunity and used

this right to criticize the regime.

158

at

it

w as

any time and was done

Duma

were shielded with

This stripped “the aura of

omniscience and omnipotence that
population

at large

From

a

it

had so assiduously cultivated and

that the

regarded as the hallmark of good government.”'

Russian perspective, however, the Fundamental Laws of 1906 were “a
6

giant step

toward democracy.” The crown allowed elected representatives

to

be actively

involved in the political process, including legislation and budgeting. This did not

last

long however. Contested elections ended by 1921 and private enterprise ended by 1929.

The new Bolshevik regime

fit

Lenin was both an innovative
a revolutionary activist,

who

no previous model. As the preeminent Bolshevik
theorist, reformulating

Marx

to

fit

leader,

the Russian context,

and

replaced spontaneous mass action with the will and

discipline of the Bolshevik Party.

The regime created

a system of dual authority

where

an extreme dictatorship was run by the Party behind the fayade of popular self-

government embodied

in the soviets.*

From

the outset, Russian political leaders

improvised their system of governance as they went along. Though rulers never

succeeded

in

providing a theoretical foundation for rule, as Richard Pipes observes, nor

succeeded

in

exercising completely unrestrained authority, as Robert Service observes,

the one-party state

was

the lasting legacy that other

Communist

states

would come

to

emulate.

The introduction of the one-party
elements.

No one

government.”

9

to

had both destructive and constructive

questioned that the Bolshevik Party was “the engine driving the Soviet

The top

priority

of the Bolsheviks was to uproot both

democratic elements of the old regime.

“designed

state

In

building a

new

resemble folkish, ‘soviet’ democracy but

159

regime, a

in reality

tsarist

new

and

authority

akin to Muscovite

was

111

patrimonial absolutism.”

The goal was

government accountability

to tools

to transform soviets

of the Party.

Though Bolsheviks claimed public
remained primarily

a private

from mechanisms of

authority over

all

of Russia, the Party

body." The 1918 constitution created

a “dictatorship

urban and rural proletariat” and granted power to “formerly oppressed classes.”

were no protections

who

institution

leaders, such as

There

of government and the only people

was the Central Executive Committee (CEC). Top Bolshevik

Lenin and Trotsky, quickly freed themselves from the

and only constitutional clash

first

two Bolshevik leaders arrogated
the

'

earned a living through “productive and socially useful work” were able to vote. The

most powerful

“the

for citizens against the actions

1

of the

CEC

14

In turn, “the

just

it

all its

'

Essentially, “the

represented, from legislative into

set in place

revolutionary rhetoric, marked a reversion

of tsarist Russia before the Manifesto of October

17,

1

905.”

1

'

eleven years, constitutionalism was over.

The Bolsheviks became accustomed

much

1

system of legislation the Bolsheviks

within two weeks of October coup, for

to the autocratic practices

of Soviet Russia.”

in

to themselves full legislative authority and transformed

and the Congress of Soviets, which

consultative bodies.”

After

in the history

CEC

so, that the

1

persuasion.”

"

to

using violence to deal with opposition, so

machine gun became the "principal instrument of political

By August of

1918, the

autonomy of soviets,

represent themselves, and a fragile multiparty system

was

the rights of workers to

over. Russia

several years of one-party dictatorship. In 1924 a federal state

Union of Soviet

Socialist Republics. Initial

members included

embarked on

was created and named

the

the Russian Federation,

Ukraine, Belorussia. and the Transcaucasian republics, composed of Azerbaijan, Georgia,

160

1

and Armenia.
in

A

Moscow.

The new

Communist

unified

much

federal system granted

greater

NEP

+Slow

areas, a

NEP

new

New

restored capitalism, though in a restrained form.

produced mixed economic

industrial

IN

wide-spread opposition and rebellion, Lenin introduced the

Economic Policy (NEP). The
The

to central authorities

party controlled this centralized authority and

completely dominated the political processes of all republics.
In the face of

power

results, yet

had

far

1

’

reaching social consequences.

growth retarded the development of the proletariat

in cities. In rural

class of prosperous farmers led efforts to restore agricultural production

constituted a conservative element that resisted future land reforms.

Party consolidate

power

in

The NEP helped

and
the

the short term, by deflecting strong resistance to the regime,

but created the long term challenge of sustaining the public legitimacy of an elite

revolutionary

As

movement dedicated

a result, the party did not

Stalin created a

new

to a class that

was not becoming

have a clear sense of purpose or mission.

20

post-revolutionary mission for the Party that stressed

development, over revolutionary goals. Stalin’s power was
class

a vital social force.

built

around

a

new

political

of party apparat (members of governing power structure) and nomeklatura (top

governing

elites). Stalin

Beginning

in

ears,

and mouth of the party.

1936, Stalin undertook a series of purges that sought eliminate

political opposition

agriculture.

used the apparat as the eyes,

all

traces of

and ensure rapid industrialization and the collectivization of

The Great Terror between 1937 and 1938

resulted in

mass

arrests

prison sentences for violations of the infamous Article 58 in the Criminal

Union republics, which provided guidelines

and long

Codes of the

for dealing with “counterrevolutionary

activities.”
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Collectivization targeted the Ukraine,

which was known

at

the time as the

“breadbasket of the Soviet Union.” Ukrainians, however, would not easily pail with their
national identity and the organization of communes at the local level.

required to give to the State. This killed over six million people and

among

the worst genocides of the

predominately men,
labor

camps and

called them,

in

gulags which have
,

the labor

to 1933,

Ukraine by massively raising grain quotas farmers were

Stalin instigated famine in the

considered

From 1932

20

th

come

is

currently

century. Forced labor killed millions,

to refer to both the administration

camps themselves. “Corrective labor camps,”

were originally established

in

of

as the State

remote locations, such as Siberia, but then

spread and varied geographically with the economic task

at

hand.

The experiences of

prisoners included interrogations, transportation in cattle cars, inadequate food,

inadequate clothing, inadequate housing, poor hygiene, and lack of medical care,

throughout years of exile

in

concentration

camps

and often led

that destroyed families

to

premature death.
Internationally, Stalin

USSR

hoped

that

signed a non-aggression pact with

needed

to be accepted as an equal in a

1936 constitution declared

composed of two

that class

opponents of Germany would unite

Germany

1

in 1939,

until the

This meant that the

Western-led international community. In

warfare

in the

USSR was

over. Russia

USSR

turn, the

was hence

“friendly” classes, the proletariat and peasantry, as well as one

“stratum,” the intelligentsia. These three groups shared

power through

society,” rather than “dictatorship of the proletariat.”"'

The end of class

franchise to be extended to

all

adult citizens in direct

162

and

“state guidance

of

struggle enabled

secret elections

and

establishment of a

bill

of rights. The State established the terms of compliance, however,

and many rights could only be exercised
to strengthen the socialist

system.”

-

in

conformity with powerful interests “in order

'

Consequently, Stalinist rule was highly repressive. Formal guarantees
constitution

were regularly ignored by the party and government. The Communist Party

and the police force monitored and controlled nearly
result, legal

in the

guarantees meant very

Stalin's death in 1953

little in

all

aspects of a citizen’s

the face of arbitrary

prompted another power struggle

government

life.

As

a

action.

that lasted for several years.

Soviet politics changed in two significant ways: one-man party dictatorship gradually

transitioned into oligarchic rule

and struggles over who would replace

Stalin set the

Soviet Union on a course of reform that would produce significant consequences well

after Nikita

Krushchev, the new Soviet leader,

24

left office.

Like Stalin, Krushchev extensively relied on patronage to build his power. This
translated into several appointments for supporters

from the Party apparatus

in

Moscow,

and Ukraine, where Khruschev had served as party chairman. At the same time,

Khruschev sought

to

the union, republic,

their pursuit

reduce the size of the central bureaucracy and decentralize power

and local

levels.

Khruschev allowed republics greater autonomy

in

of Socialism and created a new doctrine of “peaceful coexistence” with the

West. Ultimately, Khruschev was unable to consolidate power to the extent Stalin did,
largely because of the

weakening of the

accompany another purge. ^
one

new

that

at

Instead,

could more efficiently

secret police

and the

difficulties that

Khruschev focused on transforming

manage

a

modern economy and

faces through the “rotation rule” that limited Presidium

163

in

doing

members

would

the Party into

so,

brought

to three terms.

in

By

the

fall

of 1964, Khrushev faced an array of opponents, including the party
1

apparat, the military, ideologists, and conservatives."

widespread consensus among ruling

elites that

’

This opposition resulted

Khruschev had gone too

in a

pushing for

far in

reforms and thus constituted a threat to their political survival. In turn, Khruschev

became
The

the first

and

last

Soviet leader to step

fourth and final Soviet constitution

came

down from
in

of no confidence."

a vote

1977 under Khruschev’s replacement,

Leonid Brezhnev. This Constitution adopted an optimistic tone

in

of a new Soviet community, held together by increasingly fused
nationalities.

The new community would develop from

democracy and

discussing the creation

set

of differing

further perfection of Soviet

the increased involvement of everyday citizens in governance.

When Gorbachev came

to

power

in

1986, only

someone very

old could

remember

contested elections or private enterprise. At the expense of constitutions, which had
limited significance, one thing the Soviet

civic responsibility, even

to all levels

when

it

Union did do, was emphasize voting as

was meaningless. Competitive

of government and a new legislature was established

contends that Gorbachev’s strategy was embodied

in three

a moral,

elections

were extended

in 1988.

Richard Kelly

concepts: glasnost (openness),

perestroika (restructuring), and demokraitzatsiia (democratization) and argues that each

was purposely

utilized as a political

weapon. These weapons “were intended

the intelligentsia that had given up hope

life, to

reassure the dissident

Brezhnev years, and
fiction

to

community

of reform or meaningful involvement
that

had been pushed aside or worse

win the support of the general public

of soviet democracy and the promise of a better

164

that

lS

life.”'

to

in

in

mobilize
public

the

had soured on the

Glasnost sought to accomplish three goals:

1)

make

information more available

throughout the society in the belief that censorship had inhibited modernization; 2) garner
support of the intelligentsia and dissident

community who were

skeptical of official

versions of truth; 3) spotlight to highlight the current political problems or opponents.

Soon, however, newspapers acquired a
pluralistic

new

level

of independence

media environment and Gobarchev's opponents of all

of the opportunity

to publicize their versions

became increasingly

in

an increasingly

stripes took

advantage

of truth as well. Perestroika, meanwhile,

radicalized over Gorbachev’s six years of rule. Perestroika

originally represented “tinkering with the existing institutions,” then

commitment

24

to across-the-board structural reforms.”

0

became “a

In turn. Demokraitzatsiia

occurred both within the Communist Party and throughout different levels of

government. In the party, the power of the appratchiki was diminished as the power of
rank-and-file

members was enhanced, while

become more involved

in

government, soviets were permitted

governance.

in

1989 was a watershed year
material improvement, there

was

in

Russian development. While Gorbachev promised

a reversion to food rationing.

observes, “Soviet queues, already legendary for their length,

in the

course of 1989.”

’’

budget

had widened

w ould have been

revenues derived from vodka
constituted

state

40%

As Robert Service

became longer and angrier

Technological divisions between the Soviet Union and

industrial capitalist countries

state

to

in all sectors but

weapons procurement. The

massively insolvent under Brezhnev

sales.

if

not for domestic

Agriculture was so inefficient that food imports

of hard currency expenditures. These and other social

of economic emergency.
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ills

precipitated a

Gorbachev suddenly faced “two
reforms or make them more radical.”'

life-or-death alternatives: either

monopoly of power. " The

public. People

more than any other

political actor,

for the pluralization of the Soviet political system, specifically “the

creation of institutions that put an end to the

Party's

the

Abandoning reforms was never seriously

considered. According to Archie Brown, Gorbachev,

was responsible

abandon

were fascinated

first

to hear

command

polity,” including the

Communist

televised session of Congress enthralled the

open debate of public questions. The group was

generally supportive of Gorbachev, but no longer demonstrated pure obedience to the

General Secretary. As Robert Service puts

it,

“what once had been

living-rooms was given full-throated public utterance.”'

Gorbachev wanted
for political

the Congress to

become

said privately in

4

the primary

mechanism of ratification

and economic reforms, rather than a verbal battleground between

conservatives and radicals. Boris Yeltsin put a crimp in these plans. Yeltsin ran for a

representative position in

the vote. Yeltsin led

more

Moscow

as a strong critic

radical elements of the

of the nomenklatura and won

Congress

the institution as a foundation of formal opposition to the

who were

determined

still

to pressure

Gorbachev

into further action against conservative party

to use

Group sought

comrades.

6

At the same time, reformers only numbered a few thousand and were unable
stimulate genuinely popular resistance.

most popular

politician until the

As

a result,

of

communist regime, even though

party members. ° In doing so, the so called Inter-Regional

many were

90%

Gorbachev remained

to

the country’s

mid-1980’s when Yeltsin overtook him. Robert Service

explains:

Youth did not

revolt against authority;

it

despised and ignored

it.

Indeed citizens,

both young and old, treated politics as a spectator sport but not a process deserving their

166

participation.

The

quest for private pleasure outdid the zeal for public service

.

.

.

After

was not the
squares. They wanted

years of being bored by stuffy Marxism-Leninism, their ideal of freedom

freedom

to join a political party

to stay at

home and

and attend open meetings on

city

’

enjoy the freedom to be frivolous, apolitical, immobilized.

7

Things were different outside of Russia. Nationalist dissent rose throughout
Soviet Republics. Various leaders convinced their citizens that respective national

problems could not be effectively addressed without greater economic and administrative
reforms. Meanwhile, the

KGB

no longer arrested citizens

for unlawful dissent,

which

allowed for a moderately independent press to emerge slowly. The farther west a nation

was from Moscow,

Many

the bolder the resistance.

republics created democratically

elected presidencies and legislatures, though the degree of democracy varied from region

to region.

Every country

By of the end of the
By 1990

it

east

year, just

was

of the River Elbe was Communist

one country, Albania, was

clear that “perestrioika

still

was no longer

at

the beginning of 1989.

Communist.
a project for partial

TO

alterations, but for total transformation.”

In

February of 1990, Gorbachev sought

approval from the Congress of People’s Deputies for multi-party politics.

in

April of that year, “the one-party state defended by

Civil

War was

relegating itself to oblivion.’”

9

Yeltsin

When

ratified

communist apologists since
was

the

the

most outspoken proponent

of faster and deeper reform.
In

January of 1991, 15 people were killed when Soviet Special Forces

Lithuania overtook the Vilnius television tower

in

in

an attempt to deter separatist ambitions

throughout the Soviet Union. Gorbachev, however, denied prior knowledge regarding the
use of force and blamed local officials.

the

USSR. Gorbachev organized

40

a public

Determined

to preserve territorial integrity in

referendum

in

167

March

that asked:

Do

von

consider necessary the preservation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a

renewed federation of equal sovereign republics
individual

of any nationality

will

vote against sanctioning the Union.”

Union was

a

which the rights andfreedom of the

be guaranteed?

The phrasing of the referendum “made

the Soviet

in

41

it

difficult for

reform-minded citizens

to

Attached to the referendum on the preservation of

referendum on the creation of a presidency for the Russian

Republic, not the Soviet Union. Creating a post of president was even more popular than

preserving the Union.

On

June

12,

president in Russia. Yetlsin earned

round run
changing

off.

Yeltsin

1991, Boris Yeltsin

57%

was concerned

political attitudes, they

became

of the vote and

that if the

would be

in

the

first

publicly elected

doing so prevented a second

Community

Party did not adapt to

dealt a “total historical defeat.”

4

'

The concern

was prophetic.
Gorbachev and Yeltsin reconciled
other problems. Gorbachev orchestrated a

autonomy

to regional

Committee, but

The date

their differences in April, but

new Union

governments. The treaty was accepted

led to significant political divisions

for signature

treaty that

was August

20, 1991.

among

Gorbachev had

would grant greater

in principle

by the Central

top Soviet leaders

in

Russia.

The agreement was not signed, however,

because of an attempted coup by prominent Soviet leaders, such as Valentin Pavlov
(Prime Minister), Vladimir Kryuckov (Head of the K.G.B.), Dmitri Yazov (Minister of
Defense), and Gennadi Yanaev (Vice-President).

which would
isolation as

The coup sought

significantly reshape the nature of the Soviet Union.

coup leaders declared he was incapable of fulfilling

implemented

a state

of emergency.

168

to obstruct the treaty,

Gorbachev was held

his executive duties

in

and

”

A

major

of the coup was their

failure

failure to test the loyalty

the chief of military operations, prior to the assault.

to

When

abandon Gorbachev and Yeltsin. This enabled Yeltsin

put to the

to

of Pavel Grachev,

test,

Grachev refused

organize an impromptu

rally

White House, where tens of thousands of Russians gathered. Yeltsin famously

at the

climbed on
the coup.

to

one of the tanks and from an exposed position declared

Coup

leaders

were not willing

to

be responsible for significant casualties.

Demonstrations against the coup broke out in other major

When Gorbachev

returned to

his opposition to

Moscow,

cities,

the attempted

it

collapsed days

4

'

44

later.

coup had seriously

discredited his personal political influence as well as the overall prestige of the regime.

Gorbachev refused, however,

same

to

blame

the

Gorbachev reluctantly agreed

time,

Communist

Party of the Soviet Union. At the

to dissolve the

from Yelstin. The coup had fundamentally changed the
Gorbachev, emerged atop the
That

Union

fall,

treaty, but these efforts

was formed

1.

to retain a role for the

unraveled

On December

as a loose association of states

31, 1991, the

The

Union of Soviet

disintegration of the Soviet

Gorbachev bears

a large

and

Yeltsin, not

presidency by redrafting the

when Ukraine supported
7,

the

who

4

^

December 25 and

Socialist Republics

came

at

States

it

midnight,

to an end.

Union was “a transformation

By embracing

the articulation and defense of dissent,

referendum for

Commonwealth of Independent

measure of responsibility even though

struggled desperately to avoid.

a

shared a commitment to economic

coordination. Gorbachev resigned as president on

December

USSR

Party under pressure

political hierarchy.

Gorbachev sought

independence on December

Communist

for

which

was an outcome he

democratization, Gorbachev permitted

which forever altered the centralized nature of the
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self-described Soviet democracy. Clearly, the Soviet political process

was not

in line with

Western conceptions of democracy. At the same time, both the Soviet Union, and the
Russian Federation which emerged afterward, shared formal elements of democracy,
such as constitutions, institutions, and elections. These things meant very
a competitive political

1991

was

if

and how

little in

system with representative government. The key question after

this

would change.

The Soviet Union ended

abruptly.

paramount concern. Yeltsin had proven

The implementation of reform was of

to be a decisive leader.

A

central figure in the

collapse of the old order, Yeltsin set out to create a better government and

was

his popularity

still

extraordinarily high. In early 1992,

were seriously debated by Yeltsin and
elections that

was

to

terms of

would provide

proceed with reform

a popular

in

economy while

two main courses of actions
option was to hold

new

his advisers.

The

mandate

economic reform. The second option

for

first

anticipation of later electoral approval. Yeltsin chose the

later option.

Yeltsin allowed Gaidar to replace fixed prices with free-market prices. Price

liberalization

would be one of several

would include

a balanced budget

steps toward

comprehensive reform. Other steps

and the elimination of state subsidies. David Lipton

described the road to freedom and prosperity

in

Russia as long and narrow.

4,1

Yeltsin's

decision to avoid the electoral process and instead rely heavily on executive decrees

caused more problems than

4
it

solved.

Yeltsin adopted political practices he once

strongly attacked and in doing so set a precedent that

to

was

later

used under Vladimir Putin

consolidate political power and undermine the democratic process.
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1

At the same time, such practices enabled Yeltsin

to pursue a

reform agenda

alongside a Russian Supreme Soviet whose majority did not share his conviction to create

economy. The

a market

industrial

nomenklatura demonstrated a high

level

of anxiety and

uncertainty regarding the consequences of economic reform. These industrial leaders and

managers were accustomed
empires” and
activity.

felt

to

an endless supply of resources

to

slow and soften the reforms, which produced a

economic control of Russian

enterprises. Lipton described the relationship

between reformers and the nomenklatura as
that reformers

support their “enterprise

threatened by changes in government involvement with economic

The nomenklatura pushed

struggle for

to

maintained the upper hand.

a marriage, in

which Yeltsin sought

4s

Yeltsin and Gaidar mistakenly neglected to publicly justify

programs, instead assuming people were

Communist
order

still

Party

to ensure

tired

new

political

of hearing about economic programs. The

was gone and Marxism-Leninism

much of the

discredited, but

old

remained. Local political and economic elites operated largely separate of

Moscow and began
interests in a

new

to

work

closely with criminal groups toward promotion of common

era of market

economy.

Yeltsin rarely met with or sought approval from the

Supreme

Soviet. Yeltsin

"confined deliberations on policy to a small circle of associates" and "sacked personnel

whenever and wherever

his policies

existed, Yeltsin introduced his

own

were not being obeyed ."
appointees

who under

"plenipotentiaries," "representatives," "prefects,"

his political will.

4

Where

a variety

local opposition

of titles, such as

and eventually "governors," enforced

Service claims that "in the guise of a President, Yeltsin was ruling like

a General Secretary" and doing so "with less deference to 'collective leadership."'
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Ml

Yeltsin built a reform team of relatively

in their thirties

and

saw himself as

a

1

forties/

Most had

modern Peter

little

the Great.

unknown men who were predominately

intention of staying in

power

long. Yeltsin

"Having seized the reins of Great Russia's

coach and horses," Service explains, Yeltsin was determined "to drive headlong along a

bumpy

path."

Those familiar with

the comparison."

18th century Russian history, however, "trembled at

2

After price liberalization, Yeltsin's reform agenda soon expanded to include
privatization. This process

Committee
state

for the

was overseen by Anatoli Chubais,

Management of State

property to the private sector was

Property.

who

the

Chairman of the

The overriding question

exactly should

own

were permitted to purchase up to

25%

in transferring

previously state-owned

companies. Chubais created a voucher system. Vouchers were available
per citizen and could be invested in companies

State

at

10,000 rubles

when formed. Employees and managers

of the shares

in their

respective

company once

put

on the market and further privileges were available should someone desire a majority
stake. Results

were mixed

at best.

Given the high

rate

of inflation, 10,000 rubles was

a

very small grant for individual citizens, and the internal enterprise buy-outs practically

guaranteed that former Soviet managers could retain

total

control over their respective

companies/'

Lobbying organizations became highly

effective in pressuring Yeltsin during this

period of economic transformation and uncertainty. These efforts were led by directors of

energy, manufacturing, and agriculture, such as Arkadi Volsky and Viktor

Chernomyrdin,

who had been

politically

powerful under the Soviet system as well. Such
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men

suggested that economic collapse was on the horizon, but were willing to negotiate

with Chubais. Robert Service explains:

Their basic demand was that

if

the government

was going

to insist

on the de-

nationalization of companies, this should be done without ending state subsidies and
It was only
Supreme Soviet ratified his program of
privatization on
June 1992). This was the last success of the radical economic
reformers for a year. They knew that they had compromised. But their rationale was that
they had introduced enough capitalism to ensure that the members of the old Soviet
nomenklatura would not permanently be able to shield themselves from the pressures of
4
economic competition.

without threatening the immediate interests of the directors and workers.

when Chubais gave way on
1

1

this that the

(

Popular discontent was not limited
dissatisfaction and unrest

production

fell.

Many

to portions

of the ruling

elite.

Social

became widespread throughout 1992. Food and

industrial

"simply cut out a patch of land on the outskirts of towns to

cultivate produce or keep rabbits, pigs, or even cows," while others "moonlighted

their jobs, selling cigarettes at

pay workers. Unable

were

laid off. Barter

Communism and

to

Metro

stations."

"

from

Factories lacked discipline and funds to

maintain consistent production, hours were restricted and workers

became more prevalent.

Petty theft

was widespread under

persisted during the transition capitalism. For example, grocery clerks

kept the best sausages, factory workers swiped screwdrivers, and acquisitions like these

were traded among
illegally

friends.

sought to gain a

bit

The government no longer harassed people who
of luxury

in

an economic environment where luxury was

predominantly out of the reach of all but top

formed

tent settlements,

and military

even

in

legally or

elites.

Poverty was widespread. People

Moscow. Most of the poor were pensioners, oiphans,

"

invalids.

All Russians, not just the poor, suffered from vast environmental degradation

before and after the

fall

of the Soviet Union. There were significant increases
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in

respiratory and dermatological illness in heavy industrial areas, such as Chelyabinsk.

Spent nuclear fuel was discarded in the White Sea without sufficient caution or oversight.

Not since World
authorities." ^

War

II,

"had so

many

Alcohol abuse increased, while

problems facing

common

by the

citizens of Russia felt so lacking in care

life

expectancy

fell.

Most of the

social

Russians were out of their control. These included deteriorating

healthcare, lack of pollution standards, lack of industrial safety standards, and the

fall in

average family income.

The

made

a

legal order

was fragmented and

ineffective.

law-based state elusive. As Robert Service puts

being turned upside-down."

N

Under these

Everything was

it,

"a

'

their

the

terrorists.

own

capitalists

in the

to the highest bidders,

were not eager

even

to invest their profits in

country. These and other factors kept Russian development from proceeding at

same pace
In

Wealthy Russian

was pervasive

Bribery of government officials was

commonplace. Generals regularly sold military equipment

Chechen

which

world of experience was

conditions, "criminality

development of the Russian market economy."

in flux,

as neighboring countries such as Poland

November of

1992, a Constitutional Court decision enabled

conservatives to reconstitute themselves as the

Federation.

and Czechoslovakia.

The party was

led

Communist

Party of the Russian

by Gennadi Zyuganov and dedicated

Lenin and even Stalin. Yeltsin claimed

to

Communist

to the

memory of

be above party politics, but backed Gaider,

though not the extent of creating a party together. Critics of authoritarian government

came under

fire,

most notably Gavriil Popov, who resigned as the mayor of Moscow

in

1992 after being accused of fraud. This was indicative of a larger trend: wholehearted

advocacy of liberalism became

less

common.
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A

party system had yet to develop in Russia. In contrast to the Soviet tradition

“the problem

was no longer

the existence of a single party but of too

many

parties."

Robert Service explains:

The problem was no longer the existence of a single party but of too many parties.
The distinctions between one party and another were not very clear; their programs were
wordy and obscure and the parties tended to be dominated by single leaders. The far-right
Liberal-Democratic Party was described in its official handouts as 'the Party of
Zhirinovski.' Russia had not yet acquired a stable multiple-party system, and this

circumstance increased Yeltsin's freedom of maneuver."

0

Regional assertiveness was also a problem, particularly

in areas

predominantly

inhabited by Russians. In Svedlovsk, for example, Yeltsin had to deal with his

territory

which declared

in

1993

that

it

was

home

the heart of a so-called Urals Republic.

Yeltsin used to encourage such behavior under Gorbachev.

Once

in

power, Yeltsin

asserted the prerogatives of centralized power, enacted taxes, and clearly stated that

separatist tendencies

would not be

After the Russian

tolerated.

Supreme Soviet sought

Yeltsin held a referendum on his polices.

of the President.

53%

Yeltsin, but Yeltsin

59%

to

impeach Yeltsin

of those

approved of Yeltsin's economic

still

who

in

March of 1993,

participated voted in support

policies. This

was

a victory for

had to rely on executive decrees, given the slim nature of his

popular majority. Yeltsin also plotted to disband the Supreme Soviet by decree and hold

new

elections.

When

the executive degree

was

issued, however, deputies of the

Supreme

Soviet were informed and prepared. Hundreds barricaded themselves in the White

House

and declared control of government.
Yeltsin stressed his recent popular mandate, in contrast to the

which was elected

in 1990. Neither side

was

particularly prone to
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Supreme

Soviet,

compromise, though

that

was what

the public preferred.

retaken by force.

On October 4,

leaders

and detained them

plotters

were

still

6

Yeltsin eventually ordered the White

House

military forces shelled the building, captured the

same prison

in the

being held.

61

that several

to

be

coup

of the August 1991 coup

This violent episode secured the future of economic

reform and enabled Yeltsin to use his new power position to shape a new constitution

which Yeltsin and the Supreme Soviet had been working on
Dating back

to the spring

a constitutional revision

some

time.

of 1992, constitutional alternatives were entertained by

committee

Supreme

in the

based on division of powers, which feared
too powerful totalitarianism

for

Soviet.

if either the

would reemerge. Other

executive modeled around the Fifth Republic

in

Some

advocated a system

executive or legislature became

alternatives called for a strong

France and divided the legislatures into

upper and lower chambers. Growing tension surrounding the creation process was
temporarily diffused with a compromise

referendum on the draft constitution.

Months

later,

6

December of 1992

in

'

however, Yeltsin produced another constitutional

stronger presidency, and formed a Constitutional Conference

different regions in the federation.

incorporated

demands from both

descended into

crisis

64

The conference created

separate focus.

with a

composed of delegates from

moderate draft

that

the president and parliament. Constitutional negotiations

was

ratified via public

The Constitution was divided

compromises nearly

a

draft,

along with the "October Events" of 1993. In December, an amended

version of the constitution

vote.

that called for a

into

the entire document,

The second

two

referendum with

sections.

The

first

58%

of the popular

section,

which

divided into nine chapters, each with a

is

section consists of concluding and transitional provisions.
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)

)

The Russian Federation was
state

constituted as a “democratic, federal, rule-of-law

with republican form of governance.”

legislative, executive,

religion

was

)

66

Power was separated

and judicial components. The adoption of a

forbid. Individual rights

and

liberties are a

into separate

state ideology or

“supreme value” and the

recognition, observance, and protection of these rights are the obligation of the State.

There are 47

Chapter 2

articles in

that

list

the rights

and

liberties

of Russian

citizens.

These include:
•

equality before the law the courts regardless of gender, race, language,
origin, property, associations, etc. (Article 19)

The
a

•

freedom from torture and violence (Article 21

•

right to a timely judicial process (Article 22)

•

right to define one’s

•

right to

•

freedom of religion (Article 28)

•

freedom of thought and speech (Article 29)

move

own

ethnicity (Article 26)

(Article 27)

•

freedom of association (Article 30)

•

right to petition

•

right

•

freedom from forced

•

right to social security (Article 39)

•

right to

housing (Article 40)

•

right to

medical care (Article 41

•

right to a favorable

•

right to education (Article 43)

government (Article 33)

of private ownership (Article 35)
labor, right to vacation (Article 37)

environment (Article 42)

•

freedom of expression (Article 44)

•

right to an attorney (Article 48)

•

right be considered innocent until

•

freedom from double jeopardy (Article 50)

•

freedom from self-incrimination (Article 51

proven guilty (Article 49)

constitution created a strong presidency

source of stability

in a

where the executive

contentious political environment. The President

guarantor of Constitutional rights,

commander and chief of the armed

policy leader, both foreign and domestic. The president
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is

is

designed

is

to

be

head of state,

forces,

and top

elected to four-year terms via

secret ballot.

The President must be

35 years old and

at least

may

not serve

more than

two consecutive terms. The President has several enumerated powers which include
selecting the

Prime Minister, the

ability to dissolve parliament, the ability to

schedule

referenda without legislative permission, the ability to veto legislation, and the ability to

issue decrees.

and

The President has

legal

immunity, but

may

be impeached through a long

difficult process.

The Russian

court system operates from Constitution provisions and federal law.

Federal judges must be

at least

25 years old and have attained

at least 5

professional legal experience. Similar to the U.S. Constitution,

Judiciary aside

from

specific types of courts

little is

years of

said about the

and perimeters of jurisdiction. There are

As

three major types of federal courts: Constitutional, Arbitration, and Supreme.

name

the

implies, Constitutional Court deals with constitutional issues and federal laws, the

Supreme Arbitration Courts deal with economic disputes and

the

Supreme Court

is

the

supreme judicial body.

The parliament,
Council

is

the upper chamber,

deputies elected

Duma

is

called the Federal

at large

districts

Duma members may

The

State

throughout the Federation. The State

must be

at least 21

years old. While

via

in

not engage in paid activity except for teaching, research, or

other creative activity. Half of the

Duma

seats are filled based

representation. Parties receive seats based

minimum

a bicameral legislature.

which consists of 450 directly-elected delegates, elected

secret ballot for four year terms. Representatives

office,

is

which consists of 178 directly-elected delegates, two

from eighty-nine

the lower chamber,

Assembly,

on proportional

on the percentage of the vote received. The

threshold a party must obtain to qualify for seats

178

is

5%. Half of the

seats are

filled

based on single

member districts, which

are very similar to the U.S.

House of

Representatives.

New
1

forces/

'’

elections for the State

Duma

were a clear defeat for Yeltsin and pro-reform

composed of

Yeltsin had to once again deal with a lower house primarily

opponents

to

economic reform and negotiate with provincial

position of strength/’

7

Peter

Ordeshook observed

that “the

elites

from

less than a

marvel of the December 1993

elections (were) not that democratic reformers did so badly while Vladimir Zhirinovsky

somehow

did so well, but that the fascists, ultranationalists, and hardcore anti-reformists

failed to secure outright control

of the new legislature.”

Russia’s Choice, led by Gaidar,

far short

of majority control.

Yabloko (33

seats), the Party

Reform Movement

won

the largest

When combined

68

number of seats

(96), but this

was

with other reform organizations, such as

of Russian Unity and Accord (27

(8 seats), pro-reform parties only totaled

same time, the elections were not an unqualified victory

for

and the Democratic

seats),

36%

of the

6

seats.

major reform

'

At the

Vladimir

rival

Zhirinovsky. Zhirinovsky was ultra-nationalist, but an economically liberal and anti-

Communist. Zhirinovsky’s

LDPR

gained 59 seats and outperformed

competing for proportional representation with over
districts,

however,

largest faction

LDPR

only gained

real

There were two major Communist

(CPRF) and

the vote, while

1

seats

behind Russia’s Choice and the

Clark contends that the

Federation

1

winners

and

parties: the

of the vote.

in turn,

New

in the

23%

the

Regional Policy.

over

8%

other parties

finished as the third
70

Communist

Party of the Russian

CPRF

received over

of the vote. The two parties combined held

179

member

In single

1993 elections were the Communists.

the Agrarian Party of Russia (APR).

APR won

LDPR

all

1

13% of

12 seats.

which constituted the

1

Though

largest bloc.

public support of the

vindicated their struggles with Yeltsin, control of the

Communist

control of the national political agenda.

with the elections, expanded presidential power

at

Duma

to

did not translate to

The new

constitution, ratified along

most popular

the expense of the

Russian government. Legislation requires a simply majority
Council prior

Communists

in the

Duma and

pail of

State

being sent to the President for signature. Presidential vetoes can be

overridden with a two-thirds majority

in

each chamber. Communists, however, were not

close to a two-thirds majority, evident in the fact that pro-reform factions were able to

prevent the override of a presidential veto, often with Zhirinovsky’s help.

The Duma was

limited “in

its

hold the trump card of dissolution

in

ability to affect

any case

in

government” because “the president

which

the

Duma might

exercise authority vis-a-vis either the president or the bureaucracy.”

similar to the tsarist

led to criticism

Duma between

among Russian

1906 and 1917

scholars. Peter

72

attempt to

This was roughly

in its relationship to the

Ordeshook concluded

executive and

after the

1993

elections that “instead of building a sensible incentive structure to support stable

democratic

institutions, Russia's

democrats have opted for a naive, populist version of

democracy featuring crude demarcations of power between Moscow and
a simplistic

federal subjects,

view of presidential leadership, and parliamentary-election procedures

that

’

try to

be

all

things to

With the

all

people.”

ratification

of the

new

Constitution and corresponding elections, Russia

had embarked on an uncertain path toward democracy. Though democratic institutions
are designed to

promote peaceful transition of power and representative government, the

early years of the Russian transition

depended on violence and extraordinary use of
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presidential

power

to resolve institutional conflict

and implement reform.

questions were put to the public, narrow support existed for reform, but

were granted

a majority in the

ability to

Communists

most popular branch of government. Themes such

violence, vast presidential power,

to characterize

When

as

and mixed public sentiment toward reform would come

Russian development in ways that significantly inhibited the country's

develop fully-functioning democracy well after the

Looking back on Russian

history,

one

is

fall

of the Soviet Union.

struck by the fact that Russia experienced

“democratic” elections, institutions, and constitutions in the Soviet period, yet these

meant very

little

because of disproportionate power vested

the State. This illuminates

how any

history

in the

Communist

of democratic procedures

is

Party and

not necessarily a

helpful history in terms of democratic development. Past legacies with democratic

structures will very likely influence present conceptions toward these structures and

related systems

of governance. In Russia, few citizens were excited about the prospect of

elections and institutions as something of value in themselves because they

for so long.

meant so

little

This suggests that transition theorists would be better served to incorporate

greater discussion of institutional legacies in particular parts of the world, rather than

making universal generalizations regarding

the effectiveness of,

and corresponding

popularity toward, democratic structures.

Similar to dominant scholars of democratic transitions, dominant scholars of

capitalist transitions present a fairly

monolithic model for best promoting capitalism

throughout the former Soviet Union: the faster the

most notable economists focused on
Sachs was an adviser

to the

better. Jeffrey

Sachs

is

among

the

transitions to capitalism in the former Soviet Union.

Russian government as the notion of shock therapy was

181

developed and implemented. According to Sachs, the
“unprecedented opportunity
system.”

to create a

fall

of the Soviet Union created an

law-bound and prosperous international

,4

Sachs claims

that

developing countries have a “relatively straight forward

set

of

guideposts for most fundamental reforms” because “all developed countries have

openness, private ownership, and corporate governance.” °

In turn,

Sachs believes these

guideposts constitute a basic three-prong model for capitalist development around the
world. According to Sachs, capitalism

is

the best

economic system because “one

overriding lesson from the comparative growth experience of the

capitalism 'pays.'”

the

main

tenets

More

specifically,

Sachs contends

last

50 years ...

that all countries

of capitalism between 1970 and 1990 (open

is

that

which maintained

trade, currency convertibility,

private sector as engine of growth) experienced increases in per capita income.

Unfortunately,

“many

countries have behaved badly until recently” and “are stuck in a

transition crisis” because they took too long to adopt “the core capitalist institutions.”

Sachs argues that the benefits of capitalist transitions are not just limited

economic sphere. The expansion of capitalism promotes global
that “the

market revolution has gone hand

“virtually

all

in

hand with

security.

76

to the

Sachs claims

a democratic revolution” in

of Latin America, Central Europe, and the former Soviet Union.” This

is

an

important relationship for Sachs because the spread of democracy “almost surely reduces

the risks

is

of war, as do the increased economic

the best

links

economic system because capitalism

is

of enhancing world democracy and peace as well.
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among

,77

countries.”

Thus, capitalism

not just the most lucrative, but capable

Considering these benefits, Sachs claims the most perplexing aspect of capitalist

why

development

is

to Sachs, the

modem capitalist

figuring out

it

has taken so long for capitalism to triumph. According

system emerged

in the early

1800’s “with the

development of the factory system, the modern corporate form of company organization,
central banking,

and the elimination of servile obligation

easing or elimination of mercantilist trade practices.”

and

its

colonies, and then spread to Western

By
institutions

who

the

mid 18

lh

rightly predicted in

traditional societies.

capitalist

°

to

keen observers no

cites a

s

This

movement began

less than Karl

Marx and Fredrich

that capitalism

th

Engels,

would undermine

passage from The Communist Manifesto that states

development draws “even the most barbarian nations

Throughout the 18

England

in

economic superiority of capitalist

The Communist Manifesto

Sachs

Western Europe, and the

Europe and beyond.

century, the “profound

was apparent

in

into civilization.”

century, countries across the globe, such as China and Japan, and

powerful empires, like the Russian and Ottoman empires,

all

embarked on “modernizing”

reforms.

Sachs observes
international

economy

that the “financial turmoil

in the

Great Depression of the 1930’s” prevented “successful

transition” in Russia, China, the

theorists

of the 20

lh

ended

in

0

Ottoman Empire, and elsewhere/ Leading economic

century, such as John

was unstable and “the

state

of the 1920s, and the collapse of the

became

Maynard Keynes acknow ledged
1

the great stabilizer.”*

“By

the time

that capitalism

World War

1945,” Sachs explains, “there was no international trading system; no

convertible currencies except the

American

dollar'

183

and no moral attraction

in the

II

”

developing world to a capitalist system that had led to imperialist plunder, depression,

and two world wars

in

30 years.’

After the war, “the world divided into the proverbial

Worlds and the division remained
Capitalist Revolution

s

in tact until the

1980’s.”

of the 1990s” unraveled the

tripartite

“overriding reason for the revolution” was that 2

work.”

In contrast. First

a result of

within view for the

nd

and 3

M

Sachs claims that “the

world system.” The

world alternatives “did not

Sachs explains the consequences of this boom:

developments of the past decade,

first

ld

'

Second, and Third

World countries “experienced an economic boom of

unprecedented magnitude.”

As

First,

time, though

it

a global capitalist

economy

has not yet arrived. Countries with a

is

combined

population of roughly 3.5 billion people have undertaken radical economic reforms to

adopt the institutions of the capitalist system. These core reforms include six

common

points:
(

1

)

open international

trade;

(2) currency convertibility;

(3) private

ownership as the main engine of economic growth;

(4) corporate ownership as the dominant organizational form for large enterprises;
(5)

openness

to foreign

investment;

membership in key international economic institutions, including the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the GATT, which
85
now superseded by the new World Trade Organization (WTO).‘
(6)

Sachs fears

that this

unprecedented window of opportunity

concludes that “the world has
lose, if the

West

acknowledge

much

to gain
s

fails to act decisively.

that early efforts

"

close and

from the spread of capitalism, and much

to

Despite this vast record of success, Sachs does

toward economic reform

significant challenges. Sachs claims

may

is

in

Eastern Europe faced

“most of these problems (could) be ameliorated by

rapid privatization.”

The major

failure

of Eastern European governments has been the

inability to

"devise privatization strategies that adequately address the systematic crisis of the state

184

”

enterprise sector.” Sachs argues that Eastern European countries “have tended to

privatization as an exercise to be carried forward one enterprise at a time

‘voluntary basis,’

process.”'

'

As

in

which various stakeholders

a result,

state control years after

reforms were

initiated,

a

given a veto over the

in the enterprise are

most large enterprises from

and on

view

heavy

the Soviet era failed to escape

plagued by the lack of a clear path to

future privatization.

Sachs

calls for “across-the

board mechanisms of privatization

in

which thousands

of industrial enterprises are moved along the privatization process simultaneously.'
Sachs claims “the key

initial

step”

is

the

“mass commercialization of enterprises,

which thousands of enterprises are transformed
initial

into joint-stock

in

companies, with the

claims over the shares reflecting the balance of interests in the enterprises .”

commercial transformation would “provide a system of enterprise governance .”
enterprise governance

enterprise,

was

established, “a supervisory board

bound by the standard

corporate law.”

responsibilities defined in

N°

91

would be appointed

90

This

Once
for each

European and American

0

Like Sachs, Anders Aslund was an adviser

to the

Russian government during the

conception and implementation of shock therapy. Aslund claims that Western politicians

and media misunderstand Russian corruption and deteriorating infrastructure. These were
not the products of poorly designed reforms, but the remnants of Soviet

which have taken many years

to be corrected. In turn,

Aslund argues

mismanagement,

that Russia’s

transformation has developed a unique mythology that does not accurately reflect the

development process.

9

’
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Like Sachs, Aslund was a leading proponent of shock therapy. Aslund contends
that

one popular myth surrounding Russian economic reform
14

failure.”

is

that

“shock therapy was a

Conventional wisdom, according to Aslund, states that radical economic

reforms, like price liberalization and privatization, were implemented too fast and too
soon. In response, Aslund claims that Boris Yeltsin faced

rapidly in the

wake of several gradual and

little

choice but to reform

ineffective reforms. Furthermore, the

most

successful transformations in Eastern Europe, such as Poland and Estonia, implemented

reforms far more radical than Russia. As a
Russia

at the turn

of the century

to

result,

Aslund considers most problems facing

be indicators of insufficient reforms: excessive state

intervention, corruption, high tax rates, lingering inflation,

turn, “Russia’s real

form of subsidies

A

problem was too

little

to the country’s elite.”

shock and too much corrupt

“it

state

is

from 1997

to

in the

that privatization has only generated

would be more accurate

to say that

it

has generated national

wealth.” Aslund points out that the private sector generated no less than

GDP

therapy

93

second myth Aslund seeks to debunk

corruption. Aslund claims

and limited rule of law. In

2001 Whereas corruption
.

is

70%

of Russia’s

typically understood as the misuse of

public power for private gain, privatization “permanently deprives public servants of
"’

public property.”

Thus, privatization
for

all

economic

is

one of Russia's most successful reforms, though commonly blamed

shortfalls.

Aslund claims

it

would be more

logical to criticize less

successful reforms, like price liberalization.

Aslund

is

a supporter

of shock therapy and mass privatization, but acknowledges

serious failures in Russian attempts to implement radical

186

economic reform.

In

1999, for

example, Aslund states that “radical economic reform largely failed because of
extraordinary rent-seeking by old enterprise managers.”

“virtually unconstrained

economic

who

elite”

'

Rent-seeking managers are

seek to strengthen their position by

maintaining state subsidies and corruption, rather than furthering capitalist

transformation.

Other economic problems

GDP,

that

a significant rise in poverty,

could have been reinforced

West had provided

if

hampered Russia

in the 1990’s

were

and high employment. Aslund argues

a

that

40%

in

“reforms

democratic institutions had been developed faster

financial support for the reforms in early 1992.”

drop

if the

Given these

outstanding problems, Aslund concludes that shock-therapy was “neither radical, nor

fast,

but slow and partial.”

Sachs and Aslund are two leading economic scholars of transitions to capitalism.

These proponents of shock therapy argue

that the

overall profitability of the system over time.

control of the

economy, which severely

the quickest path to

economic

To end

inhibits

efficiency.

urgency of the model emerges from the
the perpetuation of inefficient state

economic growth, rapid

The pace of reform must be

as

liberalization

is

immediate as

possible because societal openings for capitalist reform are historically limited and

capitalism

is

universally desirable.

Any

short-term costs are nothing compared to the

long-term advantages.

The arguments of Sachs and Aslund
of transition and aforementioned

exhibit parallels between

political scholars

economic scholars

of transitions, such as Huntington,

O’Donnell, Schmitter, Karl, Linz and Stepan. Both understand capitalist-democracy to be
universal components of social progress. Both understand capitalist-democracy as the

187

victorious ideology in the

wake of World War

which defeated Fascism, and the Cold

II,

War, which defeated Communism. Both provide understandings of the
processes that can effectively

fit

in

transition

any social context as long as the proper model

is

followed.
Transition to democracy scholars, such as Huntington and O’Donnell, claim that

founding elections instigate
transitions,

a transition

whereas transition

and democratic

to capitalism scholars,

institutions inevitably consolidate

Aslund and Sachs, claim

that fully-

functioning capitalism best results from rapid economic liberalization. These

understandings predominately reflect a Western perspective that does not necessarily

fit

with an array of powerful social perspectives and values abroad, such as theocracy,
socialism, tribalism, national pride, anti-Semitism, and anti-Americanism. Furthermore,

both approaches provide an excessive focus on the end result of transitions, while

overlooking

many

important complexities of the development process

itself,

such as

popular attitudes toward reform, the implementation challenges that face specific
countries,

and expectations based on experience, which might be called “culture” or

“tradition.”

As

a result,

1

question these major assumptions

made by predominant

both economic and political transitions, particularly as these assumption
relatively unique context

of the former Soviet Union. Given Russia's

history, a rapid transition to capitalism

was bound

to

fit

scholars of

in the

size, culture,

have varied and profound effects on

Russian society for years to come. The turbulent years of rapid reform produced
different viewpoints

on the nature and impact of shock therapy

were predominately negative throughout the

first

188

and

in Russia,

decade of reform.

many

most of which

The implementation process of Shock Therapy generated
the effectiveness of the model.

economic turmoil
launched

in the

in

Russia,

is

it

that “in the

easy to lose sight of the

fact that

which reached 250%

in

00

debate on

midst of political and

economic reforms

beginning of 1992 brought about significant improvements”

relatively short period of time.

in line

David Lipton contends

a significant

in a

This turmoil most notably took the form of inflation

January of 1992.

When

with policies of price liberalization,

Gaidar removed

demand pushed

official price restraints,

prices upward.

“Even though

markets will not function well until stabilization and privatization are accomplished,”
Lipton observes, “the Russian

According

economic

economy

to Lipton, the

has been transformed to a market economy.”

Russian economy of 1993 barely resembled that of the

situation in 1991, “let alone that of the past seven decades.”

central planning

enterprises

101

were removed by liberalization of prices and economic

were granted

the

freedom

to

The remnants of
activity,

determine what goods to produce and

enterprise managers.

New commercial

the kiosk business in

Moscow and

and a floating exchange

rate

St.

while

how

produce them. Government and industry associations stopped issuing directives

lifted

100

to

to

ventures and activities quickly developed, such as
Petersburg. Internationally, trade barriers were

was developed

that

helped to enhance access to world

markets.

Though

liberalization efforts

were

far

from complete by the end of 1993, Lipton

concludes that new commercial relations were “emerging everywhere” and most
importantly, these relations were “based on market conditions, rather than on

directives.”

"

Lipton argues Russia's great natural resources and

provide for tremendous economic potential.

To implement

189

human resources

fully functioning capitalism.

however, Russia

have to

shift

resources out of heavy industry and into consumer

orientated manufacturing services.

The dominance of military production has created

will

inefficiencies within the

economic system

that

need to be corrected

if

capitalism

is

vast

going

to take hold.

Abram Bergson views

the “big

Gorbachev's reforms. Bergson claims

upon taking office and points

to

bang” reforms under Yeltsin
that Yeltsin inherited “fiscal

Gorbachev's acknowledgement

serious mistake in the years of pereistroika”

situation in the country.”

Responding

which Yeltsin would have
Bergson

to this

“we

1990 that the “most

lost control

of the financial

grave situation “was a cardinal matter with

states that to Yeltsin’s credit he did so,

“though with mixed

is

supposed

to

be privatized

in a

the

wholesale way,”

accomplished and how rapidly are knotty questions on which the

that is

‘standard prescription’ itself understandably allows a degree of discretion.”

privatization occurred quickly.

enterprises

Bergson

results.”

component of the "big bang” development. “Under

Big Bang,” Bergson explains, “property

“how

that

and market disarray”

to deal urgently.”

points to privatization as a major

but

was

in

as the successor to

were

privatized.

By

July of 1994, for example,

Bergson claims

this exhibits the

43%

10
'

In Russia,

of all Russian

sense of commitment by

Yeltsin and his associates to an unprecedented pace of transformation.

Bergson

states that legally

speaking “there has been a veritable revolution

agricultural ownership, paralleling that in industry.”

State, but those

who work

the land.

individual or collective. Given

must be bold

to strike out

on

how

his

104

in

The land no longer belongs

Land can be bought and

sold.

to the

Ownership can be

quickly the market was initiated, however, "a farmer

own

in

Russian circumstances.”

190

10

"

If in a cooperative

farm, one likely faced resistance from other members. Local political authorities

developed binding policies

that

posed bureaucratic obstacles for farmers. The availability

of needed supplies and equipment was limited. For these and other reasons, there were
only 277,300 private family farms in April of 1995, just over

land.

5%

of Russia’s arable

106

Despite progress, Bergson discusses several areas of concern surrounding “big

bang” development

in Russia.

State controlled industries.

One

area of concern

According

is

the monopolization of formerly

Bergson, the government response to

to

this

development was “rather ineffective” and by 1995, when the piece was written, the

problem w as not adequately resolved.

10

A

second area of concern was the high inflation

of the early 1990’s. Though a price surge was expected under Gorbachev, as Lipton

acknowledges, “the nearly fourfold jump
II,N

anticipated.”

and

The Russian

in 1995. ""

131%

significant

their life savings

Whereas

Community

inflation

was 2318%

in

1992,

841%

in

was repressed under Gorbachev,

third area

accumulated drop
loss in

GDP

Party in 1993, especially

made worthless by

1993,

it

205%,

became

a

in

older people

who saw

inflation.

GDP

GDP

in

1994 was

just

62%

of the

GDP

in 1990.

between 1992 and 1994 was nearly 40%, compared

between 1929 and 1993

Bergson concludes

among

of concern was a steep decline of Russian output. Bergson points to

official data that revealed the

30%

inflation rate

however, was even greater than

and overt problem under Yeltin. Inflation was the main the reason for the

resurgence of the

A

in 1992,

that the collapse

in

America during

was due,

The
to just a

the Great Depression

at least in part, to the

1

1(1

Big Bang and the

“confusion” and “disorganization” surrounding the transformation. Furthermore, Bergson

191

1

contends

that

Russia absorbed a multitude of simultaneous shocks, which negatively

impacted economic growth. These shocks included the end of the Cold War, a shrinking
defense sector, the dissolution of Comecon, the Communist trading bloc, and the breakup

of an economically integrated USSR.

1

1

Given these trends and concerns, Bergson concludes

that

Russia experienced a

severe inflationary depression, just three years after independence. Inflationary

depression was a typical

phenomenon

in

post-Communist

Russia was unique. This development was not favorable

transitions, but the severity in

of markets

to the introduction

and entrepreneurship, but many Russians fared well and not just the economic

was evident

in the

continuation of a social safety net that took a

Padma Desai
development process

is

in

more

of the ways

critical

Russia.

As Russia

in

entered

more

elites.

liberal form.

which shock therapy shaped
its

This

the

fourth year of economic reform in

1995, Desai claims that doubts centered around three issues:

1

)

the pace of reform; 2) the

prospects for success; 3) the role of outside influences in the transition process.

According

to Desai, the rapid

economic reform undertaken

in

Russia simply could not be

achieved within a democratic political setting, “where consensus building
necessary process.

The

size

was used

of the task created concern for scholars, such as Desai,

to central planning.

Decisions that are routine

11

out to be daunting for those

The

in a

country

how much

to

to

produce, which

borrow from

a bank- turned

never been faced with such choices. Household

decisions about which job to select, or whether to borrow
less formidable.

questioned

that:

market economies- what

who had

who

markets could rapidly take root

Desai states

'

in

free

technologies to adopt, where to set up a factory,

proved no

a slow but

,,112

whether public attitudes necessary for
that

is

interaction

among

to start a small business,

countless choices like these generates

market efficiency. Few reforming economies were ready

192

money
to leap

from centralized

1

planning to a market
set

of rules.

1

in

which innumerable decision makers had

by an unfamiliar

to play

14

Unfamiliarity

was

a

problem

in

terms of foreign aid as well. “Russian

policymakers,” Desai explains, “unfamiliar with the complexities of aid diplomacy,

nursed hopes for aid and credits bilateral and multilateral sources that ran far ahead of

any potential flow.” These policymakers were joined by Harvard professors Jeffrey Sachs
and Graham Allison,

who had

“unrealistic expectations”

and “floated

plan designed to initiate rapid economic reforms in Russia.”

a

megabuck

The problem was

Russian policymakers and the aforementioned Western advisers failed

aid

that

recognize that

to

“foreign investors would not send capital to Russia without sound opportunities to turn a

profit” and a stable,

dependable economic system

that

makes

risks

more

bearable.

Desai argues that the transition would have been more successful

the

Reagan administration had not

the Baltic Republics

USSR embraced

and

a full

insisted

that aid, trade,

if

11 ^

Congress and

on democratization including the liberation of

and

credits,

would be delivered "only

package of market-based reforms

in the areas

1

"’

if the

of financial

discipline, price decontrol,

and privatization of factories.”

approach” was designed

prevent a sequencing of reforms that would undertake one

to

type of transition, political or economic, prior to the other.

soon demonstrated
political

that

This “all-or-nothing

The Russian reform process

“economic reforms cannot be swiftly

initiated

and carried out

if

arrangements include checks and balances between the executive authority that

proposes reforms and the legislature that must accept them.”

Shock

therapists,

such as Sachs, did not realize

1

this at the

time and instead

believed that time and compromises were “like a ditch that could be leapt

193

in a

single

bound.” More specifically, the period of “extraordinary politics” was understood as a
unique situation

in

and joblessness.”
intolerably,

which “the public would be willing

costs

endure the pain of high prices

more gradual approach “would drag

In contrast, a

making such

to

felt

long after politics had turned ‘ordinary’ again and

giving opponents of reform a chance to regroup and counterattack.”
Desai, on the other hand,

things out

was

clearly a proponent of a

1

Is

more gradual approach

in

more

both the political and economic realms because such an approach would have been

effective in producing lasting democratic norms, such as a peaceful process of consensus

and Western advisers sought

building. Instead, Russian policymakers

reforms

in

to

push a

set

of

1992 through a “window of opportunity” that were not supported by the

popular branch of government. This reduced the reform process to a “disappointing
routine” by the end of 1994.

The amount of aid was

far short

of promises and what aid was granted was not

being absorbed quickly enough. For example, $43.4 billion was promised to Russia from

abroad
to

in

1993, but only a

little

more than half that amount

actually allocated. In addition

aforementioned criticisms of shock therapists, Desai blames Russian authorities for not

coming up with appropriate

project proposals to utilize available funding.

Bank, for example, approved nearly $3 billion
only $587 million from the

first

Congress approved nearly $2
million

subside

World Bank loan

billion in aid

was spent by December of
Still,

in

in

The World

loans in June of 1994, but

in

at

the time,

August of 1992 was used. Similarly,

between 1992 and 1994, but

less

than $500

111

1994.

the heated confrontations

between reformers and the nomenklatura did

favor of greater pragmatism. Unlike 1992 and 1993, the Chernomyrdin

194

government prepared
limiting the budget.

to

compromise with various Duma

At the time, Desai concluded

factions in 1994

when

that “the sensible option for

structure

is

handled will influence

economic choices

According

to

in the

political

outcomes, which

to

“how

in turn will

next round of Russia's transition.”

came

Russia

(was) a steady transition defined by a more manageable inflation rate” because
inflation control

it

help to

120

Hedlund and Sundstrom, the next round of reform was

a bit

more

successful than the period described by Lipton, Bergson, and Desai, though significant

problems and obstacles remained. The summer of 1995 produced the
potential recovery. This

was evident

December of 1995, and

a

digits

that

to a

4% decline

in 1995.

The

that “the debate

which

fell

from double

economic analysis.”

led to a debate

The

first

released a study in

in a rather unfortunate

characteristic

was

between rapid and gradual approaches

second characteristic was “the sense of being involved

in

121

on Russian economic reform has

been marked by two characteristics which have combined

policy,

low of 3.2%

claimed inflation and the budget deficit were under control.

Hedlund and Sundstrom argue

to block traditional

OECD

signs of

a

which reached

decrease in the rate of GDP decline, which

between 1992 and 1994

October of 1996

in falling inflation,

first

in

manner

a strong focus

to reform.

on

The

something exceptional” which

“led to the application of a variety of miracle cures at the expense of sound existing

knowledge.”

1-

'

Hedlund and Sundstrom contend

that the exceptional nature

of shock therapy was

unfortunate because the institutional realities of Russian society were pushed to the

background by assuming

that

Russia did not significantly differ from Western market-

oriented economies. Five years into the transition,

195

Hedlund and Sundstrom conclude

that

this

assumption was wrong because “Russian society was seriously lacking

such institutions- formal and informal- that combine to

economy

a functioning

terms of

market

possible.” Rather, a shared belief in the exceptional nature of the Russian

transition “provided legitimacy for miracle cures,

in

make

in

which often had

little

or no foundation

economic theory.” Hedlund and Sundstrom explain:

With more than four years of accumulated experience of attempted systematic
change, we can hardly avoid concluding that many of even the most pessimistic
expectations have been met and exceeded. This applies not only to shortcomings in the
design of reform- the really crucial issues relate to the ability of the Russian

economy

to

undertake institutional change, and the ability of Russian society to transform such

fundamental social and

legal

and the market economy.

The poor
transition

drop

in

state

was evident

norms

as they

combine

to

draw

the line

between the junule

^4

1

of the Russian economy between 1992 and 1994 of economic
in a

investment, and a

40%

25%

drop

drop

in

GDP,

in real

a

45%

wages.

drop

in industrial

output, a

60%

Hedlund and Sundstrom adopt

Steven Rosefielde’s characterization of the situation as one of “hyper-depression.”
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Furthermore, Hedlund and Sundstrom point to other scholars, such as Vincent Coen and

Michael Marrese,
outperformed

its

who

provide several reasons as to

neighbors, both

in

why

Russia should have

and out of the former Soviet Union. Russia had

several advantages over other transition economies, such as “vast deposits of natural

resources, a huge domestic market, a potential for substantial gains in terms of trade,

lagging sectors with a great potential for efficiency improvement, a total absence of

restitution

problems and- perhaps most important- overwhelming

interest

and support

from the West.”
Other scholars, however, emphasize continuity, rather than variance,

in

understanding the post-Soviet transition. Stanley Fischer, for example, points out that

196

all

former Soviet republics experienced shocks, the most important being the collapse of

Comecon and
to

Soviet trade. At the

same time, Fischer argues

support the idea that shock therapy produced a decline

greater than

no reform or

a gradualist

that cross-country data fails

output that would have been

in

approach.

Countries that decided not undertake rapid reform programs, such as Ukraine and

Hungary, have output declines as large as declines
programs, such as Russia and Poland.

countries with radical reform

in

In turn, Fischer

concludes that the debate between

big bang approaches and gradual approaches oversimplifies debates over the pace of

reform. In contrast to Desai, Fischer argues that conditions

in the

former Soviet Union are

very different than in China, the predominant model for gradual transition. Fischer

explains:

The economies

are

more heavily

industrialized,

and

their agricultural sectors are

too small to be the driving force of reform. Their state-owned industrial sectors are too

were in China, and the restructuring is certain
to cause more unemployment. While China has succeeded in maintaining
macroeconomic control, both Poland and Russia had to start their reform programs in
"
conditions of extreme macroeconomic instability.
large

and

inefficient to be ignored, as they

1

In addition to significant drop-offs in output,

contend

that the distributional

those with minor savings

Sundstrom explain, while

consequences of inflation

in the

“all

however, Hedlund and Sundstrom

bank saw

those

who

in

Russia were “dramatic.” “All

their capital being

wiped out,” Hedlund and

lived on fixed incomes- state wages, pensions or

other transfers- experienced a sharp reduction in their real incomes.” Like Bergson,

Hedlund and Sundstrom claim

that the

anticipated. In 1991, for example,

“Moscow

printed

impact of inflation was

money expansion was

severe than

“clearly out of hand,” as

more money than had been created during

197

much more

the previous

30 years!”

I_s

Though

inflation in Russia

200% must nevertheless
1

was much

less in 1994,

be considered

“an annual inflation rate of more than

a very serious

problem.”

ledlund and Sundstrom also discuss other indicators aside from the

discussed macroeconomic indicators. They claim there

is

1992 and 1994, the gap between per capita
to the richest oblast, increased

that

some of regions now

more astounding. Between

that

75%

to

80% of all

incomes of the poorest oblast compared

real

from eight times more,

suffer

to

42 times more. This indicates

from very severe poverty. Equally troubling,

to

conclude

the fact

is
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Moscow.

financial transactions just take place in

These developments lead Hedlund and Sundstrom

economy was

commonly

also cause for concern from a

regional perspective, where the dynamics of redistribution are

Russian

that the

significantly restructured, true to the intention of reformers, but the

direction of change “has hardly been that which

is

normally associated with

modernization within the framework of a modern economy.”

w as how “shock therapy was implemented

1

'

1

A

significant

as a military offensive- there

quick breakthrough or the whole war would be

it

I2g

1

’

lost.”

failed to adequately consider the specific institutions

2

The shock was

problem

would

either be a

artificial

because

of the Russian economy,

suggesting that Russian transition policy was more driven from expediency, than

comprehensive strategies rooted
Politically, voting in

1995, the year of the

Duma

way

in

economic theory and development experiences.

that actually

election.

meant something was

still

quite

new

in

Voting occurred frequently under the Soviet system,

but only since independence did Russians had the opportunity to choose between

candidates, parties, or between voting and not voting.

The Duma was

elected to a

year term, in contrast to the typical four year term. Shortly after the success of
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two

ultranationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky

and the Communists, Yegor Gaider, leader of pro-

reform Russia's Choice, acknowledged

that

Duma

resigned from government. The 1995

reformers were dealt a “bitter defeat” and
elections were positioned to shape

parliamentary politics for rest of the decade.
Electoral law in 1995

dual system of party

lists

was very

similar to the 1993 election.

and individual constituencies remained

The

controversial

in place.

The

political

environment was quite different however. Aforementioned economic turmoil promoted
significant

economic inequality. Many Russians were

high as one-third by some estimates.
another

20%

wealthier

8%

living

of Russians were

below basic subsidence, as

not being paid on a regular basis. Meanwhile, the wealthy were getting

both absolute and relative terms. In 1995, the wealthiest

in

of work, while

officially out

10% were

earning

25 times more than the poorest 10%. " Life expectancies were falling and crime was
1

increasing.

The number of murders had doubled

members were among
The

nominate candidates for the
electoral

Commission reported

Duma

law required

candidate

who

1%

Duma

273 organizations were

7%

won

do

so.

200,000

of these signatures could come from one

member districts were

required to

support from the respective constituency. In these 225

secured the most votes

entitled to

their intention to

that electoral associations gather at least

republic or region. Candidates running for single

at least

that

and 69 organizations declared

signatures of electors and no greater than

gather

and three

the victims.

Central Election

To compete,

in just three years

the respective seat.

districts, the

The remaining 225

seats

allocated by proportional representation required that electoral associations secure at least

5%

of the vote and

at least

25%

of the electorate turn out
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to vote.

2,627 individual candidates were nominated, 1,055 independents. 43 parties were
registered. 5,675 total candidates filled out party

groupings:

1

)

lists.

Parties could be divided into four

reform; 2) pro-government; 3) national-patriotic; 4) Communist. The

reform group was dedicated to further democratic and capitalist reform. Reformist parties
included Russia’s Choice, under Gaider, the Peasant Party, under Yuri Chernichenko, the
Social Democratic Party, under Alexander Yakolev,

and Yabloko, under Grigorii

Yavlinksky. The pro-government group was a coalition of power-holding

to

elites

dedicated

maintaining Chemomydrin's governance. The group represented two major interests;

complex,

the energy

complex,

in

The

in

which Chemomydrin was a central

which Oleg Soskovets was
national-patriotic group

figure,

and the metallurgical

a central figure.

was centered on organizations such

as the Congress

of Russian Communities, which was led by representatives of important constituencies.
This included Yuri Skokov, a former chairman of the Security Council, Sergei Galz’ev, a

former minister of foreign trade, and Alexander Lebed, a very popular military general.

The Congress sought
restoration

effective

the gradual and peaceful reconstruction of the Soviet Union, the

of Russia as a great power, tougher action against crime, the promotion of an

and socially oriented market economy, and greater support of traditional

Russian institutions such as the church and family.

the

Communist

134

The Communist group centered on

Party of Russian Federation led by Zyuganov.

The mass membership of

over a half million and relatively well developed networks of local activism was unique

compared
was

to other parties. In turn, the

truly larger than

its

1

than the party he led.

key

Communist

leader. This

Party

was evident

°
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in

was

the only organization that

how Zyuganov was

less

popular

White,

Wyman, and

Oates contend that the single most important document that

dictated the nature of the 1995 campaigns

1

Commission on September
any bias
parties

in

^

20.

’

was adopted by

the Central Electoral

Regulations stated that the media must refrain from

news coverage and required

the allotment of free air time to

all

registered

and candidates. One hour of each day between November 15 and December 15

was shared by

registered parties, while individual candidates

made arrangements

with

regional electoral commissions. Individual candidates were granted up to 20 minutes of

radio or television coverage as well free advertising in local press.

of the Media,

who monitored

that free time

was

the

Institute

campaign on behalf of the European Union, reported

distributed with compliance to regulations aside

complaints. Given tremendous size of the country and the

membership

The European

from a few minor

weak development of

structures and winter conditions, parties put a lot of effort into television

commercials. Both television and printed media focused more on individual leaders than
party platforms.

The Central

Electoral

Commission

also limited

campaign expenditures. Campaign

funds were processed through special temporary accounts

spending for political associations was capped

at

in the national

bank.

Campaign

$2.4 million and $95,000 for individual

candidates. Donations were regulated as well. Individuals could contribute up to

a party

and no more than $190

$284

to

to a candidate’s election fund. Private firms could

contribute up to $1,900 to candidate’s election fund and $19,000 to a party. Contributions

from foreigners, international organizations, and Russian firms with over
ownership were prohibited.

1
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30%

foreign

According
process.

have

90%

little

believed that

survey evidence, Russians had mixed feelings about the electoral

believed the results would be manipulated, while

no

to

to

it

effect

was

57%

thought they would

on government policy. At the same time, over half of those polled

the duty of citizens in a democratic society to participate in elections,

two-thirds of whom completely supported this view. In October of 1995,
they intended to vote, which

was up from

believed that Russia was headed in the

in

Yeltsin and just

1

1%

in the

60%

wrong

64%

Only 16% expressed confidence

Duma. Discontent could be explained by

of Russians stated their standard of living had declined

the fact that

1

in

56%

s

the previous year.

of the electorate turned out to vote. 993 registered election observers from 61

countries were distributed throughout the country.

The consensus of international

observers was that the will of the populace was accurately reflected.

the

claimed

Three quarters of Russians

in April.

direction.

70%

European Parliament declared the elections were “100%

International Foundation for Electoral

Systems claimed

“important indicator of the confidence of electors,”

free

A

delegation from

and democratic.” The

that the high turnout

was an

w hile America’s Commission on

Security and Cooperation in Europe concluded that popular sovereignty had finally taken

roots.

Some

observers asserted that most problems that were observed, such as

obstructed ballot boxes, open voting, family voting and insufficient verification of results,

were more the product of exhaustion and democratic inexperience, rather than fraudulent
intent.

Other observers were

Electoral

party

less

Commission allowed

lists

complacent and raised concerns about

parties to

fill

in all the

how

the Central

information of members on their

aside from their signatures and pointed to evidence of falsification of electoral
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results.

The

OSCE parliamentary

permitted to participate

so large that

it

delegation

commented

in the election created

confusion

that the large

among

could not be spread out in the voting booth.

number of parties

voters and the ballot

was

14

Four parties surpassed the

5%

barrier in the proportional representation portion of

the election.

Not surprisingly, the

left

did very well at the polls, particularly the

Communist

Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF). Electoral support of the

10% from

1993.

The CPRF won double

control of over one-third of the

the second

Duma. The

most successful party

their total in 1993.

the vote totals of any other party

Yabloko emerged as the

lists,

but the

1

1%

final party to

made

it

central party within the democratic

Our Home

the best positioned party in the city.

surpass 5%, was

down

was

vote share was half

opposition to Yeltsin. The party captured five single-member constituencies in
Petersburg, which

rose

and gained

Liberal Democrats under Zhirinovsky

terms of party

in

CPRF

is

St.

Russia, the

a bit from the major pro-government party in 1993,

Russia’s Choice.

The Duma
parties

and individual candidates

that

of candidates withdrew from party
affiliation,
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seats.”

January of 1996 was “an imperfect reflection of the

that took office in

had been successful

lists,

a result, the election

the elections.”
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Hundreds

dozens became independents or switched party

and “many of the leading figures on party

As

in

lists

decided not to take their

was more of a referendum on

Yeltsin, than an

organized choice on political alternatives. Given the power granted to the president
constitution, the

Duma

presidential election.

election

was

little

more than

a dress rehearsal for the

in the

upcoming

Other scholars understood the consequences of the 1995 elections

to

be more

profound. Steven Fish, for example, emphasized the paradoxical nature of the elections.

Though

were

the elections

nostalgia for a radiant

free

and

communist

revealed “a portentous popular

fair, the results

past.”

~

Fish argues that “the elections both refuted a

clutch of assumptions that have informed the pessimistic conventional

wisdom on

the

Russian electorate and revealed the decrepitude of present-day Russian liberalism.”
Fish argues that

as a result

many assumptions

of the 1995 elections.

politically passive.

about the Russian electorate were overturned

First, the election

demonstrated

that

Nearly two-thirds of all Russian adults voted. Less than

Russian voters voted against

all parties.

just

The most successful

$250,000 on the campaign.

won just

3% of

Second, the election demonstrated that Russians

were not easily manipulated even though voters were unaccustomed
participation.

Russians were not

party, the

In contrast.

CPRF,

did very

Our Home

is

little

to

democratic

advertising and spent

Russia spent ten times more and

half the votes. Third, the election demonstrated that Russians do not just vote im-

personalities. Parties that

were

led

by engaging personalities, such as Boris Fedorov's

Forward Russia and Svyatoslav Fedorov’s Party of Workers’ Self-Management, were
outperformed by parties led by “colorless bureaucrats,” such as Zyuganov’s

Chernomydin's Our

Home

electorate as a threat.

What
it,

is

if

is

Liberalism

The aftermath of the

in

and

Russia. Given these developments, Fish views the Russian

the Russian people vote

that

CPRF

election “raised an extremely unpleasant issue:

democracy

into oblivion?”

14

'

The problem,

as Fish sees

Russia as of yet had not “offered an effective solution to the

crucial matter of reconciling private interests and the public good.”
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In transitions theory, the

second election typically

is

a significant milestone

on the

path to democratic consolidation. Significant political actors are supposed to have

game which have been

accepted the political and economic rules of the

stabilized.

Russia’s 1995 election, on the other hand, did not bring these signs of consolidation.

Michael McFaul explains:

The 1995 parliamentary
and

strikingly,

party

still

in contrast to

new

and economic order. Most

political

East European transformations, Russia’s

main opposition

accepts neither the political nor the economic institutions of the

Communist

more

elections served to divide Russian political forces

sharply into supporters and opponents of the

leaders have called the dissolution of the Soviet

Union

new

status quo:

a criminal act that

must be reversed. The fusion of nationalism and communism in the CPRF makes it more
dangerous than communist-successor parties in Hungary, Poland, or the Baltic states.
While Russian Communist leaders now affirm that private property can coexist with state
and collective property (but deserves no special privilege), they have also vowed to undo
“illegal” privatizations. In sum, Russia's Communists have not “reformed” in the way
that their Polish or Hungarian counterparts have. Russian Communist leaders, far from
disavowing the heritage of the CPSU (the same party that squelched democracy,
eliminated private property, and killed millions of its own citizens), proudly flaunt it.

These deep divisions persisted
political observers

expected Yeltsin

“logically, he should

that

have

lost,

in

the 1996 presidential election,

to lose.

since he

As

a

commentator from Pravada put

was unable

to fully solve

it:

any of the problems

have piled up: the stagnation of production, the improverishment of a majority of the

people, growing unemployment, the chronic

nonpayment of wages,

science, culture and education, the continuing conflict in

Yeltsin receive a majority of the electorate’s votes.”

only

which many

at

8%

lavlinski,

election

in the polls.

Chechnya,

144

In

the decline in

etc.

Nevertheless,

of January of 1996 Yeltsin was

Other major candidates, such as Gennadi Zyuganov, Grigori

Aleksandr Lebed, and Vladimir Zhirinovski, were more popular.

was held

in

two rounds of voting,

the

first
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on June

1

7,

14

The

and the second on July

3.

Yeltsin used the

the

OSCE

media

to his

advantage throughout the campaign. Observers from

reported that relevant electoral law on the allotment of free television and radio

time for candidates was generally respected, but news coverage and political commentary

was

significantly

and

how

imbalanced

positively Yeltsin

in Yeltsin's favor,

was portrayed compared

spokesperson Michael Meadowcroft stated

to

both in terms of the amount of coverage

that

to other candidates.

“from

OSCE
came

a very early time the contest

be regarded as virtually a two horse race and the media retlected and accelerated this

perception with the result that there was hardly any coverage of the remaining

candidates.” Yeltsin

as the top

(35%) and Communist candidate Gennadi Zyuganov (32%) emerged

two contenders

after the first

round of voting.

Electoral law stated that incumbent Presidents pursuing reelection

“may

not take

advantage of his official standing for the term election.” Yeltsin, however, made highly
publicized visits to various regions and promised large

projects.

On

sums of state funds

for local

Election Day, multiple infringements of electoral law were observed in

varying degrees of seriousness. The most widely shared concern of international
observers was the lack of secrecy during the voting process. Greater instruction was

needed
voted

to

ensure that voters voted

in public,

in the

voting booths. Several presidential candidates

which many observers believed

this set a

bad example. The most

egregious cases were in Tatarstan where Yeltsin supporters solicited votes

voting booths. In

several ballots.

some

cases, individuals

in front

of

were seen coming out of the voting booths w ith

146

Many of the same problems

persisted in the second round of voting.

observed that "the continued provision of desks, together
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w ith

pens, in the

The

OSCE

open area of a

number of polling

stations suggests that the vital concept

and purpose of secret voting

have not yet been appreciated.” Yeltsin’s disproportionate media coverage persisted as
well.

The

OSCE

Commission
part

in

mission concluded that “the impotence of the Central Electoral

enforcing

and also a need

its

own

resolutions

to strengthen the

C’EC’s powers

during the period of the election campaign.”

When

40%

for

to

14

a lack

of will on

in relation to

its

media regulation

nearly

many postcommunist

54%

of the vote, compared

states, the sitting

factors,

the

f lungary,

to

government

Russia was not punished for poor economic performance as had been the case
Lithuania, Poland,

members’

'

won

the votes were tallied. Yeltsin

Zyuganov. In contrast

showed both

in

in

and Bulgaria. Yeltsin’s success was the product of several

such as the manipulation of the media, widespread promises of federal funding,

announcement of Chechen peace

capitalist

market was inevitable.

Institute for the

Media and

the

I4S

and

talks,

a

widely shared belief in the electorate

a

Despite electoral transgressions, the European

OSCE

declared the elections were well

managed and

accurately reflected the will of the electorate, despite the imbalance of media coverage,

disproportionate resources available to candidates, and inappropriate activities from

within the administration during the campaign period.

14g

Yeltsin narrowly, but successfully, navigated himself through very difficult

political terrain.

This enabled economic reform to continue, albeit uncertain, inequitable,

and unpopular. The
being secured as a

deep

first

chapter of the post-Soviet era closed with democratic elections

commonly accepted

political divisions,

and constant threats

pail

of the

economic woes, and

to the sustainability

political system.

At the same time,

institutional uncertainty

of a transition

207

to

loomed as serious

popular government and a

market economy. Though most advocates of greater reform did not realize
Russia was

fast

approaching a deep and profound

it

at

the time,

crisis.

Russia faced several obstacles to reform prior to the 1998 economic collapse.

problem was tax collection. Lawrence Summers observed

that “despite

One

some of the

highest tax rates in the world, Russia has one of the lowest rates of overall tax
collections” because approximately

at least a third

“17% of firms pay

publish no accounts and

make no

tax

taxes regularly and in

payments

1 ' 11

at all.”

full,

Clifford

while

Gaddy

explains:

New

taxes are introduced and others abolished, rates are raised or lowered,

exemptions are granted and withdrawn

dizzying pace. This unpredictability has been

at a

detrimental to economic development, especially

element of predictability

The

A

collectability

in tax

of a tax

sudden crackdown

in

as

is

policy

much

is

new

business creation. But an important

the seriousness

a part

w ith which

of who or what

is

1

is

being enforced.

being taxed as

enforcement, though laudable on paper,

unanticipated increase in the real tax burden.

it

is in fact

a

how much.

major

1

Organized crime has also had a devastating impact on Russia's economy because
“it

discourages foreign investment, deprives the country of its tax base, dominates the

banking sector and financial markets, and exacerbates the already widespread problem of
1

corruption.”

"

In contrast to

Columbian and

Italian

organized crime, most profits from

Russian organized crime are deposited and invested abroad, rather than domestically.

An

estimated $50 to $150 billion was exported from Russia between 1991 and 1997. At

minimum, 40% of the approximately $2
attributable to organized crime.

In addition to

15

billion in capital flight each

month was

’

not paying taxes, organized crime deprived the state of needed

resources. Regional crimes bosses controlled customs warehouses throughout the country

and

many customs

officials

were on the payroll of crime groups
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to divert

revenues from

the state to organized crime. Organized crime infiltrated the domestic banking sector as

well,

which caused millions of citizens

and collapsed banking
launder

money

institutions.

capital night .”

1

savings

in

pyramid schemes

Hundreds of banks were run by organized crime and

abroad. Other banks,

turn, “this criminalization

to lose their limited

who

did not launder

money, cannot compete.

In

of the banking sector and financial institutions has boosted

4

Atop Russian

amount of power and

society, a wealthy

group of individuals exercised

influence. In 1996, Boris Berezovsky, a business

automobile manufacturing,

oil,

and the media, claimed

that a

of wealthy individuals control half of the Russian economy.

1

a disproportionate

mogul

in

“magnificent seven” group
^

The remaining

six

men

include Vladimir Goussinsky, Mikhail Kodorkovsky, Valdimir Potanin, Alexander

Smolensky, V. Vinogradov, and
powerful figures

in

During the

Rem

Vyakihirev. Akin to Berezovsky, these

industry, banking, and the

first

men

are

news media.

several years of the Russian transition, the

government struck

deals with tax debtors of insolvent companies out of fear for the social consequences of

enforcing financial discipline. Only a quarter of Russian companies were financially

sound firms as of 1996, with well-established domestic or export markets. As

Kroumova, and Kruse observe, “three quarters of Russian corporations (were)
radical

and far-reaching restructuring” and

bankrupt.”

IM

crisis

in

need of

of those firms should be

'

Blasi,

budget

“at least a quarter

Blasi,

Kroumova, and Kruse argue
and not be able

to

that the

government would soon face

a

huge

simultaneously fund social programs for the needy and

grant tax breaks for corporations and cronies. In turn, “the government must
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start to

extend aid

weak

to

programs and

let

firms stand or

more than $8.8 million

in

fall

on

back wages

their

to

pensioners. Budget revenues were only

February of 1997. As a

The

first six

unemployment, and

citizens directly through health, welfare,

result,

own.”

1

more than

55%

'

By March of

a million

1997, Russia

owed

of government workers and

of the anticipated amounts

spending was only half as

training

much

in

January and
1

s

as anticipated.

years of economic transition undoubtedly produced profound change.

Though government ownership of the economy was
consequences of rapid reform led

to significant debate

therapy as a model of transition. The
unstable and produced

little

significantly reduced, the

first

over the effectiveness of shock

period of reform

(

1991-1994) was highly

economic benefit aside from massive

privatization.

Significant problems included the persistent influence of the nomenklatura ,

monopolization of former

state industries, extraordinarily

economic production, decreased investment, and
reform

(

economic foundation

analysts feared that

effectively raise

economic

crisis

wages. The second period of

who

was imminent

economic development. Many

if

the

government remained unable

transition scholars, such as Jeffrey

to

Sachs and Anders

served as Western advisers to Russia, clearly prioritized privatization over

the creation of transparent, legitimate,

much

for sustained

to

and distribute revenues.

The emphasis of economic

take

falling real

1995-1998) witnessed stabilization of earlier chaos and disruption, but failed

establish a solid

Aslund,

high inflation, shrinking

longer.

and sustainable market environment, which would

Such policymakers deserve

much of the economy; however,

credit for

removing State ownership from

an inadequate focus on the processes of institutional

reform produced economic, social, and

political
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consequences

that

generated widespread

many Russians and

hardship for

capitalist

severely limited the development of an effective

economy. Shock therapy,

therefore, can only be said to

have produced mix

results at best.

Gregory Glazkov’s critique of calls
a useful

metaphor

a tree,

you have

our legs and neck!”

jump. At

this point,

1

'

4

it

As

1

to climb.

see

it.

would be

is

fall

is

a transition

of the Soviet Union, “if you want

What you

are offering us

it

to

jump.

We

to get

will break

Russian policymakers and Western advisers opted to

difficult

more gradual approach would have
experience

reform under Gorbachev provides

understanding the process of shock therapy. “There

in

problem,” Glazkov explained prior to the

down from

for radical

tit

and of limited usefulness

better in Russia. Clearly,

to speculate

whether a

however, the Russian

not an empirically sound validation for the shock therapy model being

similarly applied to other nations. At the very least, Russian shock therapy

significantly benefited

would have

from greater recognition of how the process of transition was as

important as the desired results,

if

not

more

solid foundation for a competitive, efficient,

so.

Doing so would have helped

to establish a

and legitimate privately-owned market

economy. Instead, shock therapy created widespread chaos and uncertainty which served
as a foundation for the rise of a strong political leader

fully functioning capitalism or

Investor panic

investors

bills,

was

as

stability than

democracy.

the proximate cause of economic crisis in 1998. Foreign

were shaken by the Asian

known

more concerned with

GKO’s, would

and feared

that short

term treasury

lose value because of the ruble

exchange

rate.

financial crisis

revenue created significant problems for Russian authorities

who

Loss of

faced large budget

deficits, persistent capital (light,

and

falling

world

oil prices."’"

As

a result, the “fragile

turnaround of GDP growth visible toward the end of 1997 came to a halt.”

May of

In

worked

to pass

1998, President Yeltsin, and his

Moscow

stock market

was

deficit.

Success was

less than half the starting level

of

beginning of the year. The yield (monthly average of trading GKO's) dropped below

20%

in the

summer of

1997,

40%

in

May

of 1998, and

60%

in

June.

16 "

June of 1998. Russia’s international finance negotiator, Anthony Chubias

In

campaigned abroad
to

Minister Sergei Kiriyenko,

an austerity package that would cut the budget

limited however. Soon, the

the

new Prime

161

for

$10

to

$15

billion to help stabilize financial markets.

According

Chubias, funding would help Russia stabilize the ruble and pay off mounting debt.

Kiriyenko

set forth

plans to cut government spending by 42 billion rubles ($6.8 billion)

and increase tax revenues by 20

billion rubles ($3.2 billion).

The proposed reforms were

designed to address concerns of the International Monetary Fund (IMF)

who

criticized

Russia for not restructuring quickly enough. President Yeltsin gave parliament a deadline
for supporting the

A

measures or they would be pursued “by other means.”

Western

composed of $22.6
164

credits

1999."’"

financial assistance

billion

package was reached

in July.

from the IMF, World Bank, and Japanese government

$14.8 billion was loaned immediately and another $7.8 billion loaned

The assistance package did not immediately

restore market confidence

however, the Central Bank announced that the ruble would be allowed

one

interest

'

The package was

yields continued to rise. Yeltsin continued to resist devaluing the ruble.

9.5 to

16

dollar), after

much

effort to

payments on foreign debt

for

keep

it

pegged

at 6.3

Days

in

and

later,

to fluctuate

(up to

rubles per dollar, halted

90 days, and converted GKO's into long-term

212

bills.

Sergei Dubinin, governor of the Central Bank, claimed the

to help

moves were designed

Russian citizens and hurt “financial speculators” taking advantage of the Russian

marker for months.

166

of whom held

GKO’s

new exchange

rate,

16

The changes created problems

Russian banks, however,

for

and borrowed large sums from abroad. As the ruble

banks started

to reject attempts

fell

many

below the

by Russian citizens to convert rubles

Analysts warned that a weaker ruble could increase inflation, the lowering

to dollars.

of which, was a major economic achievement under Yeltsin's government. Yeltsin had

more immediate problems.
In a special

emergency

fulfilling his presidential

Russia was

in a

“deep

session, the

power before

161
'

The

Duma

declared that

and the President was not taking the necessary steps

crisis”

crisis,

called for President Yeltsin to “stop

the end of this term.”

protect citizens. Kiriyenko defended the

beginning of financial

Duma

government's record, claimed

and urged the

Duma

to

drop

its

this

to

was only

the

opposition to economic

reform measures advocated by the President. Yeltsin sacked the entire Kiriyenko

government and sought

to replace

Kiriyenko with Victor Chemomydrin. The

rejected the appointment eight days later.

Prime Minister
but this

in

exchange for granting the

was abandoned just

As

A

was discussed

to

keep Chemomydrin as

Duma more power

in

Russian governance,

deal

164

prior to the vote.

acting Prime Minister,

Chemomydrin asked

the Russian people not to

withdraw their money from private banks. The currency

which was
vote on

a

50%

drop

Chemomydrin

in just

as

Duma

two weeks.

A

few days

to 13 rubles per dollar,

fell

later,

the

Duma

rejected a second

Prime Minister. This prompted President Yeltsin

to

nominate

Yevgeny Primakov

for the post, a decision

welcomed by

the

Duma

and one

that

enabled

decision enabled Yeltsin to avoid potential impeachment hearings.

Primakov was
experience

in

Communist,

a career diplomat, primarily in foreign affairs,

economic

affairs.

The new Prime Minister appointed Yuri Masalyukov,

appointment constituted a return

again

in

May

impacted every day

1

best for Russia.

Prime Minister did claim

A new

1

that a

government was formed

of 1099. which dropped Masalyukov, but “failed to

economic policy team.”

install a strong,

united

71

political instability

surrounding the 1998

crisis significantly

citizens. Allan Little explains:

did not realize

into the first

to Soviet ideology, the

economy” was

Economic and

a

of Deputy Prime Minister. Though Primakov denied that the

to the post

“socially orientated

and had no

it

in that instant,

but

when

1

phase of a profound emotional trauma,

whom was pointing a

caught her eye she was
this quiet, patient

just

going

middle-aged lady

at

camera and asking for her views on the latest twist in
Russia's agonizing descent into economic collapse. And in the few minutes that followed
she visibly fell apart, weeping, inconsolable, unable finally even to speak.
1

television

She and her husband had been queuing since 8:00 in the morning - it was now
in the afternoon - at a bank kiosk near Red Square. All day they had
persevered, watching with each hour that passed the value of the rubles they were waiting
to withdraw drop further and further against the dollar on the electronic price board by
the kiosk window.
about 3:30

And when
bullet-proof glass

finally their turn

slammed

came, suddenly and cruelly the attendant behind the

the hatch shut in their tired anxious faces, declaring that the

kiosk had run out of cash and

was ceasing trading

for the day.

That was when caught her eye. Her husband spoke because she could not. They
had worked for 20 years at a military base in the frozen north of Russia, and saved all that
they had earned and had returned to Moscow at the end of the 1980s. In the hyper1

innation that attended the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 they had lost everything.

They had picked themselves up and started again, saving enough in the 90s to put
them back on their feet and allow them to think, cautiously, about retiring. And now they
could see it all beginning to happen again. And there was one theme he kept returning to

214

we are honest people, he kept
money and this is our reward.

again and again:

we have worked

saying,

honestly and

1

earned honest

Little

observed

in

1999 that “if you are honest

in

Russia the chances are that your

family will go hungry” or “your children will not be educated,” whereas the dishonest
1

thrive.

'

According

to Little, this

hardship. Consequently,

was

a

many Russians

form of humiliation, rather than just economic
failed to understand

how

the

West viewed

Yeltsin as a “progressive liberal reformer taking on the twin evils of reactionary

communism and

President Bill Clinton, meanwhile,

criminal mafia business tycoons.”

described Western support as a process of “helping Yeltsin’s overcome the worst of the
past, including his

own

past,” in

forward, one-step backward.”

1

which progress occurs incrementally with “two-steps

°

Strobe Talbott argues that the loans-for-shares program belongs

of President Yeltsin’s

past.

and his advisers concluded

Prospects for reelection

that the

to rely

on oligarch wealth and

control of media outlets to enhance public relations. In turn, “the

back with vast opportunities for insider trading.”

By

decree, Yeltsin

sell state assets to “citizen

banks

that then

Kremlin paid oligarchs

17 "

implemented the loans

for shares

investors.” In reality, auctions

made massive

the worst

1996 were so dismal that Yeltsin

in

campaign needed

among

loans to government.”

1

7

program which claimed

were “rigged

in

to

favor of large

Consequently, some of the

world’s largest energy and metals companies were hence controlled by a small number of
financial groups. Talbott claims that “loans for shares introduced a

factor in Russia’s evolution, since

force in Russian

economic and

it

substantially increased the

political life,

making
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a

new and

distorting

power of oligarchs

mockery of Russia’s

as a

incipient

regulatory structures, like

outlets

its

were liberated from

new

Securities and

state control, but

Exchange Commission.”

many of these and

1

s

Media

other enterprises were

placed under the control of oligarchs such as Berezovsky.
Yeltsin’s erratic behavior in 1997 and 1998

oligarchs.

The President looked

from heart surgery.

Many

and other oligarchs began
government.”

lso

sickly and

Russians

made

felt that a

was

particularly troubling to Russian

several public blunders while recovering

strong leader was necessary. Berezovsky

to seriously entertain the idea

of creating a “corporate

This government would operate as “a shadow board of directors”

who

would appoint ministers and “informally run the country.”

The

State

was

was

feeble, but big capital

strong.

David Hoffman explains:

The tycoons gathered quietly at the headquarters of Yukos, Russia's secondcompany, which was run by one of the oligarchs, Mikhail Khodorkovsky. The
shadow board of directors decided it was time for Chernomydrin to go, and they
discussed who would replace him. Berezovsky also met with Yeltsin’s chief of staff,
Valentin Yumashev, and the president’s influential younger daughter, Tatyana
largest oil

Dyachenko.

On

Saturday, March 21, 1998,

at this

Berezovsky gave a long, taped interview

among

the political elite.

to Itogi, a television

The program was

successful private television channel,

country house outside of Moscow,

news program popular

carried on Russia’s largest and most

NTV, founded by

another of the oligarchs,

Vladimir Gusinsky.

Berezovsky declared pointedly that the campaign to succeed
Yeltsin was already under way and that none of the leading candidates were ‘electable.’
He spoke vaguely about ‘immense opportunities to bring forward new people.' The
interview was broad cast on Sunday evening. The next morning, Yeltsin fired
1NI
Chernomydrin.
In the interview,

The 1998

crisis,

development. Joseph

however, was a significant turning point

Stiglitz

emphasizes

supply of goods and decrease in imports.

how
As

in

Russian economic

devaluation led to a significant excess

a result,

216

many

Russians went from buying

1

imported foreign goods to domestically produced goods.

how

the impact of the crash forced the

government

g2
"

.

Anders Aslund emphasizes

to cut public expenditures,

of large industries, while the practice of barter was reduced by

particularly subsidies

requiring payments in hard currency.

IN
’

Though both distinguished economists agree
economic change

the 1998 crisis provided a foundation for real

Aslund claims

that “the

Stiglitz, a well

noted

IMF

critic

of the IMF, acknowledges

GDP as
1

beginning of the decade.

in the

recovery process.

action appears as a remarkable success in hindsight.”

that “Russia’s

the crisis has been impressive,” but points out that “the

devalue” and Russia’s

Russia, Stiglitz and

in

Aslund disagree over the role of the International Monetary Fund

of 1999 was

still

nearly

that

IM

performance since

IMF

did not want Russia to

30%

below'

its

level at the

XS
‘

Public contempt for government

was

strong.

According

to

Rob Parsons,

rarely has

an electorate become so disillusioned with the promises of liberal reform so quickly.
Millions were forced into destitution, while the

privileges, stalled

on important

legislation,

Duma

and remained saturated

describes the state of affairs leading up to the 1999

The

extended their parliamentary

Duma

electoral debate has insulted the intelligence

in

corruption. Parson

elections:

of ordinary Russians.

In truth,

no debate not because there is no freedom of expression there is - but
because television and the press have become the tools of the Kremlin and its rivals.
Truth has been the first victim of a relentless campaign of mud-slinging.
there has been

And

all

-

-

around there

is

chaos. There

is

no strategy for economic recovery,

corruption eats into the heart of the state apparatus, wages are miserly if they are paid
all,

crime goes unsolved, mobsters operate w

country every month, and a
.

.•

stations.

human

ith

impunity, billions of dollars leave the

rights' report says torture

1X6
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at

has become routine

in

police

Some

institutional

w ith each successive

was progress made however.

election.

Duma

election law

Updated laws incorporated recommendations of the

international observers. For example, the election law

clarify the supervisory role of the Central Election

was amended

the rigid

who

Smaller parties
receiving

at least

5%

barrier to elect party

attain a

5%

list

3% barrier were hence

of vote was

revision created an alternative

less than

method

50%

to get

June of 1999 to

in

Commission and enhance
Is

transparency mechanisms, particularly for domestic observers.

was replacing

was upgraded

One

significant revision

candidates with a floating threshold.

included

if the total

votes of parties

of the participating voters.

on the

ballot.

A

second

Rather than gathering the

required signatures, candidates could “pay an electoral deposit of 2,000 times the

minimum wage
the

(approximately $7,000) for a single mandate candidate and 50,000 times

minimum wage

approximately
fund.

The

1

(approximately $1 70,000) for a party

10% of permitted campaign spending and had

financial option

SN

list.”

The amounts were

to be paid out the electoral

was chosen by several individuals and organizations as

method of registration. The

limit

their

on electoral expenses was $65,000 for single mandate

candidates and $1,700,000 for party

lists.

Still,

most of the new

electoral laws repeated

exact language of previous laws, which created confusion as to which law prevailed and

legal loopholes for candidates to

In contrast to the

which

cut the

undermine the

intent

of the law.

1995 election, there was a movement toward broader alliances,

number of parties from 43

participating organizations to 26.

Economic

recession, terrorist bombings, the conflict in Chechnya, and attempts to impeach the

President,

all

contributed to a turbulent political environment. Unlike past contests, “the

218

campaign was not
sense.”

189

against the

a clear reflection

of an ‘opposition

vs.

incumbent’ contest

in the usual

Furthermore, “the 1999 election was not a struggle of political leaders teamed

‘Communist

threat’

which characterized the 1996

struggle of personalities to guarantee their

the next four years.”

own

presence on the political summit during

Former Prime Ministers dominated

Examples include Yablako, who enticed Stepashin
Union of Just Forces, who convinced Kirienko

many observers viewed

elections, but rather a

to

the political landscape.

and the

into the party leadership,

head

its

party

list.

From

the beginning,

the election as a primary for the presidential election scheduled

for the following spring.

Two new

groups emerged as major contenders: the Fatherland-All Russia Bloc

and the Interregional Unity Movement otherwise known as Unity or Medved which
,

is

Russian for “the bear.” Competition emerged between these two groups within the

Kremlin base. The Unity Bloc was led by Minister of Emergency Situations Sergei
Shoigu, and the Fatherland-All Russia alliance was led by Luzkov, the powerful

Moscow, and Primakov,
political elite

was

the former

Prime Minister. This division among powerful

a sharp contrast to the alliance

which helped ensure the President’s success

in

between Yeltsin and Mayor Luzkov,

the 1996 elections.

The campaign process was characterized by
conclude that “party politics
politics continue to center

in the traditional sense,

several features that led the

OSCE

to

has yet to fully mature.” First, party

on individual personalities, not platforms. Second, “the most

powerful players remain those that

common

mayor of

come

together, not as real political parties

founded on

ideologies, but as strategic alliances often looking no farther ahead than the

specific election in

which they want

to

compete.”

219

90

Third,

campaign rhetoric was largely

devoid of issues.

A new phenomenon

of “black” campaigning developed

w as

of slanderous attacks on opponents

the 1999 campaign. This

the use

in

Russia during

in lieu

of

promoting programs or ideologies.

According

to

Robert Parsons, the parliamentary elections

two more important developments- the war
the

in

Chechnya and

felt like

“a sideshow to

the rise of opinion polls of

Prime Minister Vladimir Putin.” For Parsons, the two developments are inextricably

linked because “the prime minister

Russian armed forces.”

1

"

Lilia

owes

his popularity in large part to the success

Shevtsova describes Putin’s

rise to

of the

power:

Vladimir Valdimirovich Putin appeared on the national stage unexpectedly. The
political class as well as the public

was surprised

exhausted by the moves leading up to
office roused

no opposition. He was seen as

likely an accidental figure.

No one

just

him or considered

his

Putin quickly

new holder of the prime

one more premier

realized that this

choice and Putin’s personality lulled suspicions.

him, but everyone was so

to see

this that the

was

Many

long

line,

most

The unlikely

people simply paid no attention to

appointment something of a joke.

became an important

in a

the true heir.

minister’s

19 "

political figure as the

Kremlin’s favored

choice for the presidential elections scheduled for June of 2000. As Prime Minster, Putin

promised

to restore

Russian pride and enhance

stability in a nation “tired

11

“crying out for order again.”

to

Chechnya resonated with

gradually

fell

'

In turn. Putin's

voters.

of politics” and

youth, toughness, and hawkish approach

Support from various factions of the intelligentsia

into line as Putin solidified his position as presidential frontrunner. If

successful, no political figure

political figure in the country.

wanted

to

be on the wrong side of the most powerful

Both Yeltsin and Putin supported the Unity Bloc

parliamentary elections to create a political foundation
successful presidential transition could be built.
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in the

Duma upon which

in the

a

The impact of the media on
part, to the consolidation

the electorate

was unprecedented. This was due,

of ownership after the presidential elections. After 1996,

in

many

of the independent media outlets and major shares of state-controlled media were

purchased by “a few successful and politically connected businessmen
the role and importance of the

media

in

forming public opinion.”

1

4

who

understood

Effective media

regulation was particularly vulnerable because of “inadequate Federal laws capable of

of media owners and the underdevelopment of civil society

restricting the influence

capable of exerting market leverage to control media behavior.”

Russian law that governs the television industry
television

is

the most important form of media.

had a television

NTV,

the

two of the

set.

As of

is

particularly weak, even though

1999,

98%

of Russian households

Three stations were available throughout Russia:

main independent channel.
state-controlled stations,

In

many

ORT and

one-third to one-half of the populace. This

parts

ORT, RTR, and

of Russia, viewers could only access

RTR. Three

other major channels reach

medium was most abused during

the 1999

electoral process.

The European

some

Institute

1

were biased

to

particularly

ORT. The

extent.

State

private shareholders, the

EOM

claimed

that “the

of Media

(EOM)

concluded

that all television

channels

State-controlled stations were the worst offenders,

owned just 51% of ORT, however,

the rest

was owned by

most prominent of which was oligarch Boris Beresovsky. The

smear campaign by media supported by Berezovsky and the

government on one hand, and Luzkov and NTV’s director Gusinsky on the

other,

featured prominently

had intensified

in

during the campaign.”

the information sphere for the past year, but that

196

it

had

There were 93,000 polling

stations ereated to cater the 107 million voters in

Russia. International observers widely agreed that Precinct Election

Commissions

performed well and rated their compliance with relevant procedures

at

most

common

the public.

observers

concern of OSCE observers was

how

over 98%.

147

The

often voters scored their ballots in

At the same time, party and candidate representatives were stationed as

at

98%

of voting

sites,

OSCE

which the

considered a very positive

development.

Voter turnout was

5%

threshold. This

participate in the

went toward
again, the

meant

61%
that

of the
over

electorate.

22%

There were

of the eligible parties earned the

Duma, which was up from 9.3%

parties that did not

Communist

Party

make

in

the threshold,

(24%) received

Unity (23%), which did not compete

in

six parties that passed the

the

1995. In turn, just

down from 45%

in

right to

15% of votes
1995.

Once

most proportional votes, narrowly edging

1995. Fatherland-All Russia

(

13%) and Union of

Right Forces (9%) both performed well, while the Zhirinovski Bloc (6%) and Yabloko

(6%) barely made
1995

to

120

|

the cut.

in 1999.

)N

The number of independents was up

Even though

the

Communist

numbers dropped

to 113

Yabloko dropped

significantly, 51 to 17 and

from 157

in

the

OSCE

won

45

to

from 77

(LDPR) and

20 respectively. Meanwhile, two new

and Union of Right Forces (29

concluded the polling was conducted

in

1

w

seats).

an orderly manner and

accurately tallied the votes, there were areas for improvement. Electoral law allowed

individuals to run for office in single

member

community whatsoever.” Campaign spending

districts

limits

m

in

the most total seats, their

1995. Seats for the Zhirinovski Bloc

parties earned over 100 seats: Unity (73 seats)

Though

Party

significantly

“even

were

if

they have no

ties to the

easily circumnavigated

and

over half of polling sites observed did not adhere to relevant electoral law which required
each ballot be displayed and announced as counted. Finally,
at state-run

in as

media

lost their

many independent

Duma. At

the

The

many journalists and

jobs after criticizing political figures.

elections, the

Communist

same time. Unity was established

presidential election

was held

three

Party

was

months

For the second time

the most popular party in the

new and

as a

200

editors

influential political force.

earlier than anticipated

because

of President Yeltsin’s unexpected resignation on December 31, 1999. As stated in the
Constitution, the Prime Minister

assumed the Presidency

solidified Putin’s electoral prospects

because he would

as an incumbent. In turn, the pluralism characteristic

lived.

The

OSCE

concluded

until a

now

of the

formal election. This

enter the presidential contest

Duma

that “several factors contributed to

elections

what was

race dominated by a single, seemingly undefeatable candidate, in a

issues

and a

seemed

to

political

erode

in a

environment

which the pluralism achieved

matter of weeks.”"

Shortly after the

they had formed.

in

Duma

elections,

many

disappointing performance, which resulted

A

factions.

single

member deputies

in

the early

second problem was the

weeks of the

become

a

campaign short on
in

the

Duma

elections

political blocs

disbanded as quickly as

Bloc, for example, split apart after a

in

nearly

inability

into their ranks. This

presidential

short-

01

The Fatherland-All Russia

Duma

to

was

was

40%

of their followers joining other

of blocs and parties

part

to incorporate

of a larger trend where “beginning

campaign and throughout

the lead-up to the election

day, even the strongest opponents of pro-Kremlin forces and the administration during

the

Duma elections

began

to capitulate in favor

223

of the Acting President's candidacy.”

202

Political shifts,

such as these, are emblematic of a weak party system, where most

organizations are formed around strategic considerations specific to a certain election.

Even Unity had

a far

way

to

go

if

the block

party.

Unity was created “to provide a

power

structure

wanting

was

to consolidate into a

new name and

to secure its position

formal political

Kremlin

identity to the existing

through the

Duma

211

elections.”

'

The bloc

represented an incumbent regime and did not emerge as a grass roots force based on
ideological themes.

The impact of such

The embryonic
on

traditional practice

state

political shifts is described

of party politics

in

by the

OSCE:

Russia exacerbates a tendency to

whereby demonstrations of loyalty

to the ‘party

of power’

back

fall
is

deemed necessary to political and administrative survival. This reluctance to ‘get on the
wrong side' of existing power structures was equally evident among the regional heads as
204
the inevitability of a Putin victory became obvious.
Public opinion leading up to the

dissatisfaction with political

state:” just

was

13%

dishonest.

election.

58%

71%

in Russia.

When

replied “democratic institutions.”

72%

Russians were asked what the

of those polled replied “a strong leader,”

thought

that there

54%

interested in a

KGB

past

would be chicanery

new personal

and

63%

59%

replied “a strong

believed that Putin’s campaign

in tallying the

believed Putin was connected with oligarchs.

concerned about Putin’s

more

presidential election reflected

weakness and deep cynicism toward the legitimacy of

democratic institutions and elections
country needed,

2000

Still,

only

votes of the

25%

were

claimed to trust the President. Russians were

savior, rather than lasting democratic institutions,

despite reservations toward Putin, few conceived of any other serious option.

Over 94,000 polling

1

stations

were created throughout

" 10'

the country and over

,000,000 election officials were trained to operate these stations. Polls w'ere open

89 units of the Federation, including 2/3 's of the

224

districts in

and

in all

Chechnya, as well as 130

”

countries for citizens living abroad.

-06

There was

a three step process to register as a

who formed

candidate. First, candidates had to be nominated by parties, blocs, or citizens

nominating group of at

a special

candidate had to gather

w ith

least

100 voters called

initiative voter groups.

1,000,000 million signatures

at least

no more than 70,000 from the

home province of the

in

had

finances of the candidate.

to

support of the candidacy

candidate.

An

20%

estimated

random sampling."

collected signatures underwent a verification review based on

the nominating group

Second, a

of

Third,

submit a financial disclosure statement regarding the

The impetus of this regulation was

elements from entering the political arena.

If the

to discourage criminal

statement misrepresents assets or

provides false information, the candidate had to be rejected.

33 candidates were nominated for the 2000 election, but only
required signatures by the February 15 deadline. Originally

registered, until a 12

concluded

U|

1

1

1

5 gathered the

candidates were formally

OSCE

candidate was added after a successful court challenge. The

that “the process

was

subject to controversy as the applications of

some

candidates underwent investigations for omissions of property details on their financial
disclosure statements, while others

emerged regarding the

A

subject to an intense review

potential falsification

of signatures

major problem was the subjectivity permitted

components of relevant laws.
the crux

became

in their

supporter

in interpreting

In the case of Vladimir Zhirinovsky

when

allegations
J)S

lists.

important

(LDPR),

of the dispute rested on what constituted an “essential inaccuracy”

for

example,

in

information submitted by a candidate. Even Putin was not exempt from the speculation of
disclosure irregularities as debate ensued over a country house

OSCE

concluded

that electoral

owned by

law should be amended “to remove such

his wife.

critical

The

ambiguities that place the Central Election Commission

undesirable position

in the

having to make subjective decisions without sufficient legal guidance.”

The media environment surrounding
than the

Duma

“vitriolic

election. Presidential

media wars and

slanderous reporting.”'

a battering

10

the presidential election

campaigns were “subdued”

in

200

was much

comparison

Enforcement agencies took a more active

role in curbing

In contrast to the

problem faced by the media

in

the 1990’s

was

Though

funding.

hands-

Duma.

off role adopted by the administration in the face of black campaigning for the

persistent

to the

of blocs and candidates w ith often irresponsibly

inappropriate campaign activity during the presidential election

The

different

post-

Soviet Russia witnessed greater freedom of speech, economic hardship threatened to

close

many new

outlets, particularly print,

which

led to

80%

of regional media being

financed by local authorities in the absence of independent businesses able to fund such

efforts.

This development became

became

television

the

owned and watched

known

2
as “municipalization.” "

dominant medium, evident

in the fact that

82%

of polling

someone

else)

stations.

ith

of election officials failed

On

the electorate

concluded

A

to

rules

at

34%

voting,

which was noted

of polling

stations.

A

third

problem was

governing the counting of ballots. For example,

announce the preference of the

the plus side, voter turnout

who

of households

second problem was proxy voting (voting on behalf of

which was witnessed

inadequate compliance w

candidate.

98%

print outlets faded,

television.

The most common problem on Election Day was family
in

As

was strong once

ballot as they

again, evident in the

was conducted under

226

57%

were sorted by

turned out to vote. Despite aforementioned problems, the

that “the presidential election

in

69%

OSCE

a constitutional

and

of

legislative

framework

that is consistent with internationally

recognized democratic

standards." In turn, “the competence and expertise of election administrators to can y out

well-organized and accountable elections

is

fully institutionalized."

2 12

Given the numerous advantages Putin had as an incumbent hand-picked by
Yeltsin, the unresolved issue

50%
the

threshold with

Communist

vote.

52.94%

was when Putin would win,

to

win the election

vote. Putin

was up from
loss, the

the

the

first

round.

As

if.

Putin cleared the

expected, Zyuganov,

candidate, once again finished as runner up, with just under

Grigory Yavlinsky, the most prominent

5.8% of the

in

rather than

67%

Communist

liberal candidate, finished third

and Zyuganov received approximately

received by Yeltsin and

leader

was

30%

Zyuganov

82%

first

with just

of the vote, which

in 1996. Despite

Zyuganov’s

able to maintain a relatively consistent share of support

across the Russian electorate. Ironically, the most developed and stable party

the

of the

ten years of post-Soviet Russia

decade. Communists had accepted the

was

new

the

Communist

electoral

Party.

By

Communism

Uncertainty, destitution, and manipulation characterized the

during

the end of the

system and reformulated

platform toward the adoption of social democracy, rather than

in

first

their

per say.

ten years of the

Russian transition experience. The 1991 presidential election was an election for radical
change. The 1996 presidential election was a vote to end
system, once and for

Under

all.

The 2000

presidential election

Communism

was

as a governing

a vote for stability.
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the leadership of Vladimir Putin, Russians found the strong leadership and social

stability they desperately craved;

however, many

in the

West would

very different conception of democracy and began to would wonder

governance could be called democratic

at all.

find that Putin

if

had a

Putin's style of

This points to the significance of public opinion
transition theorists simply

capitalism

in a

is

assume

the best form of

simultaneous

political

that

democracy

the best

is

economic system. Given

and economic

in the transition process.

transition,

it

Many

form of government and

the massive uncertainty involved

would be foolish

to expect

monolithic public attitudes toward governing and economic systems. Clearly, Russians
did not want the terror that characterized the Stalin era, yet they did want a

quality of

life

and an acceptable of national prestige.

government could

fulfill

freedom and democracy.

such expectations, there

If a less

is little

In turn, transition scholars

minimum

than democratic Putin

need for Western conceptions of

would be

better served

by greater

appreciation of variance in public attitudes towards democracy around the world and

important role that various cultures can play

in

shaping or disfiguring democratic

transitions.

Vladimir Putin was a
in

little

known

figure until his appointment as Prime Minister

August of 1999. At the age of 23, Putin graduated law school

a eareer in the

KGB,

serving as a spy

in

Colonel, Putin began his political career
position of Vice-Mayor in

St.

deputy chief administrator

at

East

Germany. After

in local

in

1975 and embarked on

retiring with the rank

government, quickly rising

of

to the

Petersburg. In 1996, Yeltin's inner circle appointed Putin

the Kremlin.

The following year Putin became head of the

Federal Service and secretary of the Presidential Security Council.

Far from charismatic, Putin kept a low profile and quickly gained a reputation for
rarely smiling and speaking softly.

spotlight earned

Putin

him

the

The way

in

which he wielded power out of the public

nickname of “grey cardinal.” After becoming Prime Minister,

was immediately regarded

as a

man of action,

particularly in dealing with

Chechen

uprisings. Putin ordered the Russian

neighboring Dagestan

blamed Chechens

in

for a

Troops were ordered

in

army

to expel

Chechen Islamic

militants

from

response to violent incursions throughout the region. Putin then

number of mysterious apartment bombings
Chechnya

to root out

and destroy the

in

Russian

rebels. This

cities.

hard line

position significantly increased Putin’s popularity.

Despite his hard line image, Putin was endorsed by

liberals prior to

him

as a “decent and honest man,” while Putin

Anatoli Sobchak, the

mayor of St. Peterburg.

leader allowed voters to project on

ceremony

him

and

his nearly

KGB

and viewed

214

was not ready

The Russian economy, on
still

and gas prices produced

Bank increased from $7

to

boss, his

that

Russian leaders must

and would not soon

if ever.

the other hand,

was

in relatively

good shape

in early

lacked a comprehensive vision of economic development,

created a Hat income tax of 13%.

oil

which

new Kremlin

for classical liberalism

some important reforms were developed under

high

past of the

of social policy

resemble the United States or United Kingdom,

Though Russia

ruling group,

Putin claimed that Russia depended on a strong,

this as a reality

address. Consequently, Russia

new

monarchical ascendancy to power orchestrated by

anticommunists and revolutionaries!”
paternalistic state

worked closely with

their desires for the future. Putin's inauguration

embraced seemingly incompatible features- the

2000.

known

Putin’s lack of record as a public

“reflected the hybrid style and substance of the

liberal activity,

best

being elected President. Sergey Stepashin, Putin's predecessor as

premier, described

liberal

some of Russia’s

$35

The
a

GDP

Putin.

rose

10%

Most importantly,
in

a

2000. By the middle of 2001,

$2K million trade surplus and reserves

billion.

The

GDP

229

new law

grew by 5.2%

in

at the

Central

2001, which brought

the cumulative

growth since August 1998

income increased by 5.9%
2001.

in

to

over 20%. Real disposable household

2001, while real wages grew 19.8% between 2000 and
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At the same time, Putin faced a serious problem
capital, politics

in the

and economics, the public and the private-

not only failed to break but in

some

a Soviet tradition Yeltsin

areas had even reinforced.

goods and services were produced and sold

in a

merger of “power and

216

30%

large

amount of

gray zone that existed beyond the scope

of formal regulation and taxation. Millions of Russians operated

which constituted an estimated

A

had

in this

shadowy space

of Russia’s GDP. The system benefited criminals

the detriment of state revenues. Influential oligarchs

under Yeltsin

still

to

held significant

influence and resisted any change in the status quo under Putin.

Upon being

elected, Putin’s approach to the press quickly caused consternation.

Putin considered “every criticism of his policies as a challenge to the state” and took

advantage of every opportunity

to retaliate again his critics.

example was Andrei Babitsky of Radio Liberty who

Chechnya

in

early and prominent

toward

criticized Russian policy

1999 and 2000. Babitsky was charged with being a Chechen spy, held

isolation, interrogated,

exchange for Russian

which

One

and turned over

soldiers.

A

to

armed Chechen

in

authorities, like a terrorist, in

group of journalists protested

in a letter, a

portion of

stated:

Not once since the

stall

of perestroika have the authorities permitted themselves

such blatant lawlessness and cynicism toward representatives of the mass media. If the
journalist Babitsky has

committed an

illegal act

from the point of view of the

authorities,

then the question of his guilt or innocence must be decided in an open judicial

trial. If

actions against Babitsky are a reaction to the contents of his reporters from Chechnya,
this is a direct violation

Constitution.

of the principle of freedom of the press guaranteed by the

-ls
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the

Babitsky was

was

later released

clear however. Russia

was

and the charges dropped. The message

to journalists

not a friendly place for independent journalism.

Persecution was back after a reprieve under Yeltsin and Gorbachev.

In addition restricting individual liberties, Putin also sought to limit the

independence of regional governance throughout Russia. This was a sharp contrast
Yeltsin era where various territorial entities of the Russian federation were

to the

commonly

allowed dissimilar rights and obligations. From the outset, Putin worked toward
reestablishing

Moscow’s supremacy and weaken

regional barons

who

profited from the

policies of the previous administration. Shortly after taking office, Putin created seven

okrugs (federal regions) which coincided with military okrugs. The new okrugs
essentially divided the 89 republics of the Federation into spheres of federal control

headed by newly appointed representatives of the President. Five of the seven
representatives were from siloviki (power structures) close to Putin.

The President then

sent a trio of laws to the

Duma which

role of regional leaders, as well as the Federation Council, the

sought to weaken the

upper chamber of

parliament and legislative body for top regional politicians. With an estimated
local laws violating the

was

Putin's goal.
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30%

of

Russian constitution, greater regional subordination was clearly

The Federation Council was contrary

to the principles

government because executive representatives convened ex
legislative body. Still, the

officio

Council was the only barrier on the path

of divided

and functioned

as a

to strengthening

authoritarianism tendencies of the President. Regional elites were unable to organize

unified resistance to the

move.
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Regional government was not the only target
efforts. In

2000, Putin issued a decree that stripped the Central Bank of independence and

ordered the
10,000

m

CEC

to streamline the party system. Parties

members with

each. Every

organizations

two years

parties

in at least

were forced

was
In

limit the

amount

parties in Russia

2003, Putin used decrees

(FSB), the replacement of the
the Federal

were required

45 regions and no

to re-register

participate in an election over a five year span, they

goal

in Putin’s political restructuring

and

less

to

200

have

than 100

at least

members

if the party failed to

would be denied

from nearly

to

to

registration.

fewer than 20.

The

JI

extend the powers of the Federal Security Service

to

KGB, and

eliminate rival bureaucratic structures, such as

Border Guard Service, Federal Tax Police Service, and Federal Agency for

Government Communications and Information (FAPSI). Putin claimed
response to the fact that fighting drugs and terrorism

w as

the

moves were

“getting tougher.” Post-Soviet

reform, however, had gradually stripped the secret police of control over border guards.
Liberal opposition in Parliament expressed concern. According to

“an
the

initial

analysis of this would lead you to believe that the

form what used

three remaining

KGB.”" The
1

to be the

members of Yeltsin’s

elite:

FSB

MP

Boris Nadezhdin,

has virtually taken on

abolition of these three agencies

removed

Mikhail Fradkov from the tax police,

Konstantin Totsky from the border guards, and Viktor Matyukim of FAPSI.
Putin’s

top-down approach concentrated power

democrats reason

to suspect

him of acting more harshly

in his hands,

which “gave the

in the interests

of the narrow

TOO

groups of influence- old and new-

that

occupied the Kremlin.”

Putin

was

neither a

democrat, nor a dictator, and society was largely indifferent. Shevtosova explains:

There was no mass resistance

to Putin’s initiatives,

nor could such resistance

appear. There were several reasons for that: media controlled by the central authorities;

a

the lack of a strong opposition; society’s passivity and fatalism; the

pursue honest politics; and a reluctance to

above criticism

new

in

criticize

hope

that Putin

would

him. The president continued to be

Russia. Russians behaved as if they could not afford to lose hope in

Kremlin could disregard the scattered hotbeds of
dissatisfaction among intellectuals and a few stubborn liberals."'
their

leader. Therefore, the

How

to deal

with Russia’s small circle of multi-billionaires was another realm of

reform for Putin. Their combined wealth and connections rivaled the power of the

State,

which was particularly disconcerting when significant resources were directed against the
Kremlin. Yeltsin had an informal agreement with the Russian economic

elite. If

oligarchs

supported his administration and stayed out of the day to day political process, they

would be rewarded with

political patronage. Putin,

on the other hand, quickly went on the

offensive, albeit in a highly selective manner.

The

first

target

was Boris Berezovsky,

former Yeltsin insider and prominent

a

beneficiary of shock therapy. Putin quickly sought to curb Berezovsky's political

ambitions despite the fact the Berezovsky was the one
inner circle called “the family.” In

decide there will be no oligarchs

in

who

introduced Putin to Yeltsin’s

March of 2000 Berezovsky
Russia

.

.

if

.

stated that “Putin cannot

anything, their role will increase.”"

4

In

October, however, the Kremlin stripped Berezovsky of the major television station

Russia

First,

which had been so instrumental

more recently
State.

By

to discredit Putin's presidential

years end Berezovsky settled

in the

in

Yeltsin’s victory in 1996 and

opponents. The shares were sold to the

United Kingdom after self-imposed

Berezovsky was charged with fraud and corruption

man

in

in

Russia. After surviving several attempts on his

about his commitment to bring

down

was used

2001 and hence became
life,

the former oligarch

a

exile.

wanted

is

open

Putin by force or through bloodless revolution,

neither of which has materialized.
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In contrast to

Berezovsky, Vladimir Gusinsky directly challenged Putin back

1999. Four days after Putin's inauguration, the government seized

largest television

channel

in Russia,

largest

media empire

rivals.

Like Berezovsky, Gusinsky

in Russia,

and other major

which

left

Russia

in

and supported Putin’s

2000 and

dismantled. Russian authorities charged Gusinsky with

his

money

laundering and fraud. In

,

it’s

a

one way

According

ticket.”

to

Gusinsky the

craves absolute power, which threatens Europe. This

destroyed media and

is

real

evident

were

I

problem

in

alone other industries, such as steel and

left

political

empire was since

2001 Gusinsky described the charges as “a joke” and claimed that “if
Russia,

the second

Gusinsky had amassed the

assets.

criticized Putin

NTV,

in

how
oil.

is

to

go

to

that Putin

the regime only

Things would soon

change however.
Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the top boss of Yukos Oil, was arrested
detained on charges of fraud and tax evasion.

billion

1

1

is

w as

arrest

in

Much of Khodorkovsky's

2003 and

estimated $15

attained through the highly suspect privatization process of shock therapy.

came

after several

moves

in the political arena,

which included the acquisition

of the prestigious Moskovskiye Novosti newspaper, the hiring of a leading investigative
journalist

opposed

who was

very

critical

to the President.

of the Putin, and contributions

Khodorkovsky was convicted of tax evasion and sentenced

nine years in prison. Meanwhile,

state

owned

oil

to political parties

to

Yukos was bankrupted, auctioned, and purchased by

firms such as Rosneft and Gazprom.

Putin angrily rejected the notion that Khodorkovsky’s fate

political activities. In contrast, Putin

supposedly describe the

strict

was

retribution for his

coined the phrase “dictatorship of the law’’ to

adherence

to law. Still, the process
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by which Putin attacked

oligarchs

was highly

selective,

which

left

many

to

conclude

it

was more about

eliminating personal rivals than justice. Gusinsky, for example, was originally

imprisoned, then released, after agreeing to give

in

exchange

all his

property to the state “at gunpoint”

6

freedom." After Gusinsky went public and rescinded on the

for his

deal, he

once again became a wanted man.
Russians hardly
oligarchs

who

felt

compassion

for

Gusinsky or any of the

profited royally from a privatization system

which

elite

left

group of

many Russians

grave conditions. In turn, the political dynamic situation could be described as
than dysfunctional from a Western perspective of democratic development.

little

in

else

The most

powerful opposition to Putin's regime, which had moved away from rudimentary
democratic practices of the Yeltsin

era,

were former oligarchs who amassed

their

extraordinary wealth from stealing billions of the dollars from the State under Yeltsin.

As

long as political and economic stability persisted, the public appeared content. In July of

73%

2000, for example,
admitted they

knew very

of Russians approved of Putin, even though
little

about him.

60%

endorsed concentrating

person's hands to solve the problems facing Russia, while just

independence of branches of government.
property, while just

Russian

oil

15%

production and rising global

briefly surpassed Saudi Arabia in

as “the

oil

down OPEC’s

2002 as

new Houston” with

27%

all

power

one

in

supported the

state

owned

22N

prices generated popular and

production and export cuts in 2001 and

the world's largest oil producer.

Putin

of Russians

Most Russians (52%) supported

favored an unfettered free market.

scholarly attention as Russia stood

was touted

227

59%

crowned

as “the world’s

new

"

1

oil

Moscow
czar.”

Others claimed that Russia’s growth was premised on a “virtual economy” propped up by
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”

high

oil

prices, rather than

genuine and sustainable economic growth.

of the top producing and exporting countries

proven

oil

reserves, with only

5%

in the

world, but ranked
'

of world supply.”"

1

Russia was one

“much lower

Though Russian

production

oil

increased from 6 million to 7 million barrels per day between 1999 and 2001,

highly unlikely that Russia would regain the peak production of 1980's

LUKoil,

barrels per day.

for

example, held the largest reserves

1% between 2000 and

increased output by approximately

Russia was “the result of high

oil prices,

soared from around $10 a barrel

December 1998

in

The economy benefited from

economy

ith

to a

The public

major conglomerates.

2001. In turn, the

the Soviet model.

world

oil

recovery.

boom

oil

production, as world

oil

in

prices

peak of around $33 a barrel

This combination enabled

stability.

in

much of the

At the same time, structural imbalances were

sector remained inefficient,

New

firms, an important

economies, were slow

fix capital

million

Russia, yet only

which

led to

to

develop

in

in

component of economic growth

an enterprise structure that

still

4

slow'."'

a

a

few

in

resembled

Despite high consumer confidence, the grow th rate of the

investment began to

still

mismanagement of

public resources and services. Private sector ownership remained centralized

transition

was

several years of rapid growth and oil prices that

increased political

to operate at full capacity.

serious concern.

in

at 12

it

2 ’"

September 2000.

were coupled w

not increases

in

in

GDP

and

Given the inherently unpredictable nature of the

market, uncertainty surrounded the sustainability of Russia's economic

A

2002 World Bank report explains:

This period

development

in

been carried out

may

well turn out to be decisive in determining the path of economic

Russia. In a period of high
at

oil

prices

and

political stability,

reforms have

unprecedented depth and speed. But these favorable external
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conditions are unlikely to

changed enough

last forever.

to adapt to

In 2003, the

first

presidential election just

Only then

will

adverse circumstances/

elections to the

Duma

be clear whether the

it

months away, the elections were viewed

different than 1999. In 2001, the

resulted in the creation of a

new

The

as a significant

environment was

political

merger of Unity and Fatherland All Russia

pro-presidential party United Russia. This enabled

United Russia to surpass the Communist Party (CPRF) as the largest party

Consequently, the

Two new

CPRF became

the

main opposition

in single

The Rodina (Homeland) Bloc was formed by

to the election,

for

were several new

5%

Though most

Duma

electoral

high-profile deputies in

by any groups

back

2003

in

in

was
1999.

an effort

to

support in the run up

As

a whole, there

in the fact that

to the

political organizations

in federal or

new requirement may

local or regional political activism

lost

Party

over half had not

elections.

Russia” electoral associations to compete

expressed concern that “this

2003, evident

law was very similar

were some changes. For example,

interests.

district races

particularly important for each.

political organizations in

participated in the previous

political parties

member

The People’s

CPRF. Yabloko and Union of Right Forces

which made the

Duma.

in the

party.

pro-presidential parties and blocs emerged.

formed by MP’s elected as independents

weaken support

has

under President Putin were held. With the

indicator of future democratic development under Putin.

much

economy

0

1999

Duma

election, there

were required

to register as “all-

regional elections.

The

OSCE

seriously inhibit the development of

and effectively block the establishment of new

that seek to represent local, regional or

44 associations were eligible

to

compete
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in

2003 under

minority

this title. 18 parties

and five electoral blocs registered. In another new legal change, parties
barrier

next

no longer had

Duma

to collect signatures or

pay a deposit

to

that

reach the

5%

nominate candidates for the

election.

The major problem of the
that disproportionately

electoral process

was an

unfair

campaign environment

favored the interests and affiliations of President Putin. Most

complaints centered upon the use of administrative resources by the State to further the
candidates of United Russia. This included violations of the requirement that official
functions are suspended while they are candidates and local government support of some

certain candidates.

activities,

Other problems included denial of equal conditions

for

campaign

such meeting space and advertising, and direct pressure on voters, such police

detention of campaign workers and seizing campaign materials. Such activities “blurred

the distinction

A

between the party and the executive administration.”

2

’

7

second significant problem with the campaign centered upon the media. The

majority of media coverage was biased

in

both degree and content toward pro-

presidential parties. State controlled television channels adhered to electoral law that

required allocation of free air time for

openly promoted United Russia.
covered United Russia,
received

granted

all

all

candidates. At the

19% of news coverage

of which was positive or

13% of coverage, most of which was

16%

of its coverage

CPRF, which
Print

blocs. Voters

to

at

First Channel, for example,

neutral.

negative.

same time, remaining airtime

C'PRF, on the other hand,

TV Russia,

a second example,

United Russia, overwhelmingly positive, compared to

received comparable time, but was predominantly negative.

media represented multiple views, but
were able

to

outlets supported specific parties

form an objective view, but
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it

required consuming several

of

publications. Like television outlets, state-funded

for allotting free time, but

in

’

After the election, an unlikely coalition.

which claimed there was serious

commission fixed the vote count
eventually dismissed by the

On

to

Communists and

reduce opposition

41

On

411

Supreme Court.

fell

to

55%

as

compared

electoral

though there were isolated

pail, but significant

follow proper procedure

results

were

The Communists

in

1

that characterized the

1% was

acts

of violence, including the death of an

Chechnya. The election proceeded

in

number of polling booths

fairly for the

most

in

many

stations,

and

failures to

recording results.

a resounding success for United Russia,

finished second with

only other two groups to surpass the

LDPR’s

1999. This

in

problems existed. Top concerns were the lack of secrecy during the

voting process, an insufficient

vote.

61%

24 hours of the polls closing. The voting process was

commission member

The

to

the plus side, the electronic processing of preliminary results allowed

the result to be posted within

largely peaceful,

electoral

The case was

in parliament.

corresponded with the generally low level of public interest

campaign.

liberals tiled a legal

media and Russia's

bias in state run

Election Day, turnout dropped

fulfilled legal expectations

favor of United Russia and against the

'

CPRF.
suit

were biased

newspapers

5%

12% of the

vote.

which won

LDPR

37%

of the

and Rodina were the

threshold for proportional representation.

a surprise in light of their steady decline since 1995.

Yablako (4%) and Union of Right Forces (4%) both

fell

short,

which

The

liberal

collectively

constituted a major failure for the liberal opposition.

The “against

all” vote in the proportional pail

from 3.36%, while their remained

a relatively

of the election was up

low level of women
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to

4.72%

in federal politics. Just

2

I

women were

constituted

0%

elected in proportional

20

of the Duma. Parties and blocs

an overwhelming majority

was

lists,

close to majority.

Russia (300 deputies),

in the

single

in

that

the

CPRF

(52 deputies),

new Duma convened,

LDPR

districts,

which

supported the administration became

Duma. United Russia

When

member

controlled 224 total seats, which

four factions registered: United

(36 deputies), and Rodina (36

deputies).

Similar electoral problems resurfaced in the 2004 presidential election three

months

later.

Once

again, the advantages of

incumbency were extended beyond

appropriate norms, particularly with the media, and there were serious concerns

surrounding open voting and vote tabulation despite a litany of voter rights. Efforts

toward what the West would consider worthwhile goals created unintended
consequences. “Get out the vote” campaigns undertaken by government were broadcast
throughout the country with imagery and themes that appeared to favor the incumbent.
Desires to expand franchise

in

remote locations raised doubts of whether satisfactory
->40

precautions were taken to prevent multiple voting.

The

many

Duma

election

was

a major reorganization of parliamentary politics. This

parties without representation in the

Duma

and

a

weakened

left

party machinery.

Consequently, most presidential candidates joined the race lacking substantial party
support. With Putin’s party in control of the

Duma,

the president refrained from

most

aspects of conventional campaigning, such as participating in public debates. Regardless,

Putin remained highly popular and faced a group of opponents with
-4

'

support.
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little

public

The campaign was described by
visits

of candidates

the

OSCE

to certain regions, “there

beyond what was present
position as frontrunner”

in the

and

as “very

was almost no

low key.” Aside from
visible

campaign

a

few

activity

media.” Putin was understood to be “in an unassailable

competing candidates were unmotivated and

as a result,

unable to gather resources and investment

in effective

campaigns.
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Once

again, the

operation of polling stations was generally considered legitimate, with the majority of

complaints surrounding the role of the media. Putin easily defeated the other six

71%

candidates with

meanwhile, dropped
elections, the

13% of the

vote.

in office.

63%

68%

from

in

None of the remaining

2000.

2000. Turnout,

in

As had become

the

norm

even though

and approach

to

democratic governance

with Western norms, which became more and more apparent the longer he was

Economic development, meanwhile, exceed expectations

investment.

Once

again, however,

the price of hydrocarbons.

in

many

The average

in

to the

previous year.

7.2% economic growth

macroeconomic position
1998

crisis, the

in

in

-4 "

equated

this

into

with equally impressive increases

price of oil in the

first

The World Bank estimated

2003 was the

result

of rising

half of 2003 rose from

a cumulative total
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that

28%

increase

approximately

oil prices.

2003 and 2004 was very strong.

economy grew by

2003 and

household incomes, industrial production, and

$18.5 per barrel to $23.7, due to the American-led invasion of Iraq, a

the

second with

candidates topped 5%.

his conception

2004 with high growth, and advances

compared

in

for several

one term as president, Putin had effectively consolidated public and

institutional support

fit

to

52%

Communists, under candidate Nikolay Kharitonov, came

In just over

did not

of the vote, up significantly from

-4 "

Still,

3%

of

Russia’s

In the five years after the

of 38%, while inflation gradually

in

declined to

12%

2003. The federal budget ran a surplus for the fourth straight year and

in

federal reserves hit a record high of

Brisk

increased by

year.

As

7%. “As

$86

billion in

February of 2004.

economic growth continued throughout 2004

20%

between January and

a result, the average cost

a simple rule

Russia has always

May compared

of oil was $28 per

as the price of Russian oil

to the

barrel.

of thumb,” the World Bank reported

come with

an increase

news anymore

states, “is that this is not

growth

GDP
in

growth remained above

2004, “growth above

“The

in oil prices.”-

as

same period the previous

5%

in

best news,” the report

rates in excess of

7%

acquire an air of

~>48

By mid-decade

normality.”-

rule that financial crashes

subsequent years.”-

4

'

it

was

the clear that “Russia proved an exception to the

and defaults leave

a

measurable dent

in

addition to

steady and positive change from 2000 to 2005 as well."

in

2000

fell

substance level

levels

and

in

from 10.4%
in

2005

was

triple

fully stabilized politically

transformation.

in

Though

185% of 1999

2000

2005 compared
it

$237.2

to $1 79.4 in 2003,

disposable income steadily rose to

other hand,

output growth during

1

Other macroeconomic indicators,

grew from $80.2

in

to

2001

to

7.6%

in

in

GDP
11

and inflation, witnessed

The average wage

2004, and $301

levels in 2005.

among G-8

Russia

2005. Real

Unemployment, on

the

2005 as 15.8% of people lived below'

30.2%

in

levels.

By 2006,

2000. Gross FD1

it

was

in

2004 was double 2001

safe to say that Russia had

and economically after nearly a decade of turbulent

stable,

it

remains very difficult

to label the

Russian regime

conventional Western terms. Under Putin, Russia has simultaneously
player

.6 in

in

become

a

nations, yet faced harsh criticisms for the decline of Russian

democracy.
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in

major

This work evaluates the role of elections and institutions in Russia’s transition

from

Communism

from 1991

to 2006.

Experiences of post-Soviet Russia have produced

several indicators that elections have effectively

transition of power. Elections

promoted the peaceful and legitimate

were held frequently

in

Russia: 1993, 1995, 1996, 1999,

2000, 2003, and 2004. All elections required by the Constitution were held without

postponement or cancellation. The frequency of elections suggests
normal component of Russian

politics. Elections

became

that elections are a

fully institutionalized in the

Russian system with the 1996 presidential election which was the final clash between
liberals

and communists over the systematic nature of the regime. There

any intention

to

no evidence of

suspend constitutional government, but given Putin’s willingness

conceptualize and reformulate Russian governance

democratic norms,
Constitution or

is

it

more

is

possible Putin

may

away from previously

not give up

power

likely, distort the transition process.

in

2008

to re-

established

as required by the

This remains to be seen

however.

Turnout for national elections
democratic countries. More than

50%

in

of registered voters turned out to the polls for each

national election in post-Soviet Russia.

and

67%

Russia was consistent with norms in other

The average turnout was

it

was

for

Duma

elections

1997 revealed that two-thirds of Russians

for presidential elections. Polls in

believed that

66%

the duty of citizens in a democratic society to participate in elections.

These trends and attitudes suggest

that strong voter participating is

an important part of

national elections in Russia.

All candidates in post-Soviet elections

to the public.

There were some

restrictions,

were selected

in

processes that were open

such as the collection of signatures, but these
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did not disproportionately prevent candidates from being selected. In each parliamentary

election, for example, there

ran as independents.

that

were several thousand individual candidates, many of whom

The more pressing

issue

was figuring out an

effective

way

to verify

information provided by candidates complied with relevant electoral law. This was

complicated by the large numbers of candidates participating

in

each election.

Electoral oversight procedures are adequate, but not optimal.

The Central Election

w ell

in

some

and not as well

in

other areas, such as enforcing violations regarding the use of State

performed

areas, such as

resources for campaigning.

A

enhancing transparency of the electoral process,

major problem was the substantial and widespread lack of

secrecy during the voting process, evident

in

consistent trends of public voting and family

voting.

Since 1996, State resources have been used by incumbent Presidents to further
their electoral interests in violation

of electoral law. This, coupled with the inappropriate

cooperation of government officials and media oligarchs

is

a significant

problem

that taints Russian elections.

low

incidents,

and international observers concluded

reflected in every election.

At the same time, there have been

Still,

that the will

Russians have not expressed

process. Public opinion polls in 1997 revealed that

electoral results

suggests that fraud

of violence surrounding national elections, with some isolated

relatively

levels

in violation,

90%

of the populace was
faith in the electoral

of Russians believed that

would be manipulated, while over half thought they would have

no effect on policy. This

in part reflects the

little

to

long history of inconsequential elections

throughout the Soviet Era and the massive instability of Russian society throughout the
1990’s. In turn. Russians have widely accepted election results since the
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fall

of the Soviet

Union. There have been no popular movements in Russia against either the electoral
process or creeping dictatorship as witnessed in the Rose Revolution in Georgia or

Orange Revolution
less blatant

in

Ukraine. Manipulation in Russia was pervasive, but occurred in the

realm of communication, rather than electoral administration.

In 1995,

new campaign

regulations required the media to refrain from bias

coverage and required the allotment of free
candidates.

air

time to

The regulation was abused by media

with political leaders.

As economic

out of business, television

became

improbable bid for reelection

in

registered parties and

controlling oligarchs, often in cahoots

liberalization put

the dominant

all

news

many

legitimate print

media

medium of communication.

outlets

Yeltsin’s

1996 was secured through a regular bombardment of

pro-administration propaganda by major networks controlled by Yeltsin-friendly
oligarchs, such as Boris Berezovsky.

Under

Putin, the

selectively targeted

dynamic changed,

media moguls

critical

yet the result

remained the same. Putin

of the administration, such as Vladimir

Gusinsky, and used unrelated criminal charges to destroy media empires by cutting off
the head. This possibly

would have been done

literally, if

oligarchs had not escaped

multiple attempts on their lives and rendition after fleeing Russia. Throughout the
process, targeted elites were portrayed as enemies of the State because of their political

and economic
in

activities since the fall

of the Soviet Union. Over time, independent media

Russia was gradually destroyed.

At the same time, there was significant ideological variance

among

national elections.

Thousands of candidates competed

significant portion

of whom were independents, and represented various
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in

candidates

each national election, a
political

in

emerged

persuasions. Four major party groupings

national-patriotic,

in

1993: reform, pro-government,

and Communist. Though parties came and went, the general groupings

persisted in subsequent

Duma

elections.

registered in parliamentary elections

Hence, the average number of parties officially

was

37.

threshold for proportional seats, while 6 parties
Presidential elections

In 1995 four parties passed the

made

it

in the

5%

1999 and 2003 elections.

have been consistently centered on two dominant party groupings,

pro-government and Communist, though several other candidates from various

political

backgrounds have run. As Putin consolidated power through United Russia, ideological
variance

among

upcoming

candidates in national elections has significantly decreased.

elections in

2007 and 2008

will likely

detennine whether

this

The

trend will

continue downward, stabilize, or reverse.
Ideological variance has not been institutionalized in stable and principled parties

however. Most parties have been unable
party structures,

most

let

alone determining principles for which the party will stand. Instead,

parties in Russia

Ironically, the

Communist

organize and sustain meaningful national

to

have revolved around personalities of the party leader or leaders.

most organized and durable party

Party.

early 1990’s, this

in

Though Communists advocated
changed

after the

post Soviet Russia has been the
the resurrection of Communism in the

1996 presidential election, when the party no longer

sought regime change and instead focused on promoting more generous social policies.
Presently, United Russia appears to have an infrastructure that very well

under the next administration, though

to date, Putin's

earned United Russia the reputation of

little

dominance of the organization has

more than
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may endure

a

rubber stamp for the Kremlin.

As

a whole, elections in Russia

have produced mixed

results in terms

of

promoting the legitimate and peaceful transition of power. Elections premised on popular
selection of candidates

from across the

political

spectrum have occurred frequently with

high voter turnout. The administration of elections has experienced relatively low levels

of violence with adequate electoral oversight and wide acceptance of results. At the same
time, elections in Russia have been de-legitimized by uncharacteristically high levels of

fraud undertaken by the State to further the electoral interests of people in power. This

includes the inappropriate use of State resources and the elimination of independent

media. These fraudulent activities are particularly problematic considering there has been
few, if any candidates that represented stable and principled parties that genuinely offered

a serious

and more accountable alternative.

Even though elections have been moderately
and legitimate exchange of political power

effective in

in Russia, the illegal

promoting the peaceful
use of State resources

under Yeltsin and Putin has cast an increasingly ominous shadow over the entire electoral
process.

Whether

this

cloud will

lift

or settle

democratic governance within the Russian

many

in the

is

elite

unclear. There

is

not a strong affinity for

or populace, which puzzles and unsettles

West. Russians understand themselves to be different than the United States

and expect these differences

to

manifest themselves politically. Perhaps the development

of institutions served as important and necessary corollary

to the

shortcomings of a

democratic electoral process.
Unfortunately, however, experiences with democratic institutions in Russia have

demonstrated few indicators of stable and representative government. Russia established
a democratic constitution in 1993.

The

constitution divided political
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power among

legislative, executive,

in the constitution,

and judicial branches. Several dozen

some of which

and rights are

are included in the U.S. Bill of Rights, such as

of religion, freedom of speech and freedom of association.

commonly

liberties

Many of the

listed

freedom

liberties are

associated with social democracies, such as a right to medical care, a right to

education, a right to housing, and a right to social security. Problematically, however, the

constitution

was

the product of a tense negotiation process that disintegrated into a

violent contest for political power.

In

March of 1993,

the

Supreme Soviet sought

to

impeach Yeltsin,

who responded

with a public referendum on his policies that was narrowly supported by a majority of
Russians.

When

elections,

hundreds of deputies barricaded themselves

Yeltsin issued a decree to disband the

control of government.

resolved by force.

leaders. This

On

Supreme Soviet and hold new
in the

White House and declared

Though most Russians wanted compromise,

the conflict

was

Yeltsin's orders, military forces shelled the building, captured

enabled Yeltsin

to use his

new power position

to

coup

shape the 1993

constitution.

Unfortunately, violence was

example, several

common beyond major

Duma members were murdered

different parties, including

Communists,

forces, but generally shared business

killings

in office.

liberals, liberal

institutional disputes.

Victims have

is

come from

democrats, and pro-government

backgrounds. The murders appear

and typically go unsolved. Such violence

to

be contract

emblematic of society as a whole. At

the turn of the century, official statistics of violent crimes in Russia and the prison

population were comparable to the world's most criminalized countries.
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For

problem before

In addition to violence, corruption has been another significant

and

of the Soviet Union. Criminality was central

after the fall

market economy. Bribery of government
stole millions

officials

in the

development of a

was commonplace. Economic

of dollars from the State and invested the capital abroad

elites

to avoid the scope

of Russian law. Throughout the 1990’s, the legal order was fragmented and ineffective,

which made

a law-based state elusive. Putin’s reforms provided

but law enforcement

political

is

now

much

greater stability,

used selectively as a tool to promote the personal and

ambitions of the Kremlin.

Despite violence and corruption, there has been a gradual acceptance of the

political

system adopted since the

fall

of the Soviet Union.

development, however, given the current system
standards.

Over

a

dozen journalists

A

murdered since 2000.

compromised

the

failed to displace the

government transparency has

political process.

There

of the Soviet Union and subsequent

Kremlin as the nerve center of Russian

continues to be abused by political

politics,

is

no meaningful

political

system

which even today

elite

detriment of Russian democratic development, political conflict exceeded the

peaceful confines of formal institutions early

of this conflict established

was subservient
government
battled the

difficult to celebrate this

of the current regime have been mysteriously

development of a democratic
fall

is

so far from Western democratic

lack of public criticism and

role for the opposition as the

To

critical

is

It

a

skewed

institutional

to the executive, rather than

in its

own

right.

Communists by

By

in the

post Soviet era.

The

violent resolution

dynamic where henceforth the

Duma

an independently powerful component of

constitutional and unconstitutional means, Yeltsin

deliberately seeking to isolate himself personally and
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politically

from

threats of

impeachment and prosecution.

In

promoting and protecting

economic reform Yeltsin began issuing decrees, which both Yeltsin and Putin have used
frequently used to circumvent traditional checks on executive

institutionalized political opposition. Putin

exercise so

much

and

his creation.

power and avoid

United Russia, currently

control over Russian politics that meaningful political opposition

is

practically extinct.

Akin

to the

development of stable and representative government

formal institutions have not been highly effective

in

producing a stable and

economy. The implementation of Shock Therapy generated
effectiveness of the model.

Few

in Russia,

scholars, if any, understand

capitalist

significant debate on the

economic transformation

in

Russia to be a highly effective and well orchestrated process, though few deny that some
very important changes transpired. Shortly after the

fall

of the Soviet Union, the Yeltsin

administration undertook vast economic reform, beginning with price liberalization and

privatization. Central planning

determine what goods
In

to

was moved aside

produce and

how

to

in

favor granting enterprises freedom to

produce them.

January of 1992 reforms immediately freed

remaining prices followed
inflation rose to over

in the

2,000%.

~

"

90%

of retail prices and most of the

subsequent months. Prices increased over 1,000% and

Under

a

voucher system introduced

in

October of 1992,

privatization of industry proceeded quickly as well, though a substantial portion of

private

companies remained under

were appointed under the Soviet
as just

5%

of arable land

in

direct or indirect control
-

of the same managers

'

era.

Russia was

Agriculture proceeded

owned by family farms
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much slower
in April

who

than industry

of 1995."

4

As

a whole, a significant

administration.

number of enterprises were

The raw number, however, does not

consequences of the process by which

problem was
select

how most of the new ly

few economic

privatized under the Yeltsin

sufficiently reflect the negative

this occurred.

The most

significant long-term

freed property ultimately ended up

elites that invested the

in

the

hands of a

bulk of their profits abroad. Other significant

problems included: the persistence of the nomenklatura corrupt bargaining between
,

politicians

beyond
and

and economic

elites, the

development of a concurrent shadow economy
and economic inequality,

the scope of formal regulation, high levels of poverty

a collective failure to

address serious structural problems prior

full

economic

collapse.

High global

oil

and gas prices remain an important, but inevitably

increased economic growth because of the substantial increase

prices produce.

Most economic

Moscow, which continues
budget

to

deficit, a significant

activity also

remains confined

be a problem. Rising

problem throughout

GDP

the

first

in

Bank.

Two

to the

IMF,

state

to the region

tax,

high global

oil prices,

and the

rise in

GDP,

surrounding

has helped alleviate Russia's

decade of economic reform. The

main source of

bonds, Eurobonds, and the World

significant obstacles to raising revenues

State to effectively collect taxes and cut subsidies.

of

State revenues these

Yeltsin administration sought to solve budget problems by changing the

borrowing from the Central Bank

fragile, part

was an

inability

on behalf of the

With the implementation of a 13%

Russia's debt

is

now on

fiat

pace to become

the lowest in the Federation’s history.

In contrast to

GDP,

foreign direct investment (FD1) steadily

grew from 1994

1997 and then plummeted because of the economic collapse. After a slight

rise

to

between

1998 and 1999, FDI gradually
In

fell until

2002 when the downward trend sharply reversed.

2001, for example, outflow exceeded inflows, which meant that resources were sparse

when

they were most needed. Through the post Soviet period, several obstacles have

hampered FDI

in

Russia. Obstacles include concerns surrounding tax laws, property

rights, creditor rights,

macroeconomic

stability, political stability,

banking, accounting,

and corruption. Though FDI doubled between 2002 and 2004, Russia was

still

much
^

successful in attracting foreign investment than other Central European countries."

As

a whole, formal institutions

have been limited

and economic development. Russia established
strong legal system.

in

As

a result,

many of these

a

in

terms of fostering

political system, but the highly

informal power in such a

fully functioning

levels

way

that the

political

democratic constitution, but without a

provisions continue to be severely limited

terms of practical application. Furthermore, Russia has demonstrated

of the

less

w ide acceptance

popular President Putin has centralized formal and

system lacks many of the

institutional processes

of

Western democracies, such as a meaningful role for the opposition, low

of fraud, and low levels of violence. In

turn,

formal institutions have been largely

ineffective in promoting stable and representative government.

Formal

institutions

economy. After nearly

a

have been ineffective

in

promoting

a stable

new millennium witnessed reversing

indicators.

While such trends are promising, the net gain has been

trends in

two decades the

GDP has just begun to match

Therapy. This

not to suggest that capitalism will not

argued, but that payment

capitalist

decade of falling GDP, falling wages, and increasing budget

deficit, the

is

and

is

all

of these macroeconomic
limited. After nearly

levels that predate the beginning of

“pay” as

transition scholars

not guaranteed given Russia’s dependence on global
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Shock
have

oil

exports and greater attention to the process by which institutional reform was undertaken

most

likely

would have produced

economy. Today, Russia
institutions

(

more

equitable, efficient, legal, stable, and prosperous

struggles with creating the necessary formal and informal

of a fully functioning market economy, which limits

abroad, evident

Service

still

a

in a rising,

its

competitiveness

but inadequate FDI.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
In determining the best direction for studies

of democratic development

comparative political scholarship three basic questions must be addressed:

we

What has been

define democracy? 2)

as

detailed discussion of the

How

should

the focus in understanding democratic

development? 3) What should be the focus

The dominant paradigm,

1)

in

in

understanding democratic development?

Thomas Carothers

puts

it,

has been transitions theory.

development of transitions theory as a response

1

A

to

modernization theory was provided. Essentially, transition scholars understood the
transition process to

be dynamic, rather than based on preconditions, and emphasized the

establishment of elections and institutions in producing a functioning democracy.

As

map

for

Steven Fish observes, this focus has largely failed "to provide

a reliable

road

understanding regime change."'

As

1

institutions

see

it,

there are several reasons for this. First, a focus on elections and

under appreciates the lack of new

political

and economic

elites, particularly in

post-Soviet societies. In Ukraine and Russia, for example, prominent "democratic"
leaders have had previous careers in the former regime be

Yeltsin), secret service (Vladimir Putin), or

it

office holding (Boris

economic bureaucracy (Victor Yushchenko).

This has caused several development problems. Elites often lack training and experiences

with democratic norms and procedures in various capacities of government operation. As

one Western observer put
hours.

He

it,

"I've

been

to

meetings with Yushchenko. They

has no knowledge or experience of how to run things efficiently."

problems include a lack of transparency,

a general will to
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last

for

1

Other

moderate the pace of change

in

order to preserve traditional power structures, the consistent abuse of slate resources, a
general willingness to restrict civil liberties, and a general lack of motivation to be

genuinely accountable given the relatively limited nature of organized and sustained
popular pressure.

Second, a focus on elections and institutions under appreciates mixed public
sentiment regarding democracy, specifically the roles of institutional implementation

and international forces
the institutions

in

shaping these attitudes.

recommended by

As

Phillip

political scientists for

Roeder points

out,

deeply divided societies actually

aggravate the problems of political stability and thus undermine democracy ."
children are taught they live in a democracy based on rights granted

yet university students

commonly speak of the need

"many of

for justice

and

in the

4

Ukrainian

Constitution,

fairness, not

freedom

and democracy, when reflecting on the shortcomings of contemporary government.
In Russia,

list

meanwhile, the turbulent period of shock therapy propelled

of public

priorities for

stability

atop the

government, well ahead of abstract principles regarding the

role of government in society'.

Such observations do not intend

democracy should not be universally valued by those who study

to suggest that

its

development and

promotion. Rather, scholarly approaches must be particularly cognizant of how various
societies in the age of globalization conceive

of democracy and w hat the end

should be. Democracy as a form of government
that will

is a

process, but one by

its

result

basic nature

be undertaken with different cultural attitudes, values, and objectives that

constantly shape, even impede, development processes.
Third, a focus on elections and institutions under appreciates the lack of

meaningful and sustained

political organization

262

necessary for elections to

have governance and policy

Kennedy
in

most

state,

that

is

representative of public will.

As Ishiyama and

"where relatively stable patterns of partisan competition have emerged

states of the

former Soviet Union"

has taken the form of "pseudo-parties" that

it

are "largely shifting coalitions of individuals

unanchored

in

post

Communist

incapable of performing even the most basic functions of political parties."

society and

The problem

has not been an insufficient quantity of parties, but insufficient quality. In Ukraine and
Russia, for example, pseudo-parties center upon dominant political figures, rather than

platforms,

many of which come and go

In addition, civil society has

were made with the Gongadze

affair

with various elections.

been sporadic and disorganized.

Ukraine, strides

and Orange Revolution. Just a few years

however, Madan became a public space for parties
this flag or that flag

In

to

pay people

to stand

later,

around next

to

Many

each time the President and Prime Minister reached a standoff.

Ukrainians describe their politics as "a circus" where money, not collective action, speaks
the loudest. This

is

not surprising considering that even "free” medical care requires

informal payments to government practitioners to ensure adequate care.

As

a whole, a focus

on elections and

institutions

under appreciates the role of

personnel, attitudes, and organizations related to democratic development, particularly in

the Russia

and Ukraine. Criticizing various shortcomings of transitions theory

is

important, though regional scholars, particular of the former Soviet Union, have been

highly dismissive of any potential benefit of the transitions approach.

To

best

serve comparative political scholarship, “regionalists” and "transitologists” should

beyond

largely methodological debates like the ones

and others. Greater empirical debate that

clarifies
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move

between Bunce, O'Donnell, Karl,

and questions transitions theory would

be more useful to the study of democratic development as a whole. Such efforts

would help

establish consensus

among

should go from here. The world
interrelated

and accelerated

is full

political,

scholars and help determine where the literature

of diverse experiences in an age of highly

economic, and social change.

In turn,

pockets of

scholarship that share the general theme of democratic development will not remain
isolation long, nor should they. Conversely, universal generalizations that

comprehensive reflection and revision are of limited scholarly

between "regional ists” and
approach

is

benefit.

“transitologists” needs to be found in

A

fail to

in

face

middle ground

which the best of each

combined.

To move toward

middle way, scholars need to reconceptualize and refine

this

basic ideas toward democracy and democratic development in comparative political

scholarship in a

literature

way

that

people can understand, rather than simply expanding the

by constructing more abstract and elaborate models

recession of the third

w ave.

This begins by asking what

is

that focus

democracy

,

a

on obstructing
simply question

that has generated significant debate. Election centered definitions, as put forth

Schumpeter, even with the addition of civil
longer sufficient.

A working definition

liberties, as

by Joseph

put forth by Robert Dahl, are no

of democracy must incorporate the multifaceted

nature of the government system, yet be concise enough so as to be clearly

comprehended and

applied.

1

define democracy as the process by which popularly elected

representatives, legitimate government structures,

and active

civil society

combine

promote public good. This

is

to

form a

government recognized

political

a purposefully

system

that collectively seeks to

narrow definition

clarity.
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civil liberties,

to ensure

conceptual

much on

Transitologists have focused too

important dimensions of democracy. Democracy
solely the product of choices

made by key

actors.

institutions at the

is

expense of other

not institutionally determined, nor

As

such, the process must not be

thought of as simply building "the right track" and voting on

who

should drive for awhile.

This ignores important considerations such as desired destination, driving experience,
speed, council, maintenance, obstacles,

moving forward.

In turn,

democracy

etc., all

of which play an important

consists of several

components

role in

interacting: part

elected office holding, part institutions, part legal protections from government, part

popular organization and civic activity. Together these parts peacefully mediate conflict

and move society forward toward some conception of public good. Without one of these
parts, functioning

democracy

will

be very

difficult to attain, as

we have

seen

in

Ukraine

and Russia.
If transitions theory

Russia

to

target,

one would expect development

same time and

As Alexander Motyl

puts

it,

transitioned from the

Ukraine and

can follow."

6

same

authoritarian

however, "Ukraine and Russia are especially vivid,

and paradigmatic examples of diametrically opposed paths
states

in

be quite similar given that both countries established democratic elections and

institutions at relatively the

regime.

w as on

As Andrew Wilson

that the

USSR's successor

explains, "a decade and a half is not a particularly

long time, but the assumption that post-Soviet politics can be studied within the

framework of some kind of 'transition
untenable."

in its

This work seeks to

ow n words. To be

empirical rigor

in a

to

democracy' was always doubtful and

move beyond assumptions and engage

fair to the transitions

region where

many

is

now

transitions theory

approach, the model was tested with

other variables, such as timing, geography.
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history, culture, language,

and religion are

To my knowledge, no

similar.

critical

evaluation of this nature has yet taken place.

My
in

research question asked:

Have

elections

promoting political and economic development

and institutions been

in the former Soviet

argued that the predominant emphasis on elections and institutions

highly effective

Union?

among

My

thesis

transition

scholars has been largely ineffective in understanding democratic transitions in the

former Soviet Union and thus, hinders efforts
thesis

I

promote democracy. To evaluate

conducted in-depth case studies of Ukraine and Russia, two countries

historical

came

to

connection that dates back

to share

religion. If the

justified,

many

1

'

1

to the 9

that

then democratic development

have a

century and over the next 14 centuries

social commonalities including ethnicity, language, culture,

emphasis on elections and

this

institutions

of the transitions approach

and
is

Ukraine and Russia would have been relatively

in

successful and similar in each case because elections and institutions were established

and functioning early
the

in the transition process.

development experiences

ineffective,

transitions

1

in

This work, on the other hand, found that

Ukraine and Russia were highly divergent and

which strongly suggests

that the

emphasis on elections and

institutions in the

approach such be reconsidered.

created ten indicators to measure the effectiveness of elections in promoting

democratic development.

When

effective, elections

fundamentally promote the peaceful

and legitimate transition of power. Indicators of an effective electoral process include
holding frequent elections, high voter turnout, popular candidate selection, effective
oversight procedures to resolve electoral disputes, low levels of fraud, low levels of

violence,

wide acceptance of results, low

levels of
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media

favoritism, ideological variance

among

candidates, and candidates that represent stable and principled parties.

s

The

existence of these indicators were measured cumulatively, meaning what prevalent from

1991 to 2006, and currently, meaning what

measurements provided
development

in

a perspective

is

the

dominant trend as of 2006. Such

on both the norm and direction of post Soviet

each country.

Ukraine and Russia experienced several indicators of peaceful and legitimate
transition of

power from 1991 and 2006: frequent

turnout, popular selection of candidates, and

elections, strong levels of voter

wide acceptance of results.

In both countries

scheduled elections were never postponed or cancelled and the average turnout for
elections

was approximately 70%

laws permitted citizens

in

in

Ukraine and

67%

in Russia.

Respective electoral

both systems to popularly candidates. Both systems widely

accepted the results of elections, even fraudulent ones in the case of Ukraine.

Ukraine and Russia also consistently failed to experience certain indicators of
peaceful and legitimate transition of power, including low levels of fraud, low levels of
violence, and candidates that represent stable and principled political parties. In Ukraine,

electoral fraud

results

was

blatant throughout

were manipulated by

particularly under President

illegal

much of the

at the direction

Kuchma.

first

decade of independence. Official

of powerful members of the administration,

In Russia, the

dominant form of fraud was the

use of state resources to further the electoral advantages of politicians

in

power,

particularly those favorable to the President. Both had a significant and negative impact

on

a legitimate electoral process.

Ukraine and Russia have not had stable and principled parties as a norm of post
Soviet development. Parties have been numerous, but fleeting, and are typically centered
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upon candidates, rather than platforms. Given

this nature, party

typically held accountable by party leaders, not the other

dominant ruling coalitions

in

way

members have been

around. Interestingly, the

each country. Our Ukraine under Yushchenko and United

Russia under Putin, pursue very different political objectives with very different levels of
organizational solidarity. This points to the fact that

electoral

in

addition to

common

trends of

development, both positive and negative, Ukraine and Russia produced

divergent experiences with several indicators as well.

The media
particularly

in

Ukraine, for example, faced

under Kuchma, and now appears

for journalists, albeit tentatively.

strict

to be

Media favoritism

censorship throughout the

moving toward

1

990's,

greater independence

certainly exists in Ukraine, but certain

channels predominately support certain candidates, rather than one candidate dominating
the vast majority

of media coverage as

a

whole.

In Russia,

on the other hand, Yeltsin's

unpopularity during to his bid for reelection led to a massive and

illegal proliferation

of

pro-Yeltsin content in oligarch-controlled media networks, which laid a foundation for

Putin to slowly abolish independent media.

Ideological variance

electoral disputes,

among

candidates, effective oversight procedures to resolve

and low levels of violence are further examples of variance

in

Ukrainian and Russian development. Ukraine did not have genuine ideological variance

until

when

2002,

opposition and reform candidates formed their

in the

Rada

major

political figures,

In Russia,

elections. Since, there

own

parties to

compete

have been genuine and strong policy divisions between

such as President Yushchenko and Prime Minister Yanukovych.

on the other hand, there were very strong policy divisions between the

Communists, democratic reformers, and pro-presidential groups throughout
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the I990's,

whereas today, substantive policy divisions have faded under Putin and

his vast

consolidation of political power. In terms of oversight, Ukraine had electoral oversight

procedures

in

place since the

were ineffective

until the

first

election after independence, but these

mechanisms

Orange Revolution. Russia, meanwhile, demonstrated

relatively

effective electoral oversight procedures, particularly given their size, even though

democratic norms and behaviors have been significantly restricted under Putin.

Violence surrounding Ukrainian elections has been particularly dramatic by

Western standards. Candidates, supporters, and

political figures regularly

experienced

physical assault and destruction of property. Consecutive presidential elections witnessed

murder attempts. Natalya Vitrenko was supposedly wounded
attack, while

2004.

To

Yushchenko experienced

this day, the culprits

lethal

have not been publicly identified,

The Orange Revolution provides hope

but this

is

elections,

As

it

1999 by a grenade

amounts of the deadly poison dioxin

justice.

not yet certain.

in

for

let

in

alone brought to

genuine and lasting electoral change,

Though Russia has experienced some violence surrounding

has not been the same in nature or scale as Ukraine.

illuminated

ineffective in

in the figure

1

and figure

2, elections as a

promoting democratic development

moderately effective

in Russia.

moderately effective

in

in

whole were highly

Ukraine from 1991

to

2006, while

Currently, the situation in reversed. Elections are

promoting democratic development

in

now

Ukraine and ineffective

in

Russia. This suggests that the relationship between elections and democratic development

in

Ukraine and Russia has been and continues to be one of great variance

trajectory

and level of effectiveness.
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in

terms of the

Figure 3:
Electoral Indicators in Ukraine and Russia

Ukraine

Russia

Holding Frequent Elections

yes

yes

High Voter Turnout

yes

yes

Popular Candidate Selection

yes

yes

Wide Acceptance of Results

yes

yes

Low

Levels of Violence

no

yes

Low

Levels of Fraud

no

no

Low

Levels of Media Favoritism

no

Candidates Represent Stable and

no

no

2005)

(until

no

Principled Political Parties

Ideological Variance

no

(until

2002)

yes (until 2003)

Effective Oversight Procedures

no

(until

2005)

yes

to

Resolve Electoral Disputes

Figure 4:
Effectiveness Scale

When

all

indicators are present in a respective category, the

development process

is

considered exceptional. Conversely, lower percentages correspond with lower levels of
effectiveness.

If a

percentage of effectiveness

category will be considered highly ineffective

The

scale of effectiveness

is

case study

in a
in

falls

below 60%,

the

promoting their respective objectives.

as follows:

•

Scores between

60%

and

69%

will

be considered ineffective.

•

Scores between

70%

and

79%

will

be considered moderately effective.

•

Scores between

80%

and

89%

will

be considered effective.

•

Scores between

90%

and 100%
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will

be considered highly effective.

Figure

5:

Cumulative Electoral Scores

in

Ukraine and Russia
Ukraine

Russia

Cumulative Score

40%

70%

(1991-2006)

Elections ineffective

Moderately effective

Current Score

70%

60%

(As of 2006)

Moderately effective

Elections ineffective

Let us next see

how

institutions

compare

measure the effectiveness of democratic

development and
promoting

five indicators to

capitalist

development.

to elections.

institutions in

I

created five indicators to

promoting democratic

measures the effectiveness of institutions

When

effective, democratic institutions

promote stable and representative government

in the political

in

fundamentally

realm. Indicators of

effective institutional operation include the establishment of a democratic constitution,

low

levels

and

a

of corruption, low levels of violence, wide acceptance of the

meaningful role

for the opposition.

These indicators consider both formal and

informal aspects of institutional development and operation.

institutions

political system,

When

effective, democratic

fundamentally promote stable and sustained economic growth

economic realm. Indicators of effective

in the

institutional operation include a rising gross

domestic product, a balanced budget, significant privatization of state owned industries,
rising

wages, and rising foreign direct investment. These indicators focus on

macroeconomic
Since the

to

indicators that

fall

measure basic health of a developing economy.

of the Soviet Union, Ukraine and Russia have produced and failed

produce indicators of stable and representative government with relative similarity. For
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example, both countries established democratic constitutions and have experienced wide
acceptance of the political system. The mere establishment of democratic constitutions
ignores however the important role of the implementation process in each country.

Ukraine had the dubious distinction of being

last

former Soviet republic

to

adopt a

democratic constitution, while Russia adopted a democratic constitution after a violent
standoff between powerful factions that dominated two different powerful institutions,

the executive

and legislature. This suggests

that

formal measures of democratic

development embraced by transition scholars are limited
understand the deeper dynamics of development

in their ability to best

in transition countries.

Ukraine and Russia also experienced high levels of corruption and high levels of
violence without a meaningful role for the opposition in government. In a recent

w ith

the Minister

of Agriculture

in

Ukraine,

1

was astonished

visit

that in response to a

question regarding a specific law not being effectively enforced, the Minister simply

stated before a public

Ukraine

known

it's

that this

was Ukraine and

not hard to get around the law

fact in

if

you want

to.

like with

many

things in

This illuminates the well

both Ukraine and Russia that laws apply differently to different people and

as a result corruption

difficult to

audience

is

so

woven

even figure out where

political opposition is

into these political

to

systems

in a

way

that

makes

it

very

begin undoing the knot. In such situations, formal

very difficult to mount because without legitimacy and

transparency, political forces that control resources exert extraordinary formal and

informal influence.

To
the

the detriment of democratic development, violence

most divisive

institutional conflicts in post Soviet Russia

w as

integral in resolving

and even persisted

in

day

to

day Russian

politics. Several

Duma members

Victims have come from different

were murdered

parties, including

in while holding office.

Communists,

liberals, liberal

democrats, and pro-government forces. The murders appeared to be contract killings and

went unsolved. Such violence was emblematic of society as a whole. At the turn of the
century, official statistics of violent crimes in Russia and the prison population were

comparable

to the world’s

most criminalized countries. Violence

epidemic, but no less severe. Episodes have ranged from
secret decapitation

in

Ukraine was

fights in the

fist

less

Rada and

to the

of critical journalists by government insiders following orders from

the very top.

As with

political

measures, Ukraine and Russia shared similar experiences with

economic measures of institutions. Both countries produced
state

owned

industries and paid a high political

disingenuous, however, to categorize

this

and

significant privatization of

social price in

development as

doing

so.

It

would be

a success because of the

negative political, economic, legal, and social consequences that resulted from the

privitization process.

As

the

Orange government

grossly corrupt transition practices

is

in

Ukraine quickly realized, rectifying

very difficult to do without serious political and

economic repercussions. At the same time,

if

genuine reform

is

truly the goal,

it

is

also

very difficult to turn a blind eye toward such massive injustice. Putin, on the other hand,

was much

less

concerned about social

justice

and used the re-privization issue

consolidate power. Putin simply imprisoned and sought to imprison oligarchs

to

to

who

failed

adhere to the demands of the administration, stating throughout there would be no re-

privitizations. This

the resources

approach allowed the President to eliminate

of the State via seized

assets,

political rivals, increase

and maintain a positive public image because
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few Russians cared for wealthy individuals

who

obtained massive wealth via fraud and

corruption.

National budgets have not been consistently balanced

was

a significant

the Russian

problem during the

economy

1

made

the century, but the sustainability of such progress

turnaround

w as

Ukraine or Russia. This

990's, particularly during the

1998. Progress has been

in

in

is

in

economic collapse of

both countries since the turn of

uncertain. Ukraine's

economic

largely a product of Yushchenko's fiscal policies, the future of which are

uncertain given his falling popularity since 2004. Russia's economic turnaround

continues to be largely a product of high

oil prices,

rather than sound fiscal policies, the

future of which are also uncertain. In both societies, cutting

been very

difficult, but possible,

depending on the

was and

government spending has

political climate

and the

status

of

government revenues. Wages dropped throughout much of the 1990’s and then began
rise as the

economic

to

situations in each country improved.

Experiences with foreign direct investment (FDI) and economic production have
varied

more than

the previous indicators. Ukraine has slowly and steadily garnered

of the Soviet Union, whereas Russia experienced rising levels of FDI up

since the

fall

until the

1998 collapse,

countries.

FDI

FDI began

to

albeit surprisingly small

compared

to other

Eastern European

climb once again after the crash, though Putin's centralization

and the uncertainty surrounding the end of his term have been reasons for caution. Gross

Domestic Product (GDP)

grew

fairly steadily

in

Ukraine

from 1994

fell for

to 2004.

began, even worse than Ukraine, worse,

several years after the transition began, but

GDP

in

in fact,

274

Russia plummeted after the transition
than the Great Depression

in the

United

States. After the crash,

means

however,

GDP

grew on average about

7%

each year, providing a

for greater investment in restructuring and better equipping the military.

As

illuminated by the figures 3, figure, 4, and figure

between 1991 and 2006 were more similar

in

5, institutional

experiences

Ukraine and Russia than electoral

experiences over the same period. Importantly, however, institutional experiences were
consistently ineffective in promoting democratic development. This does not

mean

factors such as the establishment of a constitution and the privatization of state

that

owned

industries did not contribute to development, certainly they have. Rather, these findings

point to

how

development

the relationship

in

each country

between democratic
is

institutions

more complicated than

the

and democratic

mere existence of basic pieces

of democracy (a constitution) and capitalism (private property).

Figure

6:

Political

Measures of

Institutions in

Ukraine and Russia
Ukraine

Russia

yes

yes

yes

yes

Levels of Corruption

no

no

Meaningful Role for Opposition

no

no

Low

no

no

Establishment of Constitution

Wide Acceptance of

Low

Political

Levels of Violence

System
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Figure

7:

Economic Measures oflnstitutions

in

Ukraine and Russia

Ukraine

Russia

Significant Privatization

yes

yes

Rising Foreign Direct Investment

yes (slow, steady)

yes (up and down)

Balanced Budget

no

no

no (up since 2000)

no (up since 1999)

yes

no (up since 1999)

Rising

Wages

Rising Gross Domestic Product

Figure S

:

Cumulative

Institutional Scores in

Ukraine and Russia
Ukraine

Cumulative Score for
Political

Measurements

50%

Russia

60%

Institutions ineffective

Institutions ineffective

(1991-2006)

Cumulative Score for
Economic Measurements
(1991-2006)

Combined Score

for

Institutions (1991 -2006)

60%

40%

Institutions ineffective

55%

Institutions ineffective

50%

Institutions ineffective
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Institutions ineffective

As
in

whole, elections have been ineffective

a

in

Ukraine and moderately effective

Russia between 1991 and 2006, while institutions were consistently ineffective.

Clearly, the predominant focus of transition scholars needs to be rethought.

that elections

and

institutions

have some merit

in

Assuming

promoting development, scholars of

comparative political development need to reorient predominant understandings
transitions

away from

election-centered, institution-centered

development toward a multifaceted approach
fifteen years

more

country can

that incorporates the lessons

of post Soviet development. Essentially,

seriously considered aside

move toward

from

models of democratic

we must

of the

determine what should be

elections and institutions in understanding

a functioning

democracy.

1

last

how

a

label these considerations

"environments" and develop seven that are worth consideration:

1

)

popular environment;

2) historical-cultural environment; 3) international environment; 4) institutional

environment; 5) legal environment; 6) economic environment; 7)

Environments are chosen

Environments are
a process

to distinguish different aspects

static, yet

must be sustainable

to

civil

environment.

of democratic development.

be effective, and thus are constantly

in

of destruction and construction, creation and recreation, similar to the transition

process.

The popular environment concerns
given society.

should look

Key

like ?

the level

of desire

for

democracy within

questions to consider include: What do people think the

What do people

In evaluating the state

a

new regime

believe are the key objectives in reaching these goals?

of a popular environment, one must not assume democracy and

capitalism are universally desired goals and get

down

to

what aspects of a popular

government and a competitive economy are most appealing.
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If a

country

is

interested in

Western conceptions of democracy, then Western assistance should be made available. If

democracy

is

not the desired alternative, then such societies should not be forced on

Democracy

countries either explicitly or implicitly.

populace plays

a

is

form of government where the

a

unique and tremendous role in governance. Thus, public attitudes must

understood and embraced, rather than ignored or assumed.

The
that

tit

historical-cultural environment concerns the level of experiences and values

with democratic norms. Democracy does not develop

in a

variables constant, so history will impact the transition process.

include: Is there a history

the state of historical-cultural environment one must not

easily

is

Key questions

all

to consider

of democracy? What was the impact on society? Why did

democracy or related components breakdown and/or fail

democracy

laboratory with

beneficial in considering

to

be effective? In evaluating

assume

that

any history of

contemporary development. Democracies can

produce undemocratic leadership and trends

that

may have

on

a strong influence

the value a society places on popular governance. History and culture does not absolutely

limit or guarantee

democratic development; however, history and culture does provide a

context in which contemporary attitudes and reforms can be better understood.

The

international environment concerns external influences on development in a

given country. Key questions to consider include: What external groups have a stake
the

new regime? How involved are

external groups in the transition process'*

What

in

is

the

impact of this involvement? Throughout the third wave of democratic transitions external
influences have played a significant role in the nature and process of regime change,

particularly in the former Soviet Union.

Given

international context of globalization,

is difficult

it
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that

contemporary

politics transpires in

fora society to undergo massive

transformation without consideration of external incentives or disincentives. In addition

to States,

intergovernmental organizations and nongovernmental organizations

tremendous influence over a given

territory, as well as non-state actors,

or criminal organizations. In turn, international relations

domestic history and culture

The

institutional

addresses. Elections

and

institutions

must be considered alongside

a

good

part

of what transitions theory

do these conditions effectively encapsulate the process. Basic

democracy

implemented ?

to

and mechanisms, such as national elections,

Key questions

develop.

important and

distort institutional operation.

This

is

consider include:

may

How were

implementation? In evaluating

one must not assume

elections and institutions are solely beneficial to

is

to

How have they operated since

the state of the institutional environment,

implementation process

terrorist

institutions are an important part of a transition process, but

structures, such as a legislature,

are necessary for

wield

context in which a transition occurs.

environment concerns

neither alone, nor together,

government

to ascertain the

such as

may

that the

very existence of

development because the

intentionally manipulate or unintentionally

particularly evident in post Soviet societies.

The legal environment concerns

the degree to

Formal mechanisms, such as elections and

which

institutions, will

a

given society

mean very

little

is

law-based.

without

transparency, widespread adherence to established legal procedures, and government

How

protected civil liberties.

Key questions

government activity?

there widespread adherence to constitutional

Is

to consider include:

transparent

and legal

provisions? Are there effective judicial bodies that mediate constitutional
disputes? In evaluating the state of a legal environment one must not

is

and legal

assume

that

because transition societies have formal documents that establish certain political and
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legal

procedures that these procedures are regularly and effectively implemented,

respected, and mediated

when

there

is

a dispute.

The economic environment concerns
in a given society. If

the state of the

economic conditions are unstable or

decline, this will certainly have a negative impact

public opinion.

transition

Key

the previous regime?

quality of life

steady and prolonged

on development objectives and related

Are people

questions to consider include:

began? Under

in

economy and

Do people

better off than

when

the

believe they are better ojjl In

evaluating the state of an economic environment one must not under appreciate the

potentially devastating impact that rapid

individuals and reform objectives.

economic transformation can have on

The business perspective of cutting your

loses as

quickly as possible or the belief that opportunities must be maximized

in

some mythical

"window of opportunity" ignores

in

dramatic social

change.

It

is

people hang

the basic

humanity of those involved

important to not lose sight of the fact that the security and savings of average
in the

balance while they try to

make

sense of new obstacles and

opportunities by navigating around wealthy and/or criminal elements that can dominate

chaotic political scenarios. If basic quality of

life is

not maintained during the

transition process, or at least quickly reestablished, the

development goals

The

civil

will be severely

complicated

environment concerns the

society. This includes parties, blocs,

state

if not

achievement of long term

compromised.

of political organization within a given

and coalitions, as well as other forms of collective

organization outside of government, such as interest groups, civic groups, and think

tanks. If there are

government,

it

no sustained forms of collective organization inside or outside of

w ill be

very difficult for a system of governance to determine and

2X0

work

towards some conception of public good. Key questions to consider

are:

Does

the country

have stable and representative parties? Are there public groups outside of government
that

can

effectively

communicate

their policy goals to society

concept of civil society has received a

Democracy

scholars

must be

careful,

lot

of attention

in recent

years as

it

should.

however, not think of civil society as a magic

of sorts. Collective organization can be very effective

and transparency of systems

and government? The

in transition, but this

in

bullet

promoting greater accountability

only one of many important

components.

These seven democratic environments must
or partially, for democracy to develop.

enough

to be generally

genuinely

difficult

we commonly

hear

it

is

in

The

interact together, not exist separately

ideas behind the environments are simple

comprehended, yet complicated enough
for

democracy

to develop.

arguments surrounding the

to appreciate

how

Democratic development takes time, as
state

of affairs

in Iraq, but

more

accurately, development takes an array of political, economic, and social changes that

must effectively complement one another. This

is

something America must clearly

understand about the dynamics of democratic development

promote

it

order to effectively

around the world.

Now

more than

ever, scholars of comparative political

of new and effective ways

to explain the

The predominant emphasis on

throughout

this

proponents

in

time has silently

development need

to think

myriad of development scenarios that have

emerged since Rustow and Huntington pioneered
ago.

in

the transitions

elections and institutions

become core

approach over 30 years

which has persisted

perspectives of many

democracy

and out of academia and government. This research has clearly shown

that

such a focus

democracy

is

is

Hawed and provided some

and

how

it

basic suggestions for

how

to rethink

what

develops. Hopefully, greater dialogue will emerge over the

usefulness and effectiveness of the transitions approach and the counterapproach

presented. Forging

study

is

new and

better perspectives in this very important

of the utmost importance

to

and timely area of

comparative political development and the future

American foreign policy making.

'

See Carothers, Thomas. “The End of the Transition Paradigm.” Journal of Democracy. 13.2

(2002), 5-21.
2

’

4
''

999), 798

Fish

(

This

comment was made

1

off the record

in

Lviv, 2006.

Roeder (1999), 855.
Ishiyama and Kennedy (2001 ), 177.
Motyl (1997), 433.
Wilson (2005), 273.
This research was confined to the study of national
I

'

elections.
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